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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY FOR
BETTER SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is a process that allows IT managers to balance between cost of the
protective measures and gains in mission capability. A system administrator has to make
a decision and choose an appropriate security plan that maximizes the resource utiliza-
tion. However, making the decision is not a trivial task. Most organizations have tight
budgets for IT security; therefore, the chosen plan must be reviewed as thoroughly as
other management decisions.
Unfortunately, even the best-practice security risk management frameworks do not
provide adequate information for effective risk management. Vulnerability scanning and
penetration testing that form the core of traditional risk management, identify only the set
of system vulnerabilities. Given the complexity of today’s network infrastructure, it is not
enough to consider the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in isolation. Materializing a
threat strongly requires the combination of multiple attacks using different vulnerabilities.
Such a requirement is far beyond the capabilities of current day vulnerability scanners.
Consequently, assessing the cost of an attack or cost of implementing appropriate security
controls is possible only in a piecemeal manner.
In this work, we develop and formalize new network vulnerability analysis model.
The model encodes in a concise manner, the contributions of different security conditions
that lead to system compromise. We extend the model with a systematic risk assessment
iii
methodlogy to support reasoning under uncertainty in an attempt to evaluate the vulnera-
bility exploitation probability. We develop a cost model to quantify the potential loss and
gain that can occur in a system if certain conditions are met (or protected). We also quan-
tify the security control cost incurred to implement a set of security hardening measures.
We propose solutions for the system administrator’s decision problems covering the area
of the risk analysis and risk mitigation analysis. Finally, we extend the vulnerability as-
sessment model to the areas of intrusion detection and forensic investigation.
Nayot Poolsappasit
Department of Computer Science
Colorado State University
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Every organization has objective, asset, and mission to protect. These days, all or-
ganizations make use of automated information technology (IT) systems to process their
missions for greater benefits. The head of an organizational unit must ensure that the
organization has the capabilities needed to accomplish its missions. From the security
perspective, the organization needs the capabilities that allow it to maintain the desired
level of security in the face of real world threats. Risk management plays a critical role
in determining the security capabilities to protect an organizations information assets and
carry on its missions from IT-related risks. An effective risk management is an essential
part of a successful IT project.
Risk management is a process that allows IT managers to balance between cost of
the protective measures and gains in mission capability. A system administrator has to
make a decision and choose an appropriate security plan that maximizes the resource
utilization. However, making the decision is not a trivial task. Most organizations have
tight budgets for IT security; therefore, the chosen plan must be reviewed as thoroughly
as other management decisions.
Risk management is broken into three components namely risk assessment, risk mit-
igation, and evaluation. Risk assessment is a process of determining the extent of negative
impacts associated with the system. The output of this process helps decision maker to
identify appropriate controls for reducing the risk in the risk mitigation process. Risk
mitigation consists of several analysis methodologies which are used to prioritize risk
and choosing the appropriate risk-reducing measures. The evaluation process includes a
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process of risk acceptance which requires senior management to sign a statement accept-
ing the residual risk and authorizing the security hardening operation. A well-structured
risk management methodology, when used effectively, can help management identify ap-
propriate controls for providing the mission-essential security capabilities.
In summary, risk management is the process of identifying risk, assessing risk, and
taking steps to reduce risk to an acceptable level. Security Risk Management plays a
vital role in protecting information, assets, business missions, and secrets from potential
risks. Although each of these processes is equally important but we can not deny that the
success key in IT security relies on the perfection of risk identification process. Unfor-
tunately, even the best-practice risk management framework does not provide adequate
information for effective risk management. More specifically, most traditional security
risk management process ultimately boils down to only vulnerability identification for
identifying the list of system vulnerabilities. Given the complexity of today’s network
infrastructure, it is not enough to consider the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in
isolation. Materializing a threat strongly requires the combination of multiple attacks us-
ing different vulnerabilities. Such a requirement is far beyond what typical vulnerability
scanner can give.
1.1 Problem Statement
The goal of vulnerability identification is to determine an extent of negative impacts
associated with the system. The output of this process helps decision maker to identify
appropriate controls for reducing the risk in the risk mitigation process. Typically, vulner-
ability assessment relies heavily on developing a list of system vulnerabilities using vul-
nerability scanner or penetration testing. My research shows that the traditional practice
has at least two major drawbacks. First, traditional vulnerability scanners merely identify
a list of individual vulnerabilities but are unable to depict the correlations between these
vulnerabilities. Modern day attacks rely on exploiting multiple vulnerabilities in a cor-
related manner. Given the complexity of today’s network infrastructure, it is not enough
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to consider the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in isolation. Second, the value of
the penetration testing relies on the thoroughness of the testing scenarios, testing level,
and expertise of the testers. Penetration testing as practiced today is not a systematic
approach and does not guarantee completeness. Consequently, since the risk mitigation
analysis takes the input from the vulnerability assessment, then the cost-benefit analysis
would be mostly flat in structure. Then the choice of security controls would then be
determined by uncorrelated knowledges which do not describe the actual root cause of
security risk.
What is needed is a systematic approach that models threats against the system.
The model should allow system administrators to understand the actual outline of the
network vulnerability and help them manage the risk in a proper manner. Researchers
have proposed many vulnerability models using paradigms like attack graph [12, 38, 50,
62, 65] or attack tree [25, 43, 52, 60] to identify attack scenarios. But merely determining
possible attack scenarios is not enough to help the system administrators make appropriate
decisions. They are more interested in determining the best strategy to strengthen the
system. Keeping this in mind, I propose the security model that not only captures ways in
which the system can be attacked but also supports the calculations in risk analysis. The
proposed model uses the concept of attack tree paradigm.
1.2 Research Goals and Contribution
Towards an Efficient vulnerability analysis methodology, there are three goals of the
study.
1. To formalize the systematic model of the vulnerability assessment that outlines the
universe of possible consequences following a successful attack. In addition, we
wish to instantiate this abstraction to obtain a systematic method that automates the
vulnerability assessment process.
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2. To develop the pragmatic risk mitigation methodology to assist the security deci-
sion. In particular, we are interested to solve the system administrator’s dilemma in
choosing the best security hardening strategy that maximizes the resource utiliza-
tion as an optimization problem and progressively transform it into the next to cater
to more cost-benefit information as may be required by the decision maker.
3. Finally, we wish to evaluate the possibility of utilizing the proposed abstraction in
the area of intrusion detection and forensic investigation.
Toward this end, this work makes five major contributions. First, it refines and for-
malizes the notion of network vulnerability assessment model so as to encode the contri-
bution of different security conditions leading to system compromise. Second, it extends
the assessment model to encode with the systematic risk assessment analysis to support
the reasoning framework under uncertainty in an attempt to predict the vulnerability ex-
ploitation probability. Third, it proposes a cost model to quantify the potential loss and
gain that can occur in a system if a certain condition are met (or protected). The model
also quantifies the security control cost incurred to implement a set of security hardening
measures. Forth, it proposes solutions for the system administrator’s decision problems
covering the area of the risk analysis and risk mitigation analysis. Fifth, it extends the
vulnerability assessment model to the areas of intrusion detection and forensic investi-
gation. Last but not the least we discuss our thoughts and observations regarding to the
assessment model, in particular the critical sections and robust solutions, with a belief
that such this observation will help the system administrator decide what methodology to
adopt.
1.3 Dissertation Outline
The proposal is organized as the following. Chapter 2 presents the background of
risk management process covering risk assessment, risk mitigation, and ISMS security
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best-practice. Chapter 3 presents the literature review. It covers the related works in
the areas of vulnerabilities model, assessment methodologies, intrusion detection, and
forensic investigation. In Chapter 4, I give the test-bed network to illustrate the problem
and address technical challenges in designing security hardening strategies. The network
security risk assessment model is formulated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 describes an ap-
proach to represent and generate attack model given vulnerabilities and network topology
information. In the Chapter 7, we formulate the problem of security risk analysis and
develop a systematic approach to solve the problem using genetic algorithm and an attack
tree model of the system. The risk model lends itself to optimal cost-benefit analysis in
finding effective solutions for security hardening. Chapter 8 proposes dynamic risk as-
sessment framework using Bayesian networks to enable a system administrator quantifies
the chances of network compromise at various levels and shows how to use this infor-
mation to develop a security mitigation and management plan. In Chapter 9 we develop
an algorithm for intent-based intrusion detection system to detect threats from malicious
insiders who can execute perfectly legitimate operations to compromise the system. The
algorithm generates minimal forms of an attack tree customized for each user such that
it can be used efficiently to monitor the users activities. If the users activities progress
sufficiently up along the branches of the attack tree towards the goal of system compro-
mise, the system can correctly predict the outcome and timely generates an alarm. Finally,
chapter 11 summarizes the whole research and outlines the significants of network risk
models and risk management process in supporting capabilities that allow IT business to
maintain the desired level of security in the face of real world threats.
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND ON RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management is a process that allows IT managers to balance between costs of
protective measures and gains in mission capabilities. The objective of performing risk
management is to enable the organization to accomplish its mission by increasing the
security level of the IT systems, enabling management to make well-informed risk man-
agement decisions to justify the expenditures that are part of an IT budget and assisting
management in authorizing or accrediting the IT systems on the basis of the supporting
documentation resulting from the performance of risk management.
Risk management is broken into three major components namely risk assessment,
risk mitigation, and evaluation. Each can be briefly described as follow.
2.1 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a process of determining the extent of negative impacts associated
with the system. The output of this process helps decision maker identify appropriate
controls for reducing the risk in the risk mitigation process. NIST SP800-30 [64] divides
the risk assessment process into nine steps listed as follow:
Step 1 System Characterization: Identify the boundaries of the IT system along with
the resources and the information that constitute the system. The goal of this step
is to establish the scope of the risk assessment effort, delineate the operational au-
thorization (or accreditation) boundaries, and provide information (e.g., hardware,
software, system connectivity, and responsible division or support personnel) es-
sential to define the risk.
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Step 2 Threat Identification: Identify the potential threat-sources, motivations and ac-
tions. The goal of this step is to realize the threat model by listing potential threat-
sources along with the motivations and actions that are applicable to the IT system
being evaluated.
Step 3 Vulnerability Identification: Identify the flaws or misconfigurations that can be
accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited. The goal of this step is to develop
a list of system vulnerabilities that could be exploited by potential threat-sources.
Step 4 Control Analysis: The goal of this step is to analyze the security measures that
already been implemented or planned to be implemented by the organization to
minimize or eliminate the likelihood of a threat’s exercising a system vulnerability.
Step 5 Likelihood Determination: Estimate the overall likelihood rating that indicates
the probability that a potential vulnerability may be exploited under the threat envi-
ronment (threat-sources, nature of vulnerability and level of security controls). The
likelihood can be expressed as high, medium and low. NIST gives the descriptions
of these quantitative measure in Table 2.1.
Likelihood Level Definition
High The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and controls to
prevent the vulnerability from being exercised are ineffective.
Medium The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place that may
impede successful exercise of the vulnerability.
Low The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place to
prevent, or at least significantly impede, the vulnerability from being exercised.
Table 2.1: Likelihood Definitions (Source G. Stoneburner et. al.,“Risk Management
Guide for Information Technology Systems”, NIST SP 800-30, 2002).
Step 6 Impact Analysis: Estimate the level of risk by determining the adverse impact
resulting from a successful threat exercise of a vulnerability. This information can
be obtained from existing organization documents, such as the mission analysis re-
port or asset criticality assessment report. A mission analysis prioritizes the impact
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levels associated with the compromise of information assets. An asset critical-
ity assessment identifies and prioritizes an organization’s information assets (e.g.,
hardware, software, systems, services, and related technology assets) that support
the organization’s critical missions.
Step 7 Risk Determination: The final determination of mission risk is derived by mul-
tiplying the ratings assigned for likelihood and impact. The purpose of this step is
to assess the level of risk to the IT system.
Step 8 Control Recommendations: The control recommendations are the results of the
risk assessment process and are inputs to the risk mitigation process. During this
step, the recommended procedural or technical security controls are identified to
reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level. It should be noted that not all possible
recommended controls can be implemented to reduce loss. A security administrator
has to assess the security controls by conducting a cost-benefit analysis to verify
that the costs of implementing the controls are worth for the investment. The cost-
benefit analysis is covered in risk mitigation analysis.
Step 9 Results Documentation: Once the risk assessment has been completed, the re-
sults should be documented in an official report or briefing to help decision makers
reach decisions on policy, procedural, budget, and system operational and manage-
ment changes.
2.2 Risk Mitigation
Risk mitigation involves prioritizing, evaluating and implementing the appropriate
risk-reducing controls recommended from the risk assessment process. Risk mitigation
can be achieved through any of the following options:
• Research and Acknowledgment: To acknowledge the potential vulnerability or flaw
and researching controls to correct the vulnerability
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Figure 2.1: Risk Assessment Methodology Flow Chart (Adapted from G. Stoneburner
et. al.,“Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems”, NIST SP 800-30,
2002)
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• Risk Avoidance: To avoid the risk by eliminating the risk cause and/or consequence
(e.g., forgo certain functions of the system or shut down the system when risks are
detected)
• Risk Limitation: To limit the risk by implementing controls that minimize the ad-
verse impact of a threat’s exercising a vulnerability (e.g., use of supporting, preven-
tive, detective controls)
• Risk Tolerance: To implement controls to lower the risk to an acceptable level and
accept the remaining risk that can potentially cause damages while continuing the
operation of the IT system.
• Risk Transference: To transfer the risk by using other options to compensate for the
loss, such as purchasing insurance.
The goal of risk mitigation is to consider in selecting any of these options. Certainly,
it may not be practical to address all identified risks, so priority should be given to the
vulnerabilities that have the potential to cause significant mission impact or harm. Also,
in safeguarding an organization’s missions and its IT systems, each organization has its
own environment and objectives. Hence, the option(s) used to mitigate the risk and the
methodologies may vary. The following are steps toward the risk mitigation analysis.
Step 1 Prioritize Actions: Based on the risk levels presented in the risk assessment re-
port, the implementation actions are prioritized. In allocating resources, top priority
should be given to risk items with are dangerously high. These items will require
immediate corrective actions to protect an organization’s interest and mission.
Step 2 Evaluate Recommended Control Options: The controls recommended in the
risk assessment process may not be the most appropriate and feasible options for
a specific organization and IT system. During this step, the feasibility (e.g., com-
patibility, user acceptance) and effectiveness (e.g., degree of protection and level of
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risk mitigation) of the recommended control options are analyzed. The objective is
to select the most appropriate control option for minimizing risk.
Step 3 Conduct Cost-Benefit Analysis: To aid management in decision making and to
identify cost-effective controls, a cost-benefit analysis is conducted. Cost-benefit
analysis is the process that allows system administrators to find a trade-off between
the cost of implementing security hardening measures, and the gains in mission
objectives results from implementing the security control. With cost-effectiveness
in mind, system administrators can find out how to spend the resources to strengthen
the system to balance the operation and economic cost of protective measures and
achieve gains in mission capability.
Step 4 Select Control: On the basis of the results of the cost-benefit analysis, manage-
ment determines the most cost-effective control(s) for reducing risk to the organi-
zation’s mission. The controls selected should combine technical, operational, and
management control elements to ensure adequate security for the IT system and the
organization.
Step 5 Assign Responsibility: Appropriate persons who have the appropriate expertise
and skill-sets to implement the selected control are identified, and responsibility is
assigned.
Step 6 Develop a Safeguard Implementation Plan: The safeguard implementation
plan prioritizes the implementation actions and projects the start and target
completion dates. This plan will aid and expedite the risk mitigation process.
Step 7 Implement Selected Control(s): Executing selected controls in the safeguard
implementation.
Depending on the situations, the implemented controls may lower the risk level but
not eliminate the risk. The remaining risk after the implementation of security controls is
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called “residual risk”. Hence, the residual risk is an outcome of the risk mitigation analy-
sis. Figure 2.2 shows the flowchart of risk mitigation process. Note that, as mandated by
OMB Circular A-130 [9], the intent of this process is to identify risks that are not fully
addressed and to determine whether additional controls are needed to mitigate the risks
identified in the IT system. For federal agencies, after the appropriate controls have been
put in place for the identified risks, organization’s senior management needs to sign a
statement accepting any residual risk and authorizing the operation of the new IT system
or the continued processing of the existing IT system. If the residual risk has not been
reduced to an acceptable level, the risk management cycle must be repeated to identify a
way of lowering the residual risk to an acceptable level.
2.3 Risk Evaluation
This section emphasizes good practice and need for an ongoing risk evaluation and
assessment and the factors that will lead to a successful risk management program. In
most organizations, the network itself will continually be expanded and updated, its com-
ponents changed, and its software applications replaced or updated with newer versions.
In addition, personnel changes will occur and security policies are likely to change over
time. These changes mean that new risks will surface and risks previously mitigated may
again become a concern. Thus, the risk management process is ongoing and evolving.
As mandated by OMB Circular A-130, the risk assessment process must regularly repeat
at least every three years for federal agencies. Following the best practice, risk manage-
ment should be conducted and integrated in the Software Development Life Cycle of IT
systems, not because it is required by law or regulation, but because it supports the or-
ganization’s business objectives or mission. A successful risk management program will
rely on (1) senior management’s commitment; (2) the full support and participation of the
IT team; (3) the competence of the risk assessment team, which must have the expertise
to apply the risk assessment methodology to a specific site and system; (4) the aware-
ness and cooperation of members of the user community, who must follow procedures
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Figure 2.2: Risk Mitigation Methodology Flow Chart (Adapted from G. Stoneburner
et. al.,“Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems”, NIST SP 800-30,
2002)
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and comply with the implemented controls to safeguard the mission of their organization;
and (5) an ongoing evaluation and assessment of the IT-related mission risks. A well-
structured risk management methodology, when used effectively, can help management
identify appropriate controls for providing the mission-essential security capabilities.
Chapter 3
RELATED WORKS
Figure 3.1: Research Areas in Security Risk Management
Security risk management research is a complex area. It encompasses four aspects
namely risk assessment, risk mitigation, security best-practice, and security technology.
There are many research groups behind the development of security risk management
research. This chapter presents works in the areas that are relevant to our research. We
organize this chapter into four major areas including risk modeling, risk assessment anal-
ysis, intrusion detection, and forensic investigation.
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3.1 Risk Modeling
Most traditional risk analysis frameworks rely heavily on the list of vulnerabili-
ties obtained from the vulnerability scanner tools. A number of commercial and non-
commercial scanning tools such as SAINT, Nessus, and Snort [6, 7, 29, 54, 70] evaluate
the security risk of a network by developing a list of vulnerabilities per host basis. When
evaluating the security of a network, it is not enough to simply consider the presence or
absence of vulnerabilities in isolation. The major disadvantage of the vulnerability list is
that it does not consider the network properties. Therefore, it cannot correlate local vul-
nerabilities to depict the global vulnerability introduced by the interconnections between
hosts.
Graph-based models have been proposed to address this problem. Graph-based mod-
els have gained more acceptance as the method allows analysts to analyze the threats from
both outside and inside of the network. In addition, Graph-base models can analyze risk
to a specific network asset, or examine the universe of possible consequences follow-
ing a successful attack. The system could be used to test the effectiveness of making
configuration changes, implementing an intrusion detection system, etc. Among these
representations, attack graph [37, 50, 53, 55, 63] and attack tree [31, 23, 60] are the two
most general accepted models. Attack graphs depict ways in which an adversary exploits
system vulnerabilities to achieve undesirable states. Paths in an attack graph represent
different attack scenarios which attackers may use to achieve undesirable states (e.g. sys-
tem compromise, DOS, information leakage, etc.). Node in attack graphs represents an
individual attack.
On the other hand, attack trees have been proposed as a systematic method to spec-
ify system security based on varying attacks. An attack tree helps organize intrusion
and/or misuse scenarios by utilizing known vulnerabilities in the system, analyzing sys-
tem dependencies, and representing these dependencies in the form of an And-Or tree.
An often-cited criticism of attack trees (vis-a-vis attack graphs) is that they are not able
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to model cycles and time dependencies. However, we believe that this criticism is valid
only in cases where attack trees are used to represent a sequence of operations leading
to attacks, not when it is used to represent the dependency of system states. Another
criticism on attack trees is that they tend to become more unwieldy than attack graphs.
Our argument on this criticism is that both attack trees and attack graphs have their own
advantage and disadvantage. In fact, it is merely a different view of the network security
risk model. Therefore, it is not possible to make a sound judgment as to which model is
better. An appropriate model is chosen by the favor and nature of usage.
3.2 Risk Assessment Analysis
The management of IT security risk is a major concern to organizations and govern-
ments worldwide. A lot of efforts are invested to improve the risk management process.
Hence, numbers of risk assessment models have been proposed so far. In addition, we
could see that the government sectors play an important role to develop and standardize
the risk management frameworks. These models include CRAMM, EBIOS, and NIST
[4, 44, 64]. With slight differences in the implementation, most traditional risk analysis
frameworks evaluate the risk level following the classical equation:
Risk = Impact×Likelihood (3.1)
We have also found that all risk assessment frameworks do not specify which method to be
used to mitigate risk. Instead, they encourage security administrators to choose appropri-
ate methodologies to manage their own risks. A numbers of works have been proposed so
far [3, 12, 53, 55, 37, 47, 69]. We can categorize these methodologies into minimization
analysis, maximization analysis, optimization analysis, and simulation-based analysis.
The goal of minimization analysis is to identify the set of elements that, when they
are implemented (or prevented), minimizes the expense. Some known analyses are least-
cost analysis, least-effort analysis and minimal set of preventive measurements. Unlike
18
the minimization analysis, security administrators also use maximization analysis to find
the attack scenarios that are most likely to happen. In this case, the probability is used
to assess such a scenario. Note that choosing an appropriate data structure is critical.
Many researchers have found that using the attack graph in the maximization analysis
may suffer from NP-complete as, in many cases, maximizing the values is equivalent to
choosing the longest path in the network. Phillips et al. [50] found that in some cases, we
can transform the maximization to minimization problem by simply negating the assess-
ment values. However, not all maximization problems can be converted to minimization
analysis. Beside the minimization and maximization analysis, more often, the system ad-
ministrator has to work within a given set of budget constraints. Given a set of security
measures, the security administrators have to design a security plan that maximizes the
use of these countermeasures and minimizes the cost of implementation. In its most gen-
eral form, the problem is NP-hard. Phillips et al. [20] try to use bi-criteria shortest-path
algorithms to compute the near-optimal cost-benefit analysis. However, scalability is an
awful disadvantage to this approach.
The last group of risk analysis includes those that do not belong to any of the pre-
vious categories. Simulations are what-if analysis types that have their own specific use.
For example, Dacier et al. [3] compute the Mean Time to Failure (METF) by simulat-
ing the network penetration from an attacker stand point. Jha et al. [37] introduce the
reach ability analysis. Given a set of security controls, the reach ability analysis identifies
whether the network is safe if a chosen set of security controls are implemented. In many
occasions, security administrators may want to simulate the what-if analysis to assess
the consequence of the changes such as network configuration, topology, or application,
firewall technology, etc.
Of all different analysis presented, different models were designed to be used for
each specific method and the performance of the analysis relies heavily on the chosen
meta model. We have seen some attempts regarding the problem transformation but the
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transformation can be implemented in some cases but not all. There is no sufficient re-
search concerning the unified model for generic usages in risk analysis methodologies
and the problem of security optimization tends to be the most challenging problem.
3.3 Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection systems can be broadly classified into two groups: knowledge-
based systems and behavior-based systems [28]. Knowledge-based detectors [56, 61, 42]
are the most popular techniques. A numbers of commercially available intrusion detection
tools are knowledge-based detectors. These tools operate by processing system audit
data for signatures of known attacks and/or specific outcomes of interest. The result of
this processing is compared against signatures of specific attacks and vulnerabilities. A
positive match signals an intrusion.
Knowledge-based detectors tend to be fairly accurate in the sense that they have low
rates of false positives. However, they are limited by their inability to detect new attacks
for which there are no known signatures. Any action that is not recognized as an attack
is considered acceptable. Behavior-based detectors, on the other hand, take the paranoid
approach everything that has not been witnessed before is considered dangerous. To op-
erate, these systems compare the observed behavior of the system and/or the users against
a model of normal (or expected) behavior. Any deviation from the normal behavior is
considered an intrusion. Behavior-based systems are often considered complete, that is,
all attacks (even previously not known attacks) can be caught. However, the accuracy of
these systems is often low. Behavior-based systems need to undergo extensive training
sessions to determine what constitutes normal behavior. During this phase these systems
tend to generate false alarms at a very high rate. In addition, such systems require peri-
odic on-line retraining. This results in either unavailability of the system or generation of
false alarms till such time as the system is retrained.
The Intrusion Detection approach is not a perfect solution for security hardening by
at least two concerns. First, it is not possible to make a sound and objective judgment
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as to which type of intrusion detection system is better. In addition, an ideal intrusion
detection system is the most difficult to build because it needs to address a set of rather
tough and often contradictory requirements.
A second concern with intrusion detection systems is that they generate alerts only
after they are able to see misused signatures or some deviations from norm. A malicious
activity may result from a sequence of perfectly innocuous activities. Intrusion detection
systems do not report on these activities mostly to prevent information overload for the
system administrator. Thus the intrusion detection system generates an alarm only after
the cause for alarm has occurred. In many situations however, this may already be too
late.
3.4 Forensic Investigation
Digital forensic investigation is the process of identifying and preserving digital evi-
dences to reveal the fact in computer crime incidences. Works previously done in this area
are related to the development of standard investigation process [14, 49, 51], evidence ex-
traction technology [48, 15, 69], and evidence preservation methods. This dissertation
scopes itself into the area of evidence extraction technology. Following a large scale
computer attack, an investigator often needs to make a reasoned determination of who
is responsible for the attack incidence and how the system is compromised in order to
assess the actual damage and determine how to reinstate back to the last normal state. Ev-
idence extraction and analysis techniques offered by digital forensic tools can be broadly
classified into two groups; pattern-matching-base and statistic-base methodologies.
Pattern matching approaches use tools such as nmap, netcat, memdump, or CERTs
liveview [1, 5, 8, 11] to perform a keywords-search operation on potential evidence
sources including standard operating data or application components for signatures of
known attacks such as specific words, file classifications, images, etc. Even if the speed
of standard operation is increased, the process remains too manual and relies heavily on
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skill and experience of the investigators. In contrast, statistic-based analysis examines the
potential evidence sources to identify the content that is distant away from others (e.g. a
file that has been processed by unaccustomed process [15] or an image that is subjected to
atypical image transformations [48, 69]. However, statistic analysis processes often fail
to produce a satisfactory results and require substantial CPU resources to handle a huge
amount of data. Hence, the data-reduction method and/or process distribution are often
used to reduce case turnaround time.
In summary, much work needs to be done. We can summarize the current state and
challenges facing evidence extraction and analysis as the following.
• There is currently no standard model for evidence analysis. The evidence sources
often contain raw data which is hard for humans to interpret and there is no mini-
mum requirement for information that needs to be analyzed.
• There is currently no established procedure for filtering and retrieving information
from the potential evidence sources other than a sequential backward scan from the
most recent entry. System administrators use ad-hoc regular expression searching
commands to extract information from the log file. The process is too manual and
time-consuming.
• When a security incident occurs, the system administrator does not usually have
any information about what to look for in the system log. Most of the time the in-
vestigator has to rely on his/her experience or intuition for this purpose. Automated
digital forensic tools are needed to release human interventions and give investiga-
tors more time to think.
Chapter 4
PROBLEM ILLUSTRATION
This research is mainly motivated by the dissatisfaction in mission objectives in risk
management. We have found drawbacks in traditional security best-practice. Many se-
curity best-practices have identified methodologies to discover vulnerability so as to dis-
cover the threats. However, merely determining system vulnerabilities is not enough to
help the system administrators reaching appropriate decisions. Security administrators
are more interested in determining the best strategy to strengthen the system. Thus, they
want a richer threat model to help them understand ways in which the system can be
compromised and help them evaluate and manage the risk in a proper manner.
This chapter aims toward three goals. First, we introduce the test-bed network system
to illustrate our problem formulation and solution. We, then, address technical challenges
in designing security hardening strategies. Lastly, we identify the pitfalls found in the
traditional risk management process.
4.1 Test-bed Network
We first analyze the test-bed system for potential security breaches and difficulties
in designing the security hardening plan. Our test-bed network consists of eight hosts
located within two subnets. The DMZ subnet consists of Web server, Mail server, and
DNS server. This subnet is opened to the public. In the second subnet lies the SQL
Server and several local desktops including the root machine. This subnet is the trusted
zone. Hence, accesses from external sources are restricted. A DMZ tri-homed firewall
is installed with policies to ensure that Web server, Mail server, and DNS server are
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Figure 4.1: Example Network Model
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separated from the local network so that if one of these is compromised, the damage will
only be limited to the DMZ zone. The access policies are represented as the connectivity
shown in the inset table in Figure 4.1.
In terms of embedded security, the firewall has a strong set of policies (shown in
the inset table in Figure 4.1) to prevent remote access to internal hosts. In particular, all
machines in DMZ zone passively receive the service requests and only respond to the
sender as needed. However, in order to accommodate the Web service’s transactions,
Web server is allowed to send SQL queries to the SQL server located in the trusted zone.
Local machines are located behind the NAT firewall so that all communications to external
parties are delivered through the Gateway server. In addition, all local desktops including
the administrator machine have remote desktop enabled to facilitate remote operations for
company’s employees who may want to work from remote sites. The remote connections
are monitored by the SSHD installed in the Gateway server.
4.2 Traditional Risk Management and Challenge in Risk Management
The typical risk management process consists of risk assessment, risk mitigation, and
evaluation. Risk assessment is the process of identifying vulnerabilities presents in the
system by the means of network penetration test, vulnerability scanner, security exposure,
white box testing, or historical record. Table 4.1 shows the list of vulnerabilities resulted
from this process. With further investigation, the security administrator can identify eight
possible outcomes. The outcomes are ranked from information leakage to system com-
promised. Obviously, knowing ‘what’ outcome could happen is necessary for the security
hardening but it is not sufficient for determining an effective security hardening plan. Sec-
tion 4.3 addresses more detailed discussion covering this issue so as to give a motivation
to developing a better threat model.
For the control analysis, we identified 13 security controls capable of reducing risk
from initial vulnerabilities. Table 4.2 lists all these controls and their coverage. Since se-
curity controls are different in the cost and coverage they provide. It is a big challenge for
25
Host Vulnerability CVE# Outcomes
Local desktops Remote login CA 1996-83 remote-2-user
(10.0.0.1-127) LICQ Buffer Overflow (BOF) CVE 2001-0439 remote-2-user
MS Video ActiveX Stack BOF CVE 2008-0015 remote-2-root
Admin machine RPC Marshalling Engine Vulnerability CVE 2009-0568 local-2-root
(10.0.0.128)
Gateway server OpenSSL uses predicable random CVE 2008-0166 information leakage
(196.216.0.128) Heap corruption in OpenSSH CVE 2003-0693 local-2-root
Improper cookies handler in OpenSSH CVE 2007-4752 authentication bypass
SQL Server SQL Injection CVE 2008-5416 remote-2-root
(196.216.0.130)
Mail Server Remote code execution in SMTP CVE 2004-0840 remote-2-root
(196.216.0.19) Error message information leakage CVE 2008-3060 account information theft
Squid port scan vulnerability CVE 2001-1030 information leakage
DNS Server DNS Cache Poisoning CVE 2008-1447 integrity
(196.216.0.20)
Web Server IIS vulnerability in WebDAV service CVE 2009-1535 remote-2-local
(196.216.0.20) authentication bypass
Table 4.1: Intial List of Vulnerabilities in Test-bed Network.
the security administrator to design the cost-effective security controls. The methodology
the security administrator often uses is to estimate the risk from the individual vulnera-
bility, prioritize risks by their values, and compare the cost and benefit of implementing
a chosen set of security controls. Typically, the level of risk is computed by Impact and
Likelihood.
However, there are some technical challenges in designing the security hardening
plan. First, it is impossible to completely eliminate the risk as some vulnerabilities result
from design flaws. Thus, it is not an easy task to redesign the system without affecting
other business functionalities and there is no guarantee that the new design is not vulner-
able to other attacks. Second, the system administrator has to work within a given set
of budget constraints which may preclude her from implementing all suggested security
controls. Designing a set of security policies for the organizations network safety has
considerable implications on the organizations financial throughput.
Lastly, it is not an easy task to find the minimal security hardening plan since there
is no one-to-one mapping between vulnerabilities and security controls. Some vulnera-
bilities can be eliminated by multiple security controls and some security controls, with
higher costs, can have more coverage on multiple vulnerabilities. Thus, the system ad-
ministrator needs to find a trade-off between the cost of implementing a subset of security
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Vulnerability Risk Control Coverage
(CVSS)
CVE 2009-0568 10.0 digital signature CVE 2008-3060
CVE 2003-0693 10.0 disable WebDAV CVE 2009-1535
CVE 2004-0840 10.0 query restriction CVE 2008-5416
CVE 2008-0015 9.3 apply OpenSSH security patch CVE 2003-0693, CVE 2007-4752
CVE 2008-5416 9.0 use POP3 instead CVE 2008-3060
CVE 2008-0166 7.8 apply MS work around CVE 2008-0015
CVE 2009-1535 7.6 disable portscan CVE 2001-1030
CVE 2001-0439 7.5 apply MS09-004 work around CVE 2008-5416
CVE 2007-4752 7.5 filtering external traffic CA 1996-83, CVE 2004-0840, CVE 2009-1535
CVE 2008-3060 7.5 limit DNS access CVE 2008-1447
CVE 2001-1030 7.5 encryption CVE 2008-1447
CA 1996-0083 7.4 add Network IDS CVE 2001-1030, CVE 2008-3060, CVE 2009-0568
CVE 2008-1447 6.4 add Firewall CVE 2001-0439
Table 4.2: (left)Vulnerability Sorted by CVSS Risk Score. (right)List of Security Controls
and Their Coverages.
hardening measures and the damage that can potentially happen to the system if certain
weak spots are left un-plugged in order to maximize the resource utilization. As such,
this decision is not a trivial task.
4.3 Problem and Research Motivation
We have found many pitfalls in traditional security best-practice including NIST SP
800, ISO/IEC 27001, and BS7799. The major pitfall arises from the level of abstraction
of the standard itself. Most standards define the framework at the abstraction level and
leave out the implementation to field practices. As a result, one can easily misinterpret
and mislead the abstraction. In this article, we categorize the drawbacks into three major
aspects so as to highlight the problem and research motivation.
4.3.1 Pitfalls in Vulnerability Assessment
The major pitfall in traditional risk assessment is found in the process of risk assess-
ment analysis. The threat models resulting from the vulnerability identification process
are not rich enough for the security administrators to estimate the risk as well as conduct-
ing the risk mitigation analysis. Given the complexity of today’s network infrastructure, it
is not enough to consider the presence or absence of vulnerabilities in isolation. We have
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observed that modern day attacks rely on exploiting multiple vulnerabilities in a corre-
lated manner. Materializing a threat strongly requires the combination of multiple attacks
using different vulnerabilities. As such, this requirement is far beyond what typical vul-
nerability scanners can offer.
To make the above critique more concrete, consider Table 4.1. The table identifies
13 vulnerabilities and 8 possible outcomes ranked from information leakage to system
compromise. However, Knowing ‘what’ vulnerability presents in the network does not
always tell tell “how” it is exploited. In fact, more than 20 attacks possible can be derived
from the initial 13 vulnerabilities. Figure 4.2 illustrates these attacks. Hence, we can
see that the true damage assessment is far more complicate than the one obtained from
the traditional vulnerability list and the security mitigation analysis should yield different
results from the one that is solely based on eliminating individual vulnerability.
4.3.2 Pitfalls in Risk Assessment Analysis
Many security best-practices estimate the risk by considering vulnerabilities on an
individual basis. A network security administrator could be fooled in a situation where
individual vulnerability risks are low but can be combined into compromising a critical
resource. In other words, the causal dependency between vulnerabilities has been ignored
in most existing security best-practices.
To illustrate this pitfall, the NIST’s SP 800-30 security best-practice is chosen. The
SP 800 measures level of risk using the Business Impact Analysis (BIA). In particular,
the magnitude of impact is determined by the severity of the adverse outcome and the
criticality of the target resources. Let assume that we want to analyze the impact of the
vulnerability CVE 2003-0693. According to BIA, the magnitude of impact is computed
from the severity of the outcome (in this case, root compromise) and the targeted resource
(which is the Gateway server). Even if BIA impact estimation is flawless, the impact es-
timation of CVE 2003-0693 is underestimated. In fact, there are steps before executing
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Figure 4.2: Unconditional Probability Distribution of the Test-bed Network
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CVE 2003-0693. Fig 4.2 shows three attack scenarios that can compromise the Gateway
server. One way is to compromise the local machine by either bypassing the authentica-
tion (CA 1996-83) or exploiting LICQ’s vulnerability (CVE 2001-0439). Another way is
to exploit the ActiveX vulnerability to compromise the local machine and then exploit the
local connection to take the Gateway server using CVE 2003-0693. As a result there are
several adverse impacts along the path that are overlooked by NIST’s best-practice.
Similarly, there is a flaw in the likelihood estimation as well. The likelihood is meant
to estimate the probability of the vulnerability exploitation given the attacker’s capability,
nature of vulnerability, and level of security controls. We discover that node dependency
inside the system has a strong influence to the probability estimation. For example, the
Remote login (CA 1996-83) execution by its nature is extremely sensitive. Hence, it
is given the highest probability by many vulnerability exposure databases. However, in
our test-bed network, CA 1996-83 can not be executed unless an attacker successfully
bypasses the authentication process. According to the network configuration, the authen-
tication bypass can only be achieved by exploiting CVE 2007-4752. If CVE 2007-4752 is
hard to penetrate then it will greatly affect the attacker’s capability which, in turn, reduces
the attack Likelihood of CA 1996-83. We have not seen such an approach that takes node
dependencies into consideration in the likelihood estimation.
In this study, we propose the threat model in Chapter 5 and Chapter 8. The proposed
model allows us to understand ways in which the system can be compromised given a set
of initial vulnerability, network configuration and initial security measures.
4.3.3 Administrator’s Dilemma
Since the risk mitigation analysis takes the result from the risk assessment analysis
and we already discussed the flaws in the traditional risk assessment analysis. It is clear
that the security administrator will not get the best security hardening plan from a defected
input. Beside, the risk mitigation itself is not a trivial task. Hence, it is important to
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discuss one of the greatest challenges in risk mitigation analysis known as Administrator’s
Dilemma in this subsection.
The problem facing security managers while working on the risk mitigation analysis
is not merely assessing the efficiency given a security plan but rather design the resource-
effective security plan that reduces the system risk down to an acceptable level. It is
important to note that the complete elimination is usually impractical or close to impos-
sible. Hence, in order to defend against the attacks possible, a security administrator (as
a decision maker) has to implement the security hardening plan from a variety of safe-
guard technologies, each has different cost and security coverage. For example, to defend
against the ftp/.rhost exploit, one might choose to apply a security patch, firewall, or
simply disable the FTP service. Each choice of action can have a different cost to spend
with different outcomes. Besides, some measures have multiple coverage, but with higher
costs. A security administrator has to make a decision and assesses the technologies in
order to maximize the resource utilization.
At the same time, system administrator has to minimize the total cost of implement-
ing these hardening measures given the costs for individual measures. Assuming that
the vulnerability assessment analysis and control analysis are done correctly, finding the
cost-effective security plan needs to select a subset of security controls to form a candi-
date plan. For each plan, assess the effectiveness of the plan and find the cheapest plan
that reduces most of the risk. Unfortunately, given N security controls, there are as many
as 2N plans for the security administrator to evaluate. In addition, system administrators
have to work within a fixed budget which may be less than the minimum cost of system
hardening. Hence, the real problem is how to select a subset of security hardening mea-
sures so as to be within the budget and yet minimize the residual damage to the system
caused by not plugging all required security risks.
In this study, we formalize the administrator dilemma problem in Chapter 7 as a
Multi-Objective optimization problem and ropose the systematic approach to solve the
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problem. We develop the heuristic algorithm to reduce the O(2N) complexity yet capable
to give the optimal result. In addition, the proposed methodology also provides a diversity




Attack tree represents all possible ways to achieve multi-stage attack in a network
system. Typically, such a model is useful for an enterprise network where the network
administrators wish to know the security risks due to the vulnerabilities present in a multi-
host network. Of course, scanning for each host can reveal such vulnerabilities in the
network, but eliminating all vulnerable software is not always possible. Also, it is not
enough to remove the effects of combining multiple vulnerabilities, as some attacks can
simply exploit the loop holes at the system architecture level to legitimately cause security
violations. Thus, it is important to visualize the big picture of network attack scenarios in
order to analyze vulnerabilities in enterprise networks.
In this chapter, we present a formal definition of an attack tree. All formal definitions
introduced in this chapter serves as basic building blocks to explain vulnerability analy-
sis, risk assessment, risk mitigation analysis, and forensic analysis in the sub sequence
chapters.
5.1 Introduction
We can observe that vulnerabilities present in a network are often exploited in cor-
relation. Given the complexity of today’s network infrastructure, materializing a threat
usually requires the combination of multiple attacks exploiting different vulnerabilities.
Representing different scenarios under which an asset could be damaged thus becomes
important for preventive analysis. Such representations not only provide a picture of the
possible ways to compromise a system, but could also help determine a minimal set of
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preventive actions. Given the normal operational state of a network, including the vul-
nerabilities present, an attack could possibly open up avenues to launch another attack,
thereby taking the attacker a step closer to its goal. The presence of a vulnerability does
not imply that it can always be exploited. A certain state of the network, viz. in terms of
access privileges or machine connectivity, could be a prerequisite to be able to exploit a
vulnerability. Once the vulnerability is exploited, the state of the network can change en-
abling the attacker to launch the next attack in the sequence. Such a pre-thought sequence
of attacks gives rise to an attack scenario.
5.2 Description of an Attack Scenario
It is worth noting that the notion of a progressive attack induces a transitive rela-
tionship between the vulnerabilities present in the network and can be exploited while
deciding on the security measures. Attack graph [12, 38, 47, 62] and attack tree [52, 60]
representations have been proposed in network vulnerability management to demonstrate
such cause-consequence relationships. The nodes in these data structures usually rep-
resent a certain network state of interest to an attacker, with edges connecting them to
indicate the cause-consequence relationship. Although different attack scenarios are eas-
ily perceived in attack graphs, they can potentially suffer from a state space explosion
problem. Ammann et al. [12] identified this problem and proposed an alternative formu-
lation, with the assumption of monotonicity. The monotonicity property states that the
consequence of an attack is always preserved once achieved. In other words, if a network
attribute becomes true as a result of some attack, it remains so during subsequent attacks.
Such an assumption can greatly reduce the number of nodes in the attack graph, although
at the expense of further analysis required to determine the viable attack scenarios. An
exploit-dependency graph [47] can be extracted from their representation to indicate the
various conjunctive and disjunctive relationships between different nodes. For the pur-
pose of this study, we adopt the attack tree representation since it presents a much clearer
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picture of the different hierarchies present between attacker subgoals. The representation
also helps us efficiently calculate the cost factors we are interested in. Different properties
of the network effectuate different ways for an attacker to compromise a system. We first
define an attribute-template that lets us generically categorize these network properties
for further analysis.
Definition 1 ATTRIBUTE-TEMPLATE
An attribute-template is a generic property of the hardware or software configuration of
a network which includes, but not limited to, the following:
• system vulnerabilities (which are often reported in the vulnerability database such
as BugTraq, CERT/CC, or netcat).
• network configuration such as open port, unsafe firewall configuration, etc.
• system configuration such as data accessibility, unsafe default configuration, or
read-write permission in file structures.
• access privilege such as user account, guest account, or root account.
• connectivity
Attribute-template lets us categorize most of the atomic properties of the network that
might be of some use to an attacker. For example, “running SSH1 v1.2.23 on FTP Server”
can be considered as an instance of the system vulnerabilities template. Similarly, “user
access on Terminal” is an instance of the access privilege template. Such templates also
let us specify the properties in propositional logic. We define an attribute with such a
concept in mind.
Definition 2 ATTRIBUTE
An attribute is a propositional instance of an attribute-template. It can take either a true
or false value.
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The success or failure of an attacker reaching his goal depends mostly on what truth
values the attributes in a network take. It also lays the foundations for a security manager
to analyze the effects of falsifying some of the attributes by using some security policies.
We formally define an attack tree model based on such attributes. Since we consider an
attribute as an atomic property of a network taking either a true or false value, most of the
definitions are written using propositional logic involving these attributes.
Definition 3 ATTACK
Let S be a set of attributes. We define Att to be a mapping Att : S× S→ {true, f alse}
and Att(spre,spost) = truth value of spost .
• a = Att(spre,spost) is an attack if spre 6= spost ∧ a ≡ spre↔ spost . spre and spost are
then respectively called a precondition and postcondition of the attack, denoted by
pre(a) and post(a) respectively.




where si(6= spre) ∈ S′.
An attack relates the truth values of two different attributes so as to embed a cause-
consequence relationship between the two. For example (see Figure 5.1), for the attributes
spre =“vulnerable to MATU FTP attack on machine A” and spost =“root compromise on
machine A”, Att(spre,spost) is an attack – the FTP buffer overflow attack. We would like
to clarify here that the bi-conditional logical connective “↔” between spre and spost does
not imply that spost can be set to true only by using Att(spre,spost); rather it means that
given the FTP BOF attack, the only way to make spost true is by having spre true. In fact,
Att(“vulnerable to ssh BOF attack on machine A”,spost) is also a potential attack. The
φ–attack is included to account for attributes whose truth values do not have any direct re-
lationship. However, an indirect relationship can be established collectively. For example,
the attributes spre1 = “running FTP prior to V.1.23 on machine A” and spre2 = “connectiv-
ity(machine B, machine A)” cannot individually influence the truth value of spre, but can
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Figure 5.1: Example Attack Tree
collectively make “vulnerable to MATU FTP attack on machine A” true, given they are
individually true. In such a case, Att(spre1,spre) and Att(spre2,spre) are φ–attacks.
5.3 The Formal Definition of an Attack Tree
Attack trees have been previously proposed in [25, 43, 52, 60] as a systematic method
to specify system security based on varying attacks. They help organize intrusion and/or
misuse scenarios by
1. utilizing known vulnerabilities and/or weak spots in the system, and
2. analyzing system dependencies and weak links and representing these dependen-
cies in the form of an And-Or tree.
For every system that needs to be defended, there is a different attack tree. The nodes of
the tree are used to represent the stages towards an attack. The root node of the tree rep-
resents the attacker’s ultimate goal, namely, to cause damage to the system. The interior
nodes, including leaf-nodes, represent possible system states (that is subgoals) during the
execution of an attack. Following is the formal definition of an attack tree.
Definition 4 ATTACK TREE
Let A be the set of attacks, including the φ–attack. An attack tree is a tuple AT =
(sroot ,S,τ,ε), where
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1. sroot is an attribute which the attacker wants to become true.
2. S = Ninternal ∪Nexternal ∪{sroot} is a multi-set of attributes. Nexternal denotes the multi-
set of attributes si for which @a ∈ A| si ∈ post(a). Ninternal denotes the multi-set of at-
tributes s j for which ∃a1,a2 ∈ A| [s j ∈ pre(a1) ∧ s j ∈ post(a2)].
3. τ⊆ S×S. An ordered pair (spre,spost) ∈ τ if ∃a ∈ A|[spre ∈ pre(a) ∧ spost ∈ post(a)].
Further, if si ∈ S and has multiplicity n, then ∃s1,s2, . . . ,sn ∈ S| (si,s1),(si,s2), . . . ,(si,sn)∈
τ, and
4. ε is a set of decomposition tuples of the form 〈s j,d j〉 defined for all s j ∈ Ninternal ∪
{sroot} and d j ∈ {AND,OR}. d j is AND when
∧
i




[si∧ (si,s j) ∈ τ]↔ s j is true.
Fig. 5.2 shows a simple attack tree for a hypothetical system. In this figure, the goal G0
is the attacker’s ultimate objective, namely to breach the system security. Each internal
node is a sub-goal state that takes the attacker towards the ultimate goal. The leaf nodes
(represented by double rectangles) are the initial vulnerabilities present in the system and
constitute stepping stones for the attacks. Branches represent a change of state caused
by one or more actions taken by the attacker. Change in state is represented by either
AND-branches or OR-branches. Nodes may be decomposed as
1. a sequence of events (attacks), all of which must be achieved for this sub-goal to
succeed; this is represented by the events being combined by AND branches at the
node; or
2. a set of events (attacks), any one of which occurring will result in the sub-goal
succeeding; this is represented by the events being combined by OR branches at
the node.
In Definition 4, the set of ordered pairs, τ, reflect the edges in the tree. The existence of
an edge between two nodes implies that there is a direct or indirect relationship between
their truth values, signified by the decomposition at each node. The AND decomposition
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Figure 5.2: Simple Attack Tree Corresponding to a Hypothetical System
at a node requires all child nodes to have a truth value of true for it to be true. The
OR decomposition at a node requires only one child node to have a truth value of true
for it to be true. In risk analysis, the attack tree can be augmented to provide a better
quantitative representation. In particular, nodes in the attack tree can be assigned with
different metrics of interest signifying the amount of value which the analyst wishes to
assess. For example, any Boolean value, such as possible or impossible, easy or difficult,
detectable or undetectable, etc. can be assigned to the nodes and yields Boolean result
to the analysis. Assigning Boolean expression is not the only way an attack tree can be
used. It is possible to assign nodes in the tree with a quantitative value such as cost or
chance of success. Such kinds of trees help the analyst to determine the cheapest attack
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Figure 5.3: Illustration of the Combination of Quantitative and Qualitative Applications
on an Attack Tree
scenarios or can answer other what-if analyses. In addition, nodes can be assigned with
many different values corresponding to many different variables, with both Boolean and
quantitative values. These combinations can answer even ad hoc queries. Figure 5.3
shows an example of an attack tree with various assigned values. These values are used in
combination to answer the ad hoc questions such as what are the cheapest ways to attack
with no special equipment required (NSE), or what is the most likely undetectable attack
etc. We will illustrate these qualitative and quantitative applications of the attack tree
model in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter 6
CONSTRUCTION OF ATTACK TREE MODEL
Understanding the big picture of network attack scenarios is an important process
for analyzing vulnerabilities in enterprise networks. Such a model is useful for enterprise
networks where the network administrators wish to know the security risks due to the
vulnerabilities present in the multi-host network.
Constructing attack models by hand, however, is tedious, error-prone, and imprac-
tical for attack scenarios larger than a hundred nodes. Previous work on attack tree and
attack graph models has not provided an account of the scalability of the graph generat-
ing process, and there is often a lack of logical formalism in the representation of attack
models. This results in the attack model being difficult to use and be understanded by the
users.
We implemented a comprehensive attack tree analysis tool that discovers all pos-
sible paths in which the system can be compromised. This is a custom tool written in
Java programming language with full-featured user interface and attack tree visualiza-
tion capabilities. In this chapter, we demonstrate how to prepare the trace information in
generating an attack scenario, and how to use the trace to generate a logical attack tree in
polynomial time. We generate an attack tree for the test-bed network given in the previous
chapter and prove that our attack graph generation algorithm is efficient.
6.1 Introduction
Many researchers in this area [12, 25, 38, 43, 50, 60, 62, 65] have found that there
are potentially strong connections between series of attacks in that the consequence of
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Figure 6.1: Database Architecture of the Attack Tree Risk Analysis Tool
one attack enables the execution of another attack. This relationship is known as pre-
requisite and consequence relation [12, 38, 46, 50, 53]. Hence, an infinite number of
sophisticated attacks can be generated from chaining individual vulnerability exploita-
tions through these relations as one (atomic) attack serves as a prerequisite for another.
Figure 6.1 presents the data diagram showing the flow of information during the
generation of an attack tree. The chapter also describes the algorithm to generate an
attack tree from the list of vulnerabilities and network topology. The vulnerability list
represents facts about flaws in the system design and specifications. This list is prepared
by vulnerabilities scanner tools such as saint [70], snort [54], nessus [29], etc. Instances
of Vulnerability will be extracted from the report and stored in the SQL database table
vulnerabilities.
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For the Network topology, we can obtain the information from a variety of network
topology scanner tools such as TraceRoute [32], Nmap [8], nttlscan [45], etc. Thus the
connectivity information between machines in the network of interest can be identified.
Once the facts of the system vulnerabilities and network topology have been estab-
lished, the tool binds these facts with the relationship information from the knowledge
base repository. The knowledge base repository stores information relating to the de-
pendencies between vulnerabilities and their exploitations. This information is readily
available from many different sources such as the CERT Coordination Center Knowl-
edge base (http://www.cert.org/kb/), the (US) National Vulnerability Database (formerly
known as the ICAT database –http://nvd.nist.gov), or the SANS Institute. Based on this
information, we can build the inter connection from the characteristics of vulnerability
exploitation (e.g., local buffer overflow attack, remote-to-user attack, network sniffing
attack, etc.). In particular, the dependencies between vulnerability exploitation and at-
tack pattern (attack category) can be drawn directly from the outsourcing databases. The
remaining challenge is how to establish the prerequisite relationship. Section 6.2.1 de-
scribes this methodology in more detail.
6.2 Implementation
In this section, we describe the system architecture of the Attack tree risk analysis
tool. The system architecture consists of the software architecture and the database archi-
tecture. Due to the complexity of the design, Figure 6.3 can only illustrate the software
architecture of the tool. The database architecture is shown in detail by Figure 6.2. Note
that we shall assume that the readers of this article are already familiar with the terms
vulnerability, exploitation, and attack. These terms, however, are described in Chapter
12.
This section is organized as follows. We begin with the descriptive design of the
database meta model. This consists of the data schema of the Fact module and Knowledge
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module. We, then, describe the application architecture which interacts with the database
and describe how the attack tree model is generated from a list of initial vulnerabilities
and network topology information.
Before moving to the detailed description of meta data design, let’s begin with the
tuple’s convention, as it is the base structure of all elements in this SQL database. A
tuple consists of data fields which describe the type of information stored in the data
record. Each record has a unique identifier field. The identifier field is written in an
underlined italic font. In the case of table association, combination of foreign keys is
used to uniquely identify the tuple. The foreign key is identified by italic font. Figure
6.2 shows the data model in the design of the attack visualization tool. The data model
is implemented as tables in a regular SQL database. In this model, an attribute is a
basic building block of vulnerability: a prerequisite, and a consequence of attack. In this
model, attribute serves as the primitive data type to describe states in attack tree. Specific
vulnerability exploitation requires certain conditions for an attacker to execute an attack;
this relationship is known as a prerequisite. Similarly, an execution of an exploit produce
specific outcomes; this relation is called the consequence.
Next we describe tables and table associations in the design of the SQL database. The
database repository is composed of the Fact Module and Knowledge-base Module. We
begin with the design of the Fact Module which comprises of three tables: vulnerabilities,
hosts, and connectivity followed by the design of Knowledge-base Module.
6.2.1 The Design of Fact Module
We design the Fact Module to represent information that can be drawn directly from
the design specification of the evaluated network system. The data module consists of
hosts, vulnerabilities, and connectivity tables.
Definition 5 HOST
Host is described by a tuple of { IP, Name } representing the physical machine in the
network. A set of host H is a table that consists of ‘IP’ field and ‘Name’ field.
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Figure 6.2: The Design of the Database Metada
Definition 6 VULNERABILITY
Vulnerability is an attribute denoted by { Re f erenceID, V Name, service name, isrc,
measure 1,2,3... } representing information about the weakness of the host that may allow
an attacker to execute an exploit through a particular input-source isrc. In our current
version, we adopt the CVSS scoring system in our risk measurement. Hence, measures 1,
2, 3... correspond to CVSS security metrics of interest.
Definition 7 CONFIGURATION
System Configuration is an attribute denoted by { Name, Description } describing a
system configuration setting required in order to successfully exploit the vulnerability.
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Definition 8 VULNERABILITY INSTANCE
Vulnerability Instance is a table association defined as { Vulnerability, Host } repre-
senting the facts about local vulnerability present in a specific host machine.
Definition 9 CONFIGURATION INSTANCE (CONFIG INSTANCE)
Configuration Instance is a table association denoted by {Con f iguration, Host } repre-
senting the facts about local configuration in a particular host. These configurations are
either “is required by” or “is a consequence of” a certain vulnerability exploitation.
Definition 10 CONNECTIVITY
Let H be a set of hosts. Network Connectivity is the table association denoted by { host 1,
host 2 }. The connectivity table encodes the connection between host i and host j (i 6= j)
in the network topology.
Note that we impose the strict order in the connectivity tuple, which means that there
exists a process in host 1 capable of sending information to host 2 but this does not
need to have the same capability in the opposite direction. In the attack tree generation
algorithm, we are interested in identifying all entities that can reach a given target. Let H
be the host target of interest, the list of hosts that can inject the stream of information to
H (denoted by CONH ) can be identified by the following SQL statement.
SQL Statement 6.2.1
CONH = SELECT host 1
FROM ConnectivityTable
WHERE host 2 = H
6.2.2 The Design of the Knowledge-base Module
The Knowledge-base Module supports content management of the information about
vulnerability exploitations. To the best of our knowledge, more than 40,000 vulnerabili-
ties have been reported, and such reports are growing at an alarming rate. Thus, it is not
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efficient to gather information for every exploits. We observe that exploits have common
characteristics. Thus, they can be classified by their attack patterns (see Chapter 12).
In this project, we employ Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification
(CAPEC) to define attack patterns. CAPEC [2] is sponsored by the Department of Home-
land Security as part of the Software Assurance strategic initiative of the National Cyber
Security Division. An attack pattern is the mechanism to capture common characteristics
used in exploiting the system. Exploits in the same attack pattern have a set of precondi-
tions and post conditions in common. Since the number of patterns is much less than the
number of exploits, it is more scalable to link dependency among exploits to construct an
attack tree by the pattern of attack rather than by the instances of exploit. The prerequisite
relationships require human intervention but this is the only part of the tool that requires
preparation, and it is more scalable 1 and reusable.
Definition 11 ATTACK PATTERN
Attack pattern is denoted by { P Name, Severity } representing classification of taxonomy
that describes common methods for exploiting the system.
Definition 12 PRECONDITION AND POSTCONDITION
Given a set of attack patterns P and a set of configurations C. Precondition is a table as-
sociation between P and C. Precondition is denoted by a tuple { AttackPattern :: P Name,
CONFIGURATION :: Name as Precondition , JoinType }.
Similarly, Postcondition is a table association between P and C denoted by {
Attackpattern :: P Name, CONFIGURATION :: Name as Postcondition }. The
knowledge about the preconditions and postconditions can be drawn from
1especially if we are only concerned with those attack patterns that are only found in the evaluated
network
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public vulnerability bulletin such as CAPEC (http://capec.mitre.org/), Bug-
traq (http://www.securityfocus.com), the (US) National Vulnerability Database
(http://nvd.nist.gov), etc.
Definition 13 EXPLOITATION
Given a set of vulnerability instance (V I) and configuration instance (CI). The vulnera-
bility exploitation is a table association between V I and CI. Vulnerability Exploitation is
an instantiation that describes an occurrence of state transition between vulnerability and
its post-conditions in a particular host machine. An ordered tuple {V I,CI} is an exploit
if and only if there exists a vulnerability instance v and configuration instance c such that
host(v) = host(c).
Relations between exploits, pre-conditions and post-conditions are key components in
generating an attack tree. Given an instance of post-condition, we can backtrack from the
post-condition table to the vulnerabilities table (through attack pattern) in the Fact Mod-
ule to determine whether there exists such a vulnerability in the system. The following
SQL statement is used by an attack generation Algorithm 1 to identify the vulnerability
instances, denoted by VULNC , given a Configuration Instance C as a post-condition.
SQL Statement 6.2.2
VULNC = SELECT Vulnerability,Host
FROM VulnerabilityInstance JOIN Exploitation
JOIN CONFIG Instance
WHERE [CONFIG Instance].CONFIG = C .CONFIG AND
[CONFIG Instance].Host = C .Host
Similarly, given the vulnerability instance V , the following SQL statement is used to




PRECV = SELECT CONFIG,Host
FROM CONFIG Instance JOIN CONFIGURAT ION
JOIN Pre condition JOIN AT TACK PAT T ERN
JOIN VULNERABILITY JOIN Vulnerability Instance
WHERE [CONFIG Instance].Host = V .Host AND
[CONFIG Instance].Vulnerability = V .Vulnerability
Note that a single vulnerability exploitation can cause multiple outcomes and that there
exist multiple attributes required in executing an exploit. In particular, an exploit may
require multiple conditions to be satisfied or only one of its preconditions to be satisfied
in order to launch an attack. The attack tree encodes such a relation by a logical operator
AND-OR. The field JoinType in the Precondition table association captures this aspect.
We use the logical operator AND to encode the relationship where multiple conditions
are all required in order to execute an exploit and use the logical operator OR to address
the case in which an exploit can be executed if at least one of its preconditions is satisfied.
Note that in the case where both AND and OR operators are needed to launch
an attack, we use the “dummy node” to partially combine preconditions with AND-
decomposition or OR-decomposition as it is appropriate.
6.2.3 Attack Tree Generation Algorithm
We implemented the attack generation tools in Java. The design UML is shown in
Figure 6.3. The tool is comprised of a platform-dependent parser, Database Interface,
Attack Tree Generator, and ViewPanel. A Parser class is used to read the information
about vulnerabilities from public vulnerability bulletin and parse this information to the
database. In this project we implemented NessusParser to read data from the nessus
vulnerability report. A Database Interface class is used to perform queries to the Database.
The Attack Tree Generator class generates a Dependency Graph and the ViewPanel draws
an attack tree from the Dependency Graph. Note that the EventHandler and Risk Analyzer
classes are not relevant to attack tree generation. Their abstractions, however, will be
revisited when we are discussing risk analysis methodologies using the attack tree as the
risk model. The attack tree generation process begins with the ultimate goal. In this step,
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Figure 6.3: The Designed UML Diagram of the Attack Tree Generating Tool
the security analyst selects an ultimate assertion (often “root access privilege”) on the
machine which she wants to protect most as an ultimate goal.
An attack tree generation pseudo code is shown in Algorithm 1. The algorithm
works as follows. First, it executes SQL query 6.2.2 given C = ultimate goal to identify
all vulnerability instances that can cause a security breach allowing attackers to reach the
ultimate goal. Then for each vulnerability n ∈ VULNC , the algorithm searches for the
preconditions by executing the SQL query 6.2.3. All preconditions discovered in this step
are attached to DBStack. In the subsequent iterations, preconditions from the previous it-
eration then become root nodes of the subtrees. The algorithm repeats the previous steps
by executing SQL queries 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 to find vulnerabilities and their preconditions on
each subtree. The preconditions found in this iteration become root nodes of the smaller
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subtrees, and then the algorithm repeats itself until it can not find any preconditions or
vulnerabilities using all available resources. Nodes found in this step become the leaf
nodes. The above paragraph describes the typical routine of the algorithm. There is, how-
ever, one exception in this routine. If the vulnerability exploitation requires connectivity
(see line 21), the algorithm searches the connectivity table (query 6.2.1) to locate ma-
chines that can remotely launch an attack to the victim machine. For each machine, the
procedure looks for any vulnerability exploitation that can cause the system compromise,
puts these exploits in the DBStack, and switches back to the typical search.
6.3 Complexity Analysis
In this subsection, we shall prove that the attack generation algorithm scales with
the number of attributes. To begin the complexity analysis, one explicit assumption Al-
gorithm 1 adopts from [12] is monotonicity. Monotonicity implies that once a particular
state has been reached, it can not be undone. In other words, attack progress never back-
tracks. With this assumption, we assume the existence of a procedure CHAIN that takes a
tree node and returns a set of predecessor nodes by backtracking up to the root node. We
use the procedure CHAIN to enforce monotonicity constraints so that the path in the attack
tree contains no duplication thus it is monotonic. Although Monotonicity may not hold
for some cases such cases can be simplified to monotonicity. For example the attacker
may execute a denial-of-service attack to temporarily disable the local DNS service and
steal sensitive information as described in CVE-2006-0351. The attacker can not deny the
fact that an attack progress has exploited the denial-of-service state of attack in an exploit
model.
We begin the complexity analysis by assuming the set A = {a1,a2, . . . ,an} be the
set of attributes. Set A consists of three compartments: Vulnerability (V ), Configuration
(F), and Connectivity (C) such that for V 6= F 6= C, A = V ∪F ∪C. We observe that SQL
queries 6.2.1, 6.2.2, and 6.2.3 interact with different compartments of A so that we can
safely bound the complexity of SQL executions to O(N) where N = |A|.
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Algorithm 1 Attack Tree Generation Algorithm
{Description:Attack tree generation algorithm generates attack tree from a given ultimate
goal (denoted by sroot), vulnerability instances, configuration instances, and network configu-
ration attributes.
The algorithm assumes the existence of a procedure called CHAIN that takes a node n cor-
responding to the state in attack tree and returns a set of nodes resulting from backtracking
edges in τ from node n back to sroot . }
{Input: sroot , DATABASE VulnerabilitiesDB}
{Output: : The Attack Tree (AT = (sroot ,S,τ,∈))}
BEGIN
5: Let DBStack be a stack that queues nodes in the attack tree that is under exploration.
VULNC ← execute SQL statement 6.2.2 given C ← sroot
for all n ∈ VULNC | n /∈ CHAIN(C ) do
add (n,C ) to τ and add n to S
10: DBStack.put(n)
end for
while DBStack is not Empty do
C ← DBStack.pop()
if C is vulnerability then
15: PRECV ← execute SQL statement 6.2.3 given C
for all n ∈ PRECV | n /∈ CHAIN(C ) do




if C = “Connectivity” then
H ← C .hostIP
CONH ← execute SQL statement 6.2.1 given H
for all h ∈CONH do
25: VULNC ← execute SQL statement 6.2.2 given C ← { root compromise, h.hostIP
} OR { user compromise, h.hostIP }
for all n ∈ VULNC | n /∈ CHAIN(C ) do





VULNC ← execute SQL statement 6.2.2 given C
for all n ∈ VULNC | n /∈ CHAIN(C ) do








Note that the monotonicity constraint plays a critical role in guaranteeing that each
path contains no duplicate nodes. In other words, it guarantees that the search space is
reduced, thus each path has a search complexity of O(N2). Since there are at most n
branches, Algorithm 1 is bounded to O(N3). Another way to view the algorithm is from
the pseudo code. We organize Algorithm 1 into three states: initialization, maintenance,
and termination.
• Initialization: Prior to the first iteration (line 5 - 11), we execute SQL 6.2.2. The
results are stored in DBStack. The overall complexity is O(N).
• Maintenance: In each loop iteration (line 12 to 39), a tree node C is removed from
the DBStack. Node C can be either vulnerability (line 14), precondition (line 32),
or connectivity (line 21). In the cases where C is vulnerability or state condition,
the procedure only executes one SQL query and enforces monotonicity constraints
to prevent cycle (line 16 and line 33). Both executions are bounded to O(N). In the
case where node C is a connectivity, we execute SQL 6.2.1 and then SQL 6.2.2 on
each result returned from 6.2.1. In this case, the procedure is bounded to O(N2).
• Termination: The algorithm is terminated when the DBStack is empty. We use
the DBStack to store attributes discovered by SQL queries. With monotonicity
constraints, the while loop (line 12) which bounds the number of iterations in the
algorithm is bounded to O(N). Since, the maximum bound in the Maintenance state
is O(N2), the the overall complexity of the algorithm is O(N3).
6.4 Tool Illustration
We conducted the experiment on the test-bed network as described in Chapter 4.
The test-bed network has 14 vulnerabilities as shown in Table 4.1. In this test, Nessus
vulnerability scanner is chosen to produce a proof-of-concept vulnerability report to be
parsed to the tool. A sample Nessus report is provided in Figure 6.4. The first step in this
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Figure 6.4: The Nessus Report
experiment is to parse the Vulnerability report into the Database and construct the Fact
Database. We implemented the NessusParser in Java to read the Nessus Report and parse
all vulnerabilities and exploits reported in this document to the Database.
The next step is to build a Precondition and Postcondition table. In this step, National
Vulnerability Database (CVE) is chosen as the Nessus report refers to CVE. Since CVE
stores data in XML format, we implemented XMLparser using a Java standard XML li-
brary. Note that although the information about host machines can be gathered during this
process, the connectivity among those hosts is not reported by the Nessus report. There-
fore, we had to enter the connectivity information manually. We hope to integrate this tool
with the topology scanner and successfully parse the connectivity in an automatic manner
in the future. Figure 6.5 shows the screen capture of four major database components:
precondition, postcondition, VulnerabilityInstance, and Connectivity tables at the end of
this stage. Once the database is prepared, we execute an attack tree generation algorithm.
In this test, we picked host 10.0.0.128 as the root machine. Algorithm 1 identifies 4 attack
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Figure 6.5: The screen capture of the system vulnerabilities database being parsed from
the Nessus Report
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scenarios in which the root machine can be compromised. Figure 6.6 simplified the risk
model of the test-bed network. Note that the actual attack tree model is shown in the
upper-left corner.
The original attack tree consists of 33 nodes covering four distinctive attack scenarios
targeting the root machine. From the model, the attacker takes advantage of public access
of the web server (1296.216.0.21) and exploits the IIS vulnerability (CVE 2009-1535) to
gain user privilege on the server (as illustrated in sub scenario A). After compromising
the Web server, the attacker can either execute stack BOF (ActiveX vulnerability), LICQ
remote-2-user attack, or simply exploit the trust between local machines to bypass the
authentication mechanism. Any of these methods allows attackers to compromise the
local machine. Then the attacker executes a Heap corruption BOF attack to compromise
the Gateway server (196.216.0.128) from the local machine and then uses the Gateway
server to compromise the root machine.
An attack tree model resulting from this stage shows ways in which the target system
can be compromised. The model itself can be augmented to provide a better quantitative
representation and give significant benefit to risk assessment analysis. In the subsequent
chapters, we will illustrate how an attack model can be used in various risk assessment
analyses.
6.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we propose an attack tree analysis tool that discovers ways in which
the system can be compromised and we model network penetration from the attacker’s
prospective. We implemented this tool in Java language, with full-feature user interface
and attack tree visualization capability.
Our attack tree analysis tool models the network topology configuration. This con-
figuration is then subjected to simulated attacks from the exploit database. Exploits are
modeled in terms of preconditions and postconditions. When all preconditions for an
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Figure 6.6: The Simplified Attack Tree of the Test-bed Network
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exploit are met, the vulnerability exploitation is successful, and its postconditions are in-
duced. These postconditions, in turn, provide a stepping stone for other exploits. The
resulting set of exploits, joined by their precondition/postcondition dependencies, form
the graphical attack model. The graphical model reveals dependencies among exploits
and system configurations thus allowing the security administrator to accurately identify
weakness in the network design, predict all possible outcomes, and decide appropriate
defensive measures.
Chapter 7
OPTIMAL SECURITY HARDENING ON ATTACK TREE MODELS OF
NETWORKS
Researchers have previously looked into the problem of determining whether a given
set of security hardening measures can effectively make a networked system secure. Many
of them also addressed the problem of minimizing the total cost of implementing these
hardening measures given costs for individual measures. However, system administrators
are often faced with a more challenging problem since they have to work within a fixed
budget which may be less than the minimum cost of system hardening. Their problem
is how to select a subset of security hardening measures so as to be within the budget
and yet minimize the residual damage to the system caused by not plugging all required
security holes. In this work, we formulate the problem as a multi-objective optimization
problem and develop a systematic approach to solve the problem using non-dominated
sorting genetic algorithm and an attack tree model of the system.
7.1 Introduction
Network-based computer systems form an integral part of any information technol-
ogy infrastructure today. The different levels of connectivity between these systems di-
rectly facilitates the circulation of information within an organization, thereby reducing
invaluable wait time and increasing the overall throughput. As an organizations opera-
tional capacity becomes more and more dependent on networked computing systems, the
need to maintain accessibility to the resources associated with such systems has become
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an important necessity. Any weakness or vulnerability that could result in the break-
down of the network has direct consequence on the amount of yield manageable by the
organization. This in turn requires the organization to not only consider the advantages
of utilizing a networked system, but also consider the costs associated with managing
the system. With cost-effectiveness occurring as a major factor in deciding the extent to
which an organization would secure its network, it is not sufficient to detect the presence
or absence of a vulnerability and implement a security measure to rectify it. Further anal-
ysis is required to understand the contribution of the vulnerabilities towards any possible
damage to the organizations assets. Often, vulnerabilities are not exploited in isolation,
but rather used in groups to compromise a system. Similarly, security policies can have a
coverage for multiple vulnerabilities. Thus, cost-effective security management requires
researchers to evaluate the different scenarios that could lead to the damage of a secured
asset, and then come up with an optimal set of security policies to defend such assets.
Researchers have proposed building security models for networked systems using
paradigms like attack graphs [12, 38, 50, 62, 65]and attack trees [25, 43, 52, 60] and then
finding attack paths in these models to determine scenarios that could lead to damage.
However, merely determining possible attack paths does not help the system administra-
tors much. They are more interested in determining the best possible way of defending
their network in terms of an enumerated set of hardening options [47]. Moreover, the
system administrator has to work within a given set of budget constraints which may pre-
clude her from implementing all possible hardening measures or even measures that cover
all the weak spots. Deciding a set of security policies for the organizations network safety
has considerable implications on the organizations financial throughput. Thus, the sys-
tem administrator needs to find a tradeoff between the cost of implementing a subset of
security hardening measures (from a set of measures that can potentially close all attack
paths), and the damage that can potentially happen to the system if certain weak spots are
left un-plugged. In addition, the system administrator may also want to determine optimal
60
robust solutions. These are sets of security hardening measures that have the property that
even if some of measures within a set fail, the system is still not compromised.
We believe that the problem should be addressed in a more systematic manner, uti-
lizing the different tools of optimization at hand. A decision maker would possibly make
a better choice by successively evaluating different levels of optimization possible, rather
than accepting a solution from an off-the-shelf optimizer. Towards this end, the current
work makes four major contributions. First, we refine and formalize the notion of attack
trees so as to encode the contribution of different security conditions leading to system
compromise. Next, we develop a model to quantify the potential damage that can occur
in a system from the attack modeled by the system attack tree. We also quantify the se-
curity control cost incurred to implement a set of security hardening measures. Third, we
model the system administrators decision problem as three successively refined optimiza-
tion problems. We progressively transform one problem into the next to cater to more
cost-benefit information as may be required by the decision maker. Last but not the least
we discuss our thoughts and observations regarding the solutions, in particular the robust
solutions identified by our optimization process, with a belief that such discussion will
help the system administrator decide what methodology to adopt.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. We discuss some of the previous
works related to determining optimum security hardening measures in section 7.2. Sec-
tion 7.3 gives some background information about multi-objective optimization and the
genetic algorithms that we use in this work. In section 7.5, we revisit a test-bed network to
illustrate the problem. Section 7.6 presents the cost model use in this problem. The three
optimization problems are presented in section 7.7 with results and discussion following
in section 7.8. Finally we conclude in section 7.9.
7.2 Related Works
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Network vulnerability management has been previously addressed in a variety of
ways. Noel et al. used exploit dependency graphs in [47] to compute minimum cost-
hardening measures. Given a set of initial conditions in the graph, they computed boolean
assignments to these conditions, enforced by some hardening measure, so as to minimize
the total cost of those measures. As pointed out in their work, these initial conditions
(or leaf nodes in an attack tree) are the only type of network security conditions under
our strict control. Hardening measures applied to internal nodes can potentially be by-
passed by an attacker by adopting a different attack path. Jha et.al [37] did not consider
any cost for the hardening measures. Rather, their approach involved finding the minimal
set of atomic attacks critical for reaching the goal and then finding the minimal set of
security measures that cover the minimal set of atomic attacks. Although such analysis
is meant for providing solutions that guarantee complete network safety, the hardening
measures provided may still not be feasible within the financial limitations of an organi-
zation. Under such circumstances, a decision maker must perform a cost-benefit analysis
to understand the trade-off between hardening costs and network safety. Furthermore,
a minimum cost hardening measure set only means that the root goal is safe, and some
residual damage may still remain in the network. Owing to these real world concerns,
network vulnerability management should not always be considered as a single-objective
optimization problem.
A multi-objective formulation of the problem was presented by Gupta et al. in [34].
They considered a generic set of security policies capable of covering one or more generic
vulnerabilities. A security policy could also create possible vulnerabilities, thereby re-
sulting in some residual vulnerabilities even after the application of security policies.
The multi-objective problem then was to minimize the cost of implementing the security
policies, as well as the weighted residual vulnerabilities. However, the authors finally
scalarized the two objectives into a single objective using relative weights for the objec-
tives.
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7.3 BackGround on Multi-Objective Analysis
In real world scenarios, often a problem is formulated to cater to several criteria or
design objectives, and a decision choice to optimize these objectives is sought for. An
optimum design problem must then be solved with multiple objectives and constraints
taken into consideration. This type of decision making problems falls under the board
category of multi-criteria, multi-objective, or vector optimization problem.
Multi-objective optimization differs from single-objective ones in the cardinality of
the optimal set of solutions. Single objective optimization techniques are aimed towards
finding the global optima; whereas in the case of multi-objective optimization, there is
no such concept of a single optimum solution. This is due to the fact that a solution
that optimizes one of the objectives may not have the desired effect on the others. As
a result, it is not always possible to determine an optimum that corresponds in the same
way to all the objectives under consideration. Decision making under such situations thus
require some domain expertise to choose from multiple trade-off solutions depending on
the feasibility of implementation. Formally, we can state the multi-objective optimization
problem (MOOP) as follows:





2, . . . ,x
∗
n]
T which optimizes the M-dimensional vector function
~f (~x) = [ f1(~x), f2(~x), . . . , fM(~x)]T
satisfying p inequality and q equality constraints
gi(~x) ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , p
hi(~x) = 0 i = 1, . . . ,q
where −→x = [x1,x2, . . . ,xn]T is the vector of decision variables and M is the number of
objectives in the problem.
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Due to the conflicting nature of the objective functions, a simple objective value com-
parison cannot be performed to compare two feasible solutions to this problem. Most
multi-objective algorithms thus use the concept of dominance to compare feasible solu-
tions.
Definition 15 DOMINANCE AND PARETO-OPTIMAL SET
In a minimization problem, a feasible solution vector ~x is said to dominate an-
other feasible solution vector ~y if 1. ∀iε{1,2, . . . ,M} fi(~x) ≤ fi(~y) and 2.
∃ jε{1,2, . . . ,M} f j(~x) < f j(~y) ~y is then said be dominated by ~x. If the two condi-
tions do not hold, ~x and ~y are said to be non-dominated w.r.t. each other. Further, the
set of all non-dominated solutions obtained over the entire feasible region constitutes the
Pareto-optimal set.
In other words, a Pareto-optimal solution is as good as the other feasible solutions in all
the objective functions, and better in at least one of them. Solutions in the Pareto optimal
set have no apparent relationship with each other, except for their membership in the
set. The surface generated by these solutions in the objective space is called the Pareto-
front or Pareto-surface. Fig. 7.1 shows the Pareto front for a hypothetical two-objective
problem, with the dominance relationships between three feasible solutions. The classical
way to solve a multi-objective optimization problem is to follow the preference-based
approach. A relative weight vector for the objectives can help reduce the problem to
a single-objective instance, or impose orderings over the preference given to different
objectives. However, such methods fail to provide a global picture of the choices available
to the decision maker. In fact, the decision of preference has to be made before starting the
optimization process. Relatively newer methods have been proposed to make the decision
process more interactive.
Evolutionary algorithms for multi-objective optimization (EMO) have been exten-
sively studied and applied to a wide spectrum of real-world problems. One of the ma-
jor advantages of using evolutionary algorithms for optimization is their ability to scan
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Figure 7.1: Pareto-front for a Hypothetical Two Objective Problem.
through the global search space simultaneously, instead of restricting to localized regions
of gradient shifts. An EMO works with a population of trial solutions, trying to converge
on to the Pareto-optimal set by filtering out the infeasible or dominated ones. Having
multiple solutions from a single run of an EMO is not only an efficient approach, but
also helps a decision maker obtain an intuitive understanding of the different trade-off
options available at hand. The effectiveness of an EMO is thus characterized by its ability
to converge to the true Pareto-front and maintain a good distribution of solutions on the
front.
A number of algorithms have been proposed in this context [19, 39]. We employ
the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II) [27] for the multi-objective
optimization in this study. NSGA-II has gained a wide popularity in the multi-objective
optimization community, partly because of its efficiency in terms of the convergence and
diversity of solutions obtained, and partly due to its extensive application to solve real-
world problems.
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Figure 7.2: One Generation of NSGA-II.
7.4 Non-dominated Sorting GA (NSGA-II)
Similar to a simple genetic algorithm [33], NSGA-II starts with a population P0 of
N random solutions. A generation index t = 0,1, . . . ,GenMAX keeps track of the number
of iterations of the algorithm. Each generation of NSGA-II then proceeds as follows.
An offspring population Qt is first created from the parent population Pt by applying
the usual genetic operations of selection, crossover and mutation [33]. The parent and
offspring populations are combined to form a population Rt = Pt ∪Qt of size 2N. A non-
dominated sorting is applied to Rt to rank each solution based on the number of solutions
that dominate it. A rank k solution indicates that there are k other solutions that dominate
it. In the presence of constraints, the infeasible solutions are given unique ranks higher
than the highest feasible solution rank. The ranking starts in ascending order from the
infeasible solution with least constraint violation. The population Pt+1 is generated by
selecting N solutions from Rt . The preference of a solution is decided based on its rank:
lower the rank, higher the preference. By combining the parent and offspring population,
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and selecting from them using a non-dominance ranking, NSGA-II implements an elite-
preservation strategy where the best solutions obtained are always passed on to the next
generation. However, since not all solutions from Rt can be accommodated in Pt+1, a
choice is likely to be made when the number of solutions of the currently considered
rank is more than the remaining positions in Pt+1. Instead of making an arbitrary choice,
NSGA-II uses an explicit diversity-preservation mechanism. The mechanism, based on a
crowding distance metric [27], gives more preference to a solution with a lesser density
of solutions surrounding it, thereby enforcing diversity in the population. The NSGA-
II crowding distance metric for a solution is the sum of the average side-lengths of the
cuboid generated by its neighboring solutions. Figure 7.2 depicts a single generation of
the algorithm. For a problem with M objectives, the overall complexity of NSGA-II is
O(MN2).
7.5 A Simple Network Model
In this chapter, we consider the test-bed network as previously discussed in the Chap-
ter 4. The test-bed network consists of eight hosts located with in two subnets. The DMZ
subnet consists of Web server, Mail server, and DNS server. This subnet is opened to the
public. The second subnet lies the SQL Server and several local desktops including the
root machine. This subnet is the trusted zone. Hence, the access from the external are
restricted. A DMZ tri-homed firewall is installed with policies to ensure that Web server,
Mail server, and DNS server located in the DMZ network are separated from local net-
work so that if one of these is compromised, the damage will only be limited to the DMZ
zone. Figure 7.3 simplifies the the attack tree model of the test-bed network. We use an
in-house tool to generate this attack tree. The attack tree consists of 33 nodes covering
four distinctive attack scenarios targeting the administrative machine. From the model,
attacker takes advantage on public access of the web server (129.216.0.21) and exploits
the IIS vulnerability (CVE 2009-1535) to gain user privilege on the server (as illustrate in
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Figure 7.3: The Simplified Attack Tree of the Test-bed Network
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sub scenario A). After compromising Web server, attacker can either execute stack BOF
(ActiveX vulnerability), LICQ remote-2-user attack, or simply exploits trust between lo-
cal machines into bypassing the authentication mechanism. Any of these method allows
attackers to compromise the local machine. Then attacker executes Heap corruption BOF
attack to compromise Gateway server (196.216.0.128) from local machine and then use
the Gateway server to compromise the root machine.
According to the definition of an attack tree (see Definition 4). The multi-set S forms
the nodes of the tree. The multi-set Nexternal represents the leaf nodes of the tree. These
nodes reflect the initial vulnerabilities present in a network and prone to exploits. Since,
an attribute can be a precondition for more than one attack, it might have to be duplicated,
hence forming a multi-set. The attribute “Authentication bypass” in the example is one
such attribute. The set of ordered pairs, τ, reflect the edges in the tree. The existence of
an edge between two nodes imply that there is a direct or indirect relationship between
their truth values, signified by the decomposition at each node. The AND decomposition
at a node requires all child nodes to have a truth value of true for it to be true. The OR
decomposition at a node requires only one child node to have a truth value of true for it to
be true. Using these decompositions, the truth value of an attribute s j ∈ Ninternal ∪{sroot}
can be evaluated after assigning a set of truth values to the attributes si ∈ Nexternal .
7.6 Cost Model
In order to defend against the attacks possible, a security manager (decision maker)
can choose to implement a variety of safeguard technologies, each of which comes with
different cost and coverages. For example, to defend against the ftp/.rhost exploit, one
might choose to apply a security patch, disable the FTP service, or simply tighten the write
protection on the .rhost directory. Each choice of action can have a different cost. Besides,
some measures have multiple coverages, but with higher costs. A security manager has to
make a decision and choose to implement a subset of these policies in order to maximize
the resource utilization.
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However, this decision is not a trivial task. Security planning begins with risk as-
sessment which determines threats, loss expectancy, potential safeguards and installation
costs. Many researchers have studied risk assessment schemes, including the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). For simplicity, the security manager can
choose to evaluate the risks by considering a relative magnitude of loss and hardening
costs [16, 40, 64]. However, relative-cost approaches do not provide sufficient infor-
mation to prioritize security measures especially when the organization faces resource
constraints. We implement Butlers multi-attribute risk assessment framework [butler02a,
butler02b] to develop quantitative risk assessments for our security optimization. First we
define the notion of a security control in the context of the attack tree definition.
Definition 16 SECURITY CONTROL
Given an attack tree (sroot ,S,τ,ε), the mapping SC : Nexternal→{true, f alse} is a security
control if ∃ si ∈ Nexternal = f alse.
In other words, a security control is a preventive measure to falsify one or more attributes
so as to stop an attacker from reaching its goal. Further, in the presence of multiple




Given a security control SC, the set of all si ∈ Nexternal | SC(si = f alse) is called the
coverage of SC. Hence, for a given set of security controls we can define the coverage
matrix specifying the coverage of each control. For a given set of m security controls, we
use the boolean vector ~T = (T1,T2, . . . ,Tm) to indicate if a security control is chosen by a
security manager. Note that the choice of this vector indirectly specifies which attributes
in the attack tree would be false to begin with.
7.6.1 Evaluating Potential Damage
The potential damage, Pj , represents a unitless damage value that an organization
might have to incur in the event that an attribute s j becomes true. Based on Butlers
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framework, we specify below the four steps to calculating the potential damage for an
attribute s j.
1. Identify potential consequences of having a true value for the attribute, induced by
some attack. In our case, we have identified five outcomes lost revenue ($$$), non-
productive downtime (hrs), damage recovery ($$$), public embarrassment (severity
scale) and law penalty (severity scale) denoted by x1 j , x2 j , x3 j , x4 j and x5 j.
2. Estimate the expected number of attack occurrence, Freq j , resulting in the conse-
quences. A security manager can estimate the expected number of attack from the
organization-based historical data or public historical data. 1
3. Assess a single value function, Vi j(xi j), for each possible consequence. The purpose
of this function is to normalize different unit measures so that the values can be
summed together under a single standard scale.
Vi j(xi j) =
xi j
Max jxi j
×100 ,1≤ i≤ 5 (7.1)
4. Assign a preference weight factor, Wi, to each possible consequence. The weight
factor represents an organizations concerns for different outcomes. A security man-
ager can rank each outcome on a scale of 1 to 100. The outcome with the most
concern would receive 100 points. The manager ranks the other attributes relative
to the first. Finally, the ranks are normalized and set as Wi.
The potential damage for the attribute can then be calculated from the following equation.




Wi Vi j(xi j) (7.2)
When using an attack tree, a better quantitative representation of the cost is obtained by
considering the residual damage once a set of security policies are implemented. Hence,
1Also known as an incident report published annually in many sites such as CERT/CC or SANS.ORG.
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we augment each attribute in the attack tree with a value signifying the amount of potential
damage residing in the subtree rooted at the attribute and the attribute itself.
Definition 17 AUGMENTED-ATTACK TREE
Let AT = (sroot ,S,τ,ε) be an attack tree. An augmented attack tree ATaug = AT | 〈I,V 〉 is
obtained by associating a tuple 〈I,V 〉 to each si ∈ S, where
1. Ii is an indicator variable for the attribute si, where
Ii =
{
0 , i f si is f alse
1 , i f si is true
2. Vi is a value associated with the attribute si.
In this work, all attributes si ∈ Nexternal are given a zero value. The value associated with





Vk +I jPj i f d j is AND
Max
k|(sk,s j)∈τ
Vk +I jPj i f d j is OR
(7.3)
Ideally, Pj is same for all identical attributes in the multi-set. We took a “panic approach”
in calculating the value at each node, meaning that given multiple subtrees are rooted
at an attribute with an OR decomposition, we choose the maximum value. The residual
damage of the augmented tree is then defined as follows.
Definition 18 RESIDUAL DAMAGE
Given an augmented-attack tree (sroot ,S,τ,ε) | 〈I,V 〉 and a vector ~T = (Ti),Ti ∈
{0,1};1≤ i≤ m, the residual damage is defined as the value associated with sroot , i.e.,
RD(~T ) = Vroot
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7.6.2 Evaluating Security Cost
Similar to the potential damage, the security manager first lists possible security
costs for the implementation of a security control, assigns the weight factor on them, and
computes the normalized value. The only difference is that there is no expected number
of occurrence needed in the evaluation of security cost. In our case, we have identified
five different costs to implementing a security control installation cost ($$$), operation
cost ($$$), system downtime (hrs), incompatibility cost (scale), and training cost ($$$).
The overall cost C j , for the security control SC j , is then computed in a similar manner
as for potential damage, with an expected frequency of 1. The total security cost for a set
of security controls implemented is then defined as follows.
Definition 19 TOTAL SECURITY CONTROL COST
Given a set of m security controls, each having a cost Ci ; 1≤ i≤m, and a vector ~T = (Ti),







The two objectives we consider in this study are the total security control cost and
the residual damage in the attack tree of our example network model. For the attack
tree shown in Figure 7.3, we identified 19 different security controls possible by patching
or disabling of different services, as well as by changing file access permissions. These
controls are listed in Table 7.7.We also tried to maintain some relative order of importance
between the different services in a real world scenario when computing the potential
damage and security control costs.
Problem 1 THE SINGLE-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Given an augmented-attack tree (sroot ,S,τ,ε) | 〈I,V 〉 and m security controls, find a vector




i ∈ {0,1};1≤ i≤ m, which minimizes the function
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Security Action Security Action
Control Control
SC1/SC2 Disable/Patch WebDAV @ 196.216.0.21 SC11 Add Gateway Firewall @ 10.0.0.0/8
SC3/SC4 Disable/Patch LICQ @ 10.0.0.0-127 SC12/SC13 Disable/Patch SMTP @ 196.216.0.19
SC5 Patch Marshalling Engine @ 10.0.0.128 SC14/SC15 Disable/Patch OpenSSH @ 196.216.0.128
SC6/SC7 Disable/Patch port scan service @ 196.216.0.19 SC16 Disable remote shell service @ 10.0.0.0-127
SC8 Disconnect Internet @ 196.216.0.128 SC17 Disconnect Internet @ 196.216.0.19
SC9 Change to POP3 protocol @ 196.216.0.19 SC18 Patch Active X @ 10.0.0.0-127
SC10 Enforce digital signature @ 196.216.0.19 SC19 Disconnect Internet @ 196.216.0.21
αRD(~T ∗)+βSCC(~T ∗)
where, α and β are preference weights for the residual damage and the total cost of
security control respectively, 0≤ α, β≤ 1 and α+β = 1.
The single-objective problem is the most likely approach to be taken by a decision maker.
Given only two objectives, a preference based approach might seem to provide a solution
in accordance with general intuition. However, as we find in the case of our example net-
work model, the quality of the solution obtained can be quite sensitive to the assignment
of the weights. To demonstrate this affect, we run multiple instances of the problem using
different combination of values for α and β. α is varied in the range of [0, 1] in steps of
0.05. β is always set to 1−α.
Problem 2 THE MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Given an augmented-attack tree (sroot ,S,τ,ε) | 〈I,V 〉 and m security controls, find a vector
~T ∗ = (T ∗i ),T
∗
i ∈ {0,1};1≤ i≤m, which minimizes the total security control cost and the
residual damage.
The next level of sophistication is added by formulating the minimization as a multi-
objective optimization problem. The multi-objective approach alleviates the requirement
to specify any weight parameters and hence a better global picture of the solutions can be
obtained.
Problem 3 THE MULTI-OBJECTIVE ROBUST OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Let ~T = (Ti) be a boolean vector. A perturbed assignment of radius r, ~Tr, is then obtained
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by inverting the value of at most r elements of the vector~(T ). The robust optimization
problem can then be defined as follows.
Given an augmented-attack tree (sroot ,S,τ,ε) | 〈I,V 〉 and m security controls, find a vector
~T ∗ = (T ∗i ),T
∗
i ∈ {0,1};1≤ i≤m, which minimizes the total security control cost and the
residual damage, satisfying the constraint
Max
~T ∗r
RD(~T ∗r )−RD(~T ∗)≤ D
where, D is the maximum perturbation allowed in the residual damage.
The third problem is formulated to further strengthen the decision process by determining
robust solutions to the problem. Robust solutions are less sensitive to failures in security
controls and hence subside any repeated requirements to reevaluate solutions in the event
of a security control failure. We use a simple genetic algorithm (SGA) to solve Problem
1. NSGA-II is used to solve Problem 2 and 3.
The algorithm parameters are set as follows: population size = 200, number of gen-
erations = 200, crossover probability = 0.9, and mutation probability = 0.1. We ran each
instance of the algorithms five times to check for any sensitivity of the solutions obtained
from different initial populations. Since the solutions always converged to the same op-
tima, we dismiss the presence of such sensitivity.
7.8 Results and Discussion
We first study the sensitivity of NSGA-II and SGA to their parameters. Increasing
the population size from 200 to 400 gives us a faster convergence rate, although the solu-
tions reported still remains the same. The effect of changing the crossover probability in
the range of 0.7 to 0.9 does not lead to any significant change of the solutions obtained.
Similar results were observed when changing the mutation probability from 0.1 to 0.05.
The solutions also do not change when the number of generations is changed from 150
to 300. Since we did not observe any significant change in the solutions by varying the
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Figure 7.4: SGA Solutions to Problem 1 with α Varied from 0 to 1 in Steps of 0.05.
algorithm parameters, the following results are presented as obtained by setting the pa-
rameters as chosen in the previous section. It is usually suggested that the preference
based approach should normalize the functions before combining them into a single func-
tion. However, we did not see any change in the solutions in the normalized version of
Problem 1. Figure 7.4 shows the solutions obtained from various runs of SGA in Problem
1 with varying α. A decision maker, in general, might want to assign equal weights to
both the objective functions, i.e. set α = 0.5. It is clear from the figure that such as assign-
ment do not necessarily provide the desired balance between the residual damage and the
total security control cost. Furthermore, such balance is also not obtainable by assigning
weight values in the neighborhood of 0.5.
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The solutions obtained are quite sensitive to the weights, and in this case, much
higher preference must be given to the total security control cost to find the other pos-
sible solutions. Since the weights do not always influence the objectives in the desired
manner, understanding their effect is not a trivial task for a decision maker. It is also not
possible to always do an exhaustive analysis of the affect of the weights on the objectives.
Given such situations, the decision maker should consider obtaining a global picture of
the trade-offs possible. With such a requirement in mind, we next consider Problem 2.
The corresponding solutions from Problem 1 are shown in Table 7.8. The two solutions
Table 7.1: Security Controls Obtained for Problem 1 with Different α and β.
α Optimum security controls RD SCC
0 null (31777) 0
0.05, 0.1 SC2, SC13, SC15 (3700) 625
0.2 to 0.35 SC1, SC6,SC13,SC15 (1094) 930
0.4 to 0.5 SC1,SC6, SC9, SC13, SC15 (612) 1135
0.55,1.0 SC1, SC6, SC12, SC15 (566) 1370
corresponding to α = 0.2 and 0.35, including any other solutions in the vicinity, are likely
candidates for a decision makers choice as it reduces risk down to an acceptable level with
a reasonable cost. Unlike the single objective approach, where determining such vicinal
solutions could be difficult, the multi-objective optimization approach clearly revealed
the existence of at least one such solution.
Figure 7.5 shows the solutions obtained from a single run of NSGA-II on Problem
2. NSGA-II reported all the solutions obtained from multiple runs of SGA, as well as
12 more solutions. Interestingly, there exists no solution in the intermediate range of (0,
600] for security control cost. This inclination of solutions towards the extremities of the
residual damage could be indicative of the non-existence of much variety in the security
controls under consideration. Most of the security controls for the example network in-
volve either the disabling or patching of a service, resulting in a sparse coverage matrix.
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Figure 7.5: NSGA-II Solutions to Problem 2 and Sensitivity of a Solution to Optimum
Settings.
For a more “continuous” Pareto-front, it is required to have security controls of compara-
tive costs and capable of covering multiple services. A real-world scenario would likely
have a good mixture of both local and global security controls, in which case, such gaps
in the Pareto-front will be unlikely. Once the decision maker has a better perspective
of the solutions possible, further analysis of the solutions may be carried out in terms
of their sensitivity to security control failures. Such sensitivity analysis is helpful in not
only reducing valuable decision making time, but also to guarantee some level of fault
tolerance in the network. Figure 7.5 shows the sensitivity of the solutions R4 to a failure
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in one of the security controls corresponding to the solution. This solution, with security
controls SC2, SC13 and SC15, will incur a high residual damage in the event of a failure
of SC2. Thus, a decision maker may choose to perform a sensitivity analysis on each of
the solutions and incorporate the results thereof in making the final choice. However, the
decision maker then has no control on how much of additional residual damage would be
incurred in the event of failure. Problem 3 serves the requirements of this decision stage
by allowing the decision maker to specify the maximum allowed perturbation in the resid-
ual damage. It is possible to specify the scope of failure the radius r within which the
decision maker is interested in analyzing the robustness of the solutions. Because of the
sparse nature of the coverage matrix, we set the perturbation radius r to 1. Also, we are
mostly interested in obtaining solutions that are fully robust, meaning the residual damage
should not increase. However, we can not found alternate solution unless we allow the
residual damage tolerance > 500, hence we set D to 1000. Figure 7.6 shows the solutions
obtained for this problem. The solutions to Problem 3 reveals that none of the optimum
solutions, except the trivial zero SCC solution, previously obtained is fully robust, even
for a single security control failure. Such insight could be of much value for a decision
maker when making a final choice. Table 7.8 shows the security controls corresponding
to the selected robust solutions.
Table 7.2: Robust Solutions Obtained by NSGA-II with r = 1.
Robust-optimum security controls RD SCC
R’0 null (31777) 0
R1 SC3,SC6 (30666) 145
R2 SC8, SC9,SC14, SC15 (24992) 460
R3 SC1, SC16 (14428) 730
R4 SC2, SC6, SC14, SC15 (9359) 805
R5 SC2, SC6, SC12, SC13, SC14 (2282) 1275
R6 SC1, SC6, SC12, SC13, SC14 (566) 1515
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Figure 7.6: NSGA-II Solutions to Problem 3 with D = 1000 and r = 1. Problem 2 solutions
are also shown for comparison.
80
7.9 Chapter Summary
In this paper, we addressed the system administrators dilemma, namely, how to se-
lect, when needed, a subset of security hardening measures from a given set so that the
total cost of implementing these measures is not only minimized but also within budget
and, at the same time, the cost of residual damage is also minimized. We formulated
the problem as a multi-objective optimization problem and used non-dominated sorting
genetic algorithm to solve it. One important contribution of our solution is the use of an
attack tree model of the network to drive the solution. Without the attack tree modeling,
the optimization problems would be mostly flat in structure. The choice of security con-
trols would then be determined by the number of coverage they provide and the cost to
do so. By using an attack tree in the problem, we were able to better guide the optimiza-
tion process by providing the knowledge about the attributes that make an attack possible.
Quite often, a policy that disables a single attribute is enough to forbid an attack scenario.
Vulnerability management would not be of much practical use without integrating such
attack modeling approaches in the optimization procedures. Further, a systematic analysis
enabled us to approach the problem in a modular fashion, providing added information
to a decision maker to form a concrete opinion about the quality of the different trade-off
solutions possible.
The cost model that we adopted in this paper is somewhat simplistic. We assumed
that from a cost of implementation perspective the security measures are independent
of each other when in real life they may not be so. In addition, we have assumed that
the system administrators decision is in no way influenced by an understanding of the
cost to break the system. Finally, there is a dynamic aspect to the system administrators
dilemma. During run time the system administrator may need to revise her decision based
on emerging security conditions. In future we plan to refine our models to incorporate
these scenarios.
Chapter 8
DYNAMIC SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION USING
BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPHS
Security risk assessment and mitigation are two vital processes that need to be ex-
ecuted to maintain a productive IT infrastructure. On one hand, models such as attack
graphs and attack trees have been proposed to assess the cause-consequence relation-
ships between various network states, while on the other hand, different decision prob-
lems have been explored to identify the minimum-cost hardening measures. However,
these risk models do not help reason about the causal dependencies between network
states. Further, the optimization formulations ignore the issue of resource availability
while analyzing a risk model. In this paper, we propose a risk assessment framework
using Bayesian networks that enable a system administrator to quantify the chances of
network compromise at various levels, and show how to use this information to develop
a security mitigation and management plan. This risk model lends itself to dynamic anal-
ysis during the deployed phase of the network. A multi-objective optimization platform
provides the administrator with all trade-off information required to make decisions in a
resource constrained environment.
8.1 Introduction
Traditionally, information security planning and management for an organization
begins with risk assessment that determines threats to critical resources and the corre-
sponding loss expectancy. A number of researchers have proposed risk assessment meth-
ods by building security models of network systems, using paradigms like attack graphs
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[12, 38, 50, 62, 65] and attack trees [25, 43, 52, 60], and then finding attack paths in these
models to determine scenarios that could lead to damage. However, a majority of these
models fail to consider the attacker’s capabilities and, consequently, the likelihood of a
particular attack being executed. Without these considerations, threats and their impact
can be easily misjudged.
To alleviate such drawbacks, Dantu et al. [24] propose a probabilistic model to as-
sess network risks. They model network vulnerabilities using attack graphs and applied
Bayesian logic to perform risk analysis. Liu and Man [41] use Bayesian networks to
model potential attack paths in a system, and develop algorithms to compute an optimal
subset of attack paths based on background knowledge of attackers and attack mecha-
nisms. In both Dantu et al.’s and Liu and Man’s works, nodes in the attack graph are
assigned a probability value that describes the likelihood of attack on a node. They com-
pute the likelihood of system compromise by chaining Bayesian belief rules on top of
the assigned probabilities. The organizational risk is then computed as the product of the
likelihood of system compromise and the value of expected loss. The major problem with
both these works is that they do not specify how the conditional probability value of an
attack on each node is computed. Further, these works do not consider the problem of
optimal risk mitigation.
System administrators are often interested in assessing the risk to their systems and
determining the best possible way to defend their network in terms of an enumerated
set of hardening options. Risk assessment methods such as those discussed earlier have
been adopted by researchers to determine a set of potential safeguards, and related se-
curity control installation costs. Noel et al. uses exploit dependency graphs to compute
minimum-cost hardening measures [47]. Given a set of initial conditions in the graph,
they compute boolean assignments to these conditions, enforced by some hardening mea-
sures, to minimize the total cost. Jha et al. [38] determine the minimal set of attacks
critical for reaching a goal and then find the minimal set of security measures that cover
this set of attacks.
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While such cost analysis is useful, they miss out on one major issue. The system ad-
ministrator often has to work within a given set of budget constraints which may preclude
her from implementing all possible hardening measures or even measures that cover all
the weak spots. Thus, the system administrator needs to find a trade-off between the cost
of implementing a subset of security hardening measures (from a set of measures that can
potentially close all attack paths) and the damage that can be potentially inflicted on the
system after the security decision has been made (the residual damage). Dewri et al. [30]
first formulated this so-called “system administrators’ dilemma” (discussed above) as a
series of multi-objective optimization problems. The solutions to these problems allow
one to select a subset of hardening measures so that the total cost of implementing them
is not only minimized but also within a fixed budget and, at the same time, the residual
damage is minimized. One of the significant contributions of this work is the development
of an attack tree model of network risks in order to drive the solution methodology. The
attack tree model is able to better guide the optimization process by providing knowledge
about the attributes that make an attack possible. While this work makes significant con-
tribution towards appreciating the security planning process as something beyond simple
risk assessment, it has one significant shortcoming. The authors’ modeling of the prob-
lem is a static one. There is however a dynamic aspect to the security planning process.
For every attack, there is a certain probability of occurrence that can change during the
life time of a system depending on what the contributing factors for the attack are and
how they are changing. During run time, the system administrator may need to revise
her decision based on such emerging security conditions. Dewri et al.’s attack tree model
does not allow such dynamic security planning. In order to address these limitations, the
current work makes five major contributions.
• We propose an alternative method of security risk assessment that we call Bayesian
Attack Graphs (BAGs). In particular, we adapt the notion of Bayesian belief net-
works so as to encode the contribution of different security conditions during sys-
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tem compromise. Our model incorporates the usual cause-consequence relation-
ships between different network states (as in attack graphs and attack trees) and, in
addition, takes into account the likelihoods of exploiting such relationships.
• We propose a method to estimate an organization’s risk from different vulnerability
exploitations based on the metrics defined in the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) [59]. CVSS is designed to be an open and standardized method to
rate IT vulnerabilities based on their base, temporal and environmental properties.
• We develop a model to quantify the expected return on investment based on a user
specified cost model and likelihoods of system compromise.
• We model the risk mitigation stage as a discrete reasoning problem and propose a
genetic algorithm to solve it. The algorithm can identify optimal mitigation plans
in the context of both single and multi-objective analysis.
• Last, but not the least, we discuss how the above contributions collectively provide
a platform for static and dynamic analysis of risks in networked systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The test network used to illustrate our
problem is shown in Section 4.1. Section 8.3 presents the formalism for a Bayesian
Attack Graph model. The likelihood estimation method in static and dynamic scenarios
is discussed in Section 8.4. The risk mitigation process along with the expected cost
computations is presented in Section 8.5. Results and discussion are presented in Section
8.6. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.7.
8.2 A Test Network
We revisit the test-bed network previously discussed in the Chapter 4. Figure 8.1
recaptures the test network. The network consists of eight hosts located within two sub-
nets. A DMZ tri-homed firewall is installed with preset policies to ensure that the Web
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Figure 8.1: Test-bed Network Model.
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server, Mail server and the DNS server, located in the DMZ network, are separated from
the local network so that the damage will only be limited to the DMZ zone if one of these
servers is compromised. The firewall has a strong set of policies (shown in the inset table)
to prevent remote access to the internal hosts. In particular, all machines in the DMZ zone
passively receive service requests and only respond to the sender as needed. However, in
order to accommodate Web service’s transactions, the Web server is allowed to send SQL
queries to the SQL server located in the trusted zone on a designated channel. Local
machines are located behind a NAT firewall so that all communications to external parties
are delivered through the Gateway server. In addition, all local desktops, including the
administrator machine, have remote desktop enabled to facilitate remote operations for
company employees working from remote sites. The remote connections are monitored
by SSHD installed in the Gateway server.
A list of initial vulnerabilities/attack templates in this test network is listed in Table
8.1. Further scrutiny of this initial list using a vulnerability database reveals that eight
malicious outcomes are possible in this network. However, the list of vulnerabilities alone
cannot suggest the course of actions that lead to these outcomes, or accurately assess the
casualty of each outcome as it may have involved other damages along the way. These
vulnerabilities produce more than 20 attack scenarios with different outcomes, ranging
from information leakage to system compromise. Moreover, two of these scenarios use
machines in the DMZ zone to compromise a local machine in the trusted zone.
8.3 Modeling Network Attacks
We use a Bayesian belief network to model network vulnerabilities. We extend the
notion of Bayesian networks as presented by Liu and Man [41] to encode the contri-
butions of different security conditions during a system compromise. We term such a
Bayesian network as a Bayesian Attack Graph (BAG). Different properties of the net-
work effectuate different ways for an attacker to compromise a system. We first define an
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Host Vulnerability CVE# Attack Template
Local desktops Remote login CA 1996-83 remote-2-user
(10.0.0.1-127) LICQ Buffer Overflow (BOF) CVE 2001-0439 remote-2-user
MS Video ActiveX Stack BOF CVE 2009-0015 remote-2-root
Admin machine MS SMV service Stack BOF CVE 2008-4050 local-2-root
(10.0.0.128)
Gateway server OpenSSL uses predicable random CVE 2008-0166 information leakage
(196.216.0.128) Heap corruption in OpenSSH CVE 2003-0693 local-2-root
Improper cookies handler in OpenSSH CVE 2007-4752 authentication bypass
SQL Server SQL Injection CVE 2008-5416 remote-2-root
(196.216.0.130)
Mail Server Remote code execution in SMTP CVE 2004-0840 remote-2-root
(196.216.0.19) Error message information leakage CVE 2008-3060 account information theft
Squid port scan vulnerability CVE 2001-1030 information leakage
DNS Server DNS Cache Poisoning CVE 2008-1447 integrity
(196.216.0.20)
Web Server IIS vulnerability in WebDAV service CVE 2009-1535 remote-2-local
(196.216.0.20) authentication bypass
Table 8.1: Initial List of Vulnerabilities in Test-bed Network
attribute-template that allows us to categorize these network properties for further analy-
sis.
Definition 20 ATTRIBUTE-TEMPLATE
An attribute-template is a generic property of the network which includes, but not limited
to, the following:
1. system vulnerabilities (which are often reported in vulnerability databases such as
BugTraq, CERT/CC, or netcat),
2. (insecure) system properties such as unsafe security policy, corrupted file/memory
access permission, or read-write access in file structure,
3. (insecure) network properties such as unsafe network condition, unsafe firewall
properties, unsafe device/peripheral access permission, and
4. access privilege such as user account, guest account, or root account.
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An attribute-template helps us categorize most of the atomic properties of the network
that may be useful to an attacker. For example, “SSH buffer overflow vulnerability in FTP
server” can be considered as an instance of the system vulnerabilities template. Similarly,
“user access on Local machine” is an instance of the access privilege template. Such
templates also let us specify the properties as random variables. We define an attribute
with such a concept in mind.
Definition 21 ATTRIBUTE
An attribute is a Bernoulli random variable representing the state of an instance of an
attribute-template.
An attribute S is therefore associated with a state – True (S = 1/T ) or False (S = 0/F) –
and a probability Pr(S). The state signifies the truth value of the proposition underlined
by the instance of the attribute template. For example, the instance S :“user access on
Local machine” is an attribute when associated with a truth value signifying whether an
attacker has user access on the local machine. We shall also use the term “compromised”
to indicate the true (or S = 1) state of an attribute. Further, Pr(S) is the probability of the
attribute being in state S = 1. Consequently, Pr(¬S) = 1−Pr(S) is the probability of the
state being S = 0. The success or failure of an attacker reaching its goal depends mostly on
the states of the attributes in a network. It also lays the foundations for a security manager
to analyze the effects of forcing some attributes to the false state using security measures.
We formally define a BAG to capture the cause-consequence relationships between such
attributes.
Definition 22 ATOMIC ATTACK
Let S be a set of attributes. We define A , a conditional dependency between a pair of
attributes, as a mapping A : S×S→ [0,1]. Then, given spre,spost ∈ S, a : spre 7→ spost is
called an atomic attack if
1. spre 6= spost ,
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2. given spre = 1, spost = 1 with probability A(spre,spost) > 0, and
3. @s1, . . . ,s j ∈ S − {spre,spost} such that A(spre,s1) > 0,A(s1,s2) > 0, . . . , and
A(s j,spost) > 0.
Therefore, an atomic attack allows an attacker to compromise the attribute spost from spre
with a non-zero probability of success. Although, given a compromised attribute, another
attribute can be compromised with positive probability using a chain of other attributes;
the third condition in the definition does not allow such instances to be considered as
atomic attacks. Instead, each step in such a chain is an atomic attack. Informally, an
attack is associated with a vulnerability exploitation, denoted by ei, which takes the at-
tacker from one network state (spre) to another (spost). The probability of an exploitation,
Pr(ei), states the ease with which an attacker can perform the exploitation. Hence, we
say that A(spre,spost) = Pr(ei), and spre and spost are respectively called a precondition
and postcondition of the attack a, denoted by pre(a) and post(a) respectively. An attack
relates the states of two different attributes so as to embed a cause-consequence relation-
ship between the two. For example, for the attributes spre =“sshd BOF vulnerability on
machine A” and spost =“root access privilege on machine A”, the attack spre 7→ spost is
associated with the ei =“sshd buffer overflow” exploit. Using this exploit, an attacker can
achieve root privilege on a machine provided the machine has the sshd BOF vulnerability.
A(spre,spost) is the probability of success of the exploit, i.e. A(spre,spost) = Pr(ei).
Definition 23 BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPH
Let S be a set of attributes and A be the set of atomic attacks defined on S. A Bayesian
Attack Graph is a tuple BAG = (S,τ,ε,P ), where
1. S = Ninternal ∪Nexternal ∪Nterminal . Nexternal denotes the set of attributes si for which
@a ∈ A|si = post(a). Ninternal denotes the set of attributes s j for which ∃a1,a2 ∈
A|[s j = pre(a1) and s j = post(a2)]. Nterminal denotes the set of attributes Sk for
which @a ∈ A|Sk = pre(a).
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2. τ ⊆ S× S. An ordered pair (spre,spost) ∈ τ if spre 7→ spost ∈ A. Further, for si ∈ S,
the set Pa[si] = {s j ∈ S|(s j,si) ∈ τ} is called the parent set of si.
3. ε is a set of decomposition tuples of the form 〈s j,d j〉 defined for all s j ∈ Ninternal ∪
Nterminal and d j ∈ {AND,OR}. d j is AND if s j = 1⇒∀si ∈ Pa[s j],si = 1. d j is OR
if s j = 1⇒∃si ∈ Pa[s j],si = 1.
4. P is a set of discrete conditional probability distribution functions. Each attribute
s j ∈ Ninternal ∪Nterminal has a discrete local conditional probability distribution
(LCPD) representing the values of Pr(s j | Pa[s j]).
Figure 8.2 shows the BAG for our test network. We have developed an in-house tool to
generate such BAGs. The tool takes as input an initial vulnerability table, generated by
a vulnerability scanner, and the network topology (currently provided manually to the
tool). Using a sequence of SQL queries on a vulnerability exposure database, the tool
creates consequence attributes for the graph until no further implications can be derived.
The BAG in Figure 8.2 depicts a clear picture of 20 different attack scenarios. Each node
is a Bernoulli random variable (si) representing the state variable of the attribute. The
set Nexternal represents the entry points of the graph. These nodes reflect an attacker’s
capability as discovered in a threat-source model. Nterminal resemble the end points in the
graph. These nodes reflect casualty at the end of each attack scenario. The set of ordered
pair, τ, reflects the edges in the graph. The existence of an edge between two nodes imply
that there is a causal dependency between their states, signified by the decomposition at
each node. AND-decomposition signifies that the compromised state of a node implies
that all nodes in its parent set have also been compromised. Similarly, OR-decomposition
signifies that at least one parent node is in the true state. Note that these decompositions
are uni-directional. For instance, under AND-decomposition, compromising all nodes in
the parent set does not necessarily imply the node itself has been compromised. This is
because the attacks relating the node with its parents can have varying levels of difficulty,
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Figure 8.2: BAG of Test-bed Network with Unconditional Probabilities
or in other words, different probabilities of success. Hence, although the preconditions
of the attacks have been met, there can still be a non-zero probability that the attacker
is unable to carry out all the exploits successfully. The existence of this probability is
what primarily differentiates a BAG from a classical attack graph. The probabilities are
captured in the local conditional probability distribution of the node. The LCPD is a set of
probability values specifying the chances of the node being compromised, given different
combination of states of its parents.
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Definition 24 LOCAL CONDITIONAL PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION
Let BAG = (S,τ,ε,P ) be a BAG and s j ∈ Ninternal ∪Nterminal . For si ∈ Pa[s j], let ei be the
vulnerability exploitation associated with the attack si 7→ s j. A local conditional proba-
bility distribution (LCPD) function of s j, mathematically equivalent to Pr(s j | Pa[s j]), is
defined as follows.
1. d j = AND
Pr(s j | Pa[s j]) =
0, ∃si ∈ Pa[s j] | si = 0Pr( ⋂
si=1
ei), otherwise
2. d j = OR
Pr(s j | Pa[s j]) =
0, ∀si ∈ Pa[s j],si = 0Pr( ⋃
si=1
ei), otherwise
To compute the local conditional probabilities when multiple exploits are involved, we
proceed as follows. For AND-decomposition, each vulnerability exploitation is a distinct
event. The chance of compromising the target node depends on the success of each in-











For OR-decomposition, Liu et al. observed that the joint probability is equivalent to the







8.4 Security Risk Assessment with BAG
Security risk management consists of threat analysis, risk assessment, loss ex-
pectancy, potential safeguards and risk mitigation analysis. A BAG positions itself be-
tween threat analysis and risk assessment. Threat sources and the list of initial vulnera-
bilities are used to build the BAG threat model. Once the graph is built, the administrator
can expect better results in risk assessment and risk mitigation analysis as follows.
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1. Static Risk Assessment: Risk assessment begins with the identification of system
characteristics, potential threat sources and attacker capabilities. Threat sources
are represented as the external nodes in a BAGs, along with their impact on other
network attributes. One set of attributes act as preconditions to an exploit, which
when successfully executed by an attacker, can make the network state favorable for
subsequent exploits. Estimating the amount of risk at each node therefore requires
some judgment on attacker capabilities. Often this judgment is indirectly stated
as the system administrator’s subjective belief on the likelihood of a threat source
becoming active and the difficulty of an exploit. The former is represented by the
probabilities Pr(si) for all si ∈ Nexternal , also called the prior probabilities, and is
subjectively assigned by the administrator. The latter is incorporated into an internal
node’s LCPD. Thereafter, given the prior probability values and the LCPDs, we can
compute the unconditional probability Pr(s j) for any node s j ∈ Ninternal ∪Nterminal .
These risk estimates can be used to help locate weak spots in the system design and
operations.
2. Dynamic Risk Assessment: A deployed system may experience first hand attack
incidents during its life cycle. Formally, an attack incident is evidence that an at-
tribute is in the true state. A security administrator may then want to investigate how
these incidents impact the risk estimates initially derived solely based on subjective
beliefs. Knowledge about attack incidents is therefore used to update the probabili-
ties using the Bayesian inference techniques of forward and backward propagation.
Forward propagation updates the probability on successor attributes that are directly
influenced by the evidences. Backward propagation corrects/adjusts the initial hy-
pothesis on all prior attributes. Thereafter, the posterior probabilities (updated un-
conditional probabilities) reflect the likelihoods of other potential outcomes under
the light of detected events.
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CVSS metrics group CVSS attributes category score
base metrics access vector(B AV ) local(L) 0.395
adjacent network(A) 0.646
network(N) 1.0




instance(B AU) single(S) 0.56
none(N) 0.704
temporal metrics exploitability unproved(U) 0.85
(tools & techniques) proof-of-concept(POC) 0.9
(T E) functional(F) 0.95
high(H) 1.0




report confidence (T RC) unconfirmed(UC) 0.90
uncorroborative(UR) 0.95
confirmed(C) 1.0
Table 8.2: CVSS Attributes Used for Estimation of Attack Likelihood.
3. Risk Mitigation Analysis: Risk assessment paves the way for efficient decision mak-
ing targeted at countering risks either in a proactive or reactive manner. Given a set
of security measures (e.g. firewall, access control policy, cryptography, etc.), we
can design the security plan which is the most resource efficient in terms of re-
ducing risk levels in the system. This can be done before the deployment (static
mitigation) or in response to attack incidents (dynamic mitigation).
8.4.1 Probability of Vulnerability Exploitation
In order to compute the local conditional probability distribution (LCPD) of an at-
tribute, the administrator needs to estimate the probability of success while an attacker
exploits a known vulnerability exploitation. We propose a method to estimate this at-
tack likelihood using publicly available risk exposure data sources. In particular, we are
interested in deriving attack likelihoods using the metrics defined in NIST’s Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [59]. A CVSS score is a decimal number on a
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scale of 0 to 10. It is composed of three groups – base, temporal and environmental. The
base metrics quantify the intrinsic characteristics of a vulnerability with two sub-scores –
(i) the exploitability sub-score, composed of the access vector (B AV ), access complex-
ity (B AC) and authentication instances (B AU), and (ii) the impact sub-score, expressing
the potential damage on confidentiality (B C), integrity (B I) and availability (B A). The
temporal metrics quantify dynamic aspects of a vulnerability on the environment around
the organization. These metrics take into account the availability of exploitable tools and
techniques (T E), remediation level (T RL) and report confidence (T RC). The envi-
ronmental metrics quantify two aspects of impact that are dependent on the environment
surrounding the organization. More details on CVSS metrics and their scoring computa-
tion can be found in the CVSS guide [59]. In this study, we are interested in likelihood
estimation and hence the impact sub-score and environmental metrics are ignored in the
analysis. A summary of the metrics used here is shown in Table 8.2. We refine Houmb’s
Misuse Frequency model [36] to estimate the probability of success in vulnerability ex-
ploitation. Given the vulnerability exposure information (CVSS attributes), the probabil-
ity of success Pr(ei) while executing a given vulnerability exploitation ei is computed by
the following equations.
Pr(ei) = (1−µ)MFinit +µMFuFac, where (8.3)
0 ≤ µ ≤ 0.5
MFinit = B AV×B AC×B AU0.49984
MFuFac = T E×T RL×T RC.
The constant µ represents the evaluator’s preference weight on temporal knowledge of the
exploitation. In the case where the vulnerability exploitation is unknown to the evaluator,
the estimation should rely on the base score by setting µ to zero. In the case where
the evaluator or organization has experienced the vulnerability exploitation, or there is
an ongoing concern about the exploitation, the evaluator may set the value of µ to a
specific value. However, we bound µ to a maximum value of 0.5 in order to restrict
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likelihood estimates based solely on temporal factors. Nonetheless, temporal metrics help
capture the uncertainties in relatively new exploits. For instance, at the time of writing
this article, CVE announced a vulnerability in Acrobat Reader(VU#905281) where the
only workaround is to disable JavaScript in Acrobat Reader. In such a case, temporal
metrics often influence security decisions because of immediate needs. We design µ to
capture such an aspect.
Our empirical estimation in Eq. (8.3) preserves the CVSS design characteristics
and extends the range of possible values in Houmb’s model [36] from [0.53,0.83] to
[0.12,1.00].
8.4.2 Local Conditional Probability Distributions
Refer to the BAG in Figure 8.3. Nodes A:“root/FTP server”, B:“Matu FTP BOF”
and C:“remote BOF on ssh” are internal attributes, while node D:“remote attacker” is
an external attribute. A is the successor of B and C which in turn are successors of D.
The values on the edges reflect the probability of success of the associated vulnerability
exploitation, computed by following the procedure described in the previous section. We
begin by assigning a prior probability of Pr(D) = 0.7 to the external attribute D. This
probability represents the administrator’s subjective belief on the chances of a remote at-
tack. For the nodes A,B and C, we calculate LCPDs by the equations previously defined
in Definition 24. For example, for node A, there are 22 marginal cases given the two par-
ents B and C. The decomposition at the node dictates the rule to follow while computing
the local conditional probability for each case.
8.4.3 Unconditional Probability to Assess Security Risk
Once the LCPDs have been assigned to all attributes in the BAG, we can merge the
marginal cases at each node to obtain the unconditional probability at the node. This is
commonly known as marginalization. Further, given a set of Bernoulli random variables
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S = {s1, ...,sn} in a Bayesian belief network, the joint probability of all the variables is





Pr(si | Pa[si]). (8.4)
In Figure 8.3, the unconditional probability at node A is derived as the joint probability
Figure 8.3: Simple BAG Illustrating Probability Computations.
of A along with all nodes that influence its outcome, which is essentially all ancestors of
A. Hence we have,
Pr(A) = Pr(A,B,C,D)




[Pr(A | B,C)×Pr(B | D)×
Pr(C | D)×Pr(D)]




Similarly, unconditional probabilities at nodes B and C can be computed by considering
the sub-network rooted at the corresponding nodes. The unconditional probabilities are
shown under the LCPD table of each node. Figure 4.2 shows the unconditional probabil-
ities of the nodes in our test network. It exposes the weak spots of the system where the
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likelihood of attack is higher than others. The security administrator can use this threat
model to prioritize risk and derive an effective security hardening plan so as to reduce
the risk to a certain level (e.g. < 50%) before deploying the system. The model can also
be used to assess what-if scenarios, for e.g. while deploying new machines, services, or
operations of interest.
8.4.4 Posterior Probability with Attack Evidence
The BAG can also be used to address dynamic aspects of the security planning pro-
cess. Every network state has a certain probability of occurrence. This probability can
change during the life time of the system due to emerging security conditions, changes
in contributing factors or the occurrence of attack incidents. The BAG can then be used
to calculate the posterior probabilities in order to evaluate the risk from such emerging
conditions. Let S = {s1, ...,sn} be the set of attributes in a BAG and E = {s′1, ...,s′m} ⊂ S
be a set of attributes where some evidence of exploit have been observed. We can say that
attributes in E are in the true state, i.e. s′i = 1 for all s
′
i ∈ E. Let s j ∈ S−E be an attribute
whose posterior probability has to be determined. The probability we are interested in is
Pr(s j | E) and can be obtained by using the Bayes Theorem, given as
Pr(s j | E) = Pr(E | s j)×Pr(s j)/Pr(E). (8.5)
Pr(E | s j) is the conditional probability of joint occurrence of s′1, ...,s′m given the states of
s j. Pr(E) and Pr(s j) are the prior unconditional probability values of the corresponding
attributes. Since evidence attributes in E are mutually independent, Pr(E | s j) = ∏i Pr(s′i |
s j) and Pr(E) = ∏i Pr(s′i). For example, in Figure 8.3, assume that the system adminis-
trator detects an attack incident on A (attacker compromises FTP server). The posterior
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probability of C is then computed as follows.
Pr(C | A) = Pr(A |C)Pr(C)/Pr(A)
= 0.81 where





Similarly, the posterior probability at node B can be computed in the same manner. Note
that the unconditional probability of node C was originally 0.49. After taking into account
the attack incident at node A, the posterior probability becomes 0.81. Further, computa-
tion of posterior probabilities for successor nodes of A (forward propagation) remains the
same as described in the previous sub-section, with the change that the LCPDs at those
nodes only account for the A = 1 case while marginalization. In this manner, the secu-
rity administrator can revise the probability of occurrence of every node of the graph in
response to an emerging attack incident. Figure 8.4 shows the posterior probabilities in
response to two hypothetical evidences (denoted by the label E©) in the Mail server of our
test network. Note that the parent (“root access @ 196.216.0.19”) of the evidence node
“squid port scan” has a posterior probability of less than 1.0. Ideally, given the evidence
that the port scan has been executed, the attacker must have had root access on the ma-
chine. Hence, the parent node should also have an updated probability of 1.0. However,
this inference assumes that the squid port scan is only executable after gaining root ac-
cess on the machine. The system administrator may decide to relax such an assumption in
order to account for uncertainties (e.g. zero-day attacks), achieved by replacing the zero
values in Def. 24 with non-zero values. Such a relaxation will reduce the impact of the
evidence nodes on their parents.
As can be seen in Figure 8.4, most of the unconditional probabilities increase after
the attack incidents, but not at the same rate. It is possible to have nodes with decreased
probabilities as well. In this specific scenario, there is a significant increase in the chance
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that the administrator machine is targeted by an attacker. This observation shows that the
attacker is likely to execute an attack to compromise the root machine. Hence, sufficient
measures should be taken to protect it. Moreover, it is also possible that the mitigation
plan designed earlier in static analysis may no longer be appropriate under the light of the
emerging events. We will formally address this problem in the next section.
Figure 8.4: Posterior Probabilities in Test-bed Network After Attack Incidents (marked
by E©).
8.5 Security Risk Mitigation with BAG
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Although many researchers have studied risk assessment schemes, including the
NIST, the methodologies used to estimate loss varies from organization to organization.
Loss can be measured in terms of monetary units, relative magnitudes [13, 16, 40, 64] or
multi-units [17, 18, 30]. In a BAG, the security manager can choose to evaluate the risks
by considering an expected loss/gain quantity. The expected loss/gain is computed from
organization specific factors such as potential loss or gain associated with an attribute’s
states. It usually reflects the impact of attack likelihoods on the economic turnout of an
organization. We will describe this scheme later in the section. We begin with the notion
of a security control in the context of the BAG.
8.5.1 Assessing Security Controls
Definition 25 SECURITY CONTROL
Given a BAG (S,τ,ε,P ), a Bernoulli random variable Mi is a security control if ∃s j ∈
Ninternal ∪Nexternal such that Pr(s j | Pa[s j],Mi = T ) < Pr(s j | Pa[s j],Mi = F) for at least
one assignment of states to Pa[s j]. Further, Pr(Mi) = 1.0 if Mi = T ; otherwise zero.
In other words, a security control is a preventive measure that minimizes or eliminates the
likelihood of attack on one or more attributes so as to prevent an attacker from reaching
its goal. We define the security measure as a Bernoulli random variable with the true
state signifying that the control is enforced and false signifying that the control is known
but not enforced. Enforcement of a control directly influences the LCPD of the asso-
ciated attribute and indirectly impacts the unconditional probabilities of other attributes.
For example, the probability of the node A in Figure 8.3 is initially Pr(A | B,C). As-
sume that a security measure M0:“local access control” can influence the outcome at
A. The probability distribution therefore becomes Pr(A | B,C,M0) and the LCPD of the
node is hypothetically expanded as shown in Table 8.3. The probabilities when M0 = 0
are directly taken from the original LCPD. However, probabilities for M0 = 1 are as-
signed based on certain subjective belief on the security measure’s capacity to prevent
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the attribute’s compromise. The modified LCPDs are used to compute the unconditional
probability of nodes in the graph. It is not difficult to see that the unconditional probabil-
ity of a node (and its successors) influenced by a control will reduce when the control is
enforced. Note that, by definition, the unconditional probability of the control itself is 1.0
if its state is true.
B C Pr(A) Pr(¬A)
1 1 1.00 0.00
1 0 0.65 0.35 −→
0 1 1.00 0.00
0 0 0.00 0.00
B C M0 Pr(A) Pr(¬A)
1 1 1 0.50 0.50
1 1 0 1.00 0.00
1 0 1 0.65 0.35
1 0 0 0.65 0.35
0 1 1 0.75 0.25
0 1 0 1.00 0.00
0 0 1 0.00 1.00
0 0 0 0.00 1.00
Table 8.3: Expanded LCPD of Node A (in Figure 8.3) under the Presence of Security
Control M0.
Definition 26 SECURITY MITIGATION PLAN
Given set M = {M1, . . . ,Mm} of m security controls, a security mitigation plan is repre-
sented by a boolean vector ~T = (T1,T2, . . . ,Tm) where Mi = Ti.
Therefore, the mitigation plan is a specification of which controls have been chosen for
enforcement as part of the hardening process. Further, for a given control Mi, consider the
set I of all s j ∈ Ninternal ∪Nterminal such that Pr(s j | Pa[s j],Mi = T ) < Pr(s j | Pa[s j],Mi =
F) (for some assignment of states to Pa[s j]). Then, the subset {sk ∈ I |Pa[sk]∩ I = φ} is
called the coverage of Mi. With reference to Figure 8.3, a control such as M0:“disconnect
from Internet” directly changes the probability Pr(D) (equal to zero if M0 = 1). This in
effect changes the LCPD tables at nodes B, C and D. Therefore, the set I contains all four
nodes for M0. However, only node D is in the coverage of M0 since, for all other nodes,
one or more parent nodes are also present in I . Intuitively, the coverage nodes are those
whose LCPDs are directly affected by a security control, rather than by indirect inference.
For a given security mitigation plan ~T , we can define the plan coverage by collecting the
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coverage of each enforced control in the plan. Each control Mi also has an associated cost






8.5.2 Assessing Security Outcomes
When using a BAG, a better quantitative representation of the loss/gain is obtained
by considering the expected loss/gain once a set of security measures have been imple-
mented. Hence, we augment the BAG with a value signifying the amount of potential
loss/gain at each node, and account for the security decision during evaluation.
Definition 27 AUGMENTED-BAYESIAN ATTACK GRAPH
Let BAG = (S,τ,ε,P ) be a Bayesian attack graph. An augmented-Bayesian attack graph
(augmented-BAG) BAGaug = BAG|(M,γ,V ) is obtained by adding a node set M, edge set
γ and by associating a value Vj to each s j ∈ S, where
1. M is the set of security controls.
2. γ⊆M×S. An ordered pair (Mi,s j) ∈ γ if s j is in the coverage of Mi.
3. Vj is the expected loss/gain associated with the attribute s j ∈ S.
The set M extends the BAG with additional nodes representing hardening measures. The
set γ represents the new edges between the controls and attributes of the graph. A new
edge is inserted if a control directly influences the state of an attribute. In this work,
all external attributes are given a zero cost, i.e. Vj = 0 for all s j ∈ Nexternal . The value





×G j−Pr(s j)×L j, (8.7)
where L j is the potential loss representing the damage value that an organization might
have to pay when the attribute s j is compromised, G j is the potential gain if s j is not
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compromised and Pr(s j) is the unconditional probability of s j. If there exists (Mi,s j)∈ γ,
Pr(s j) is computed as a conditional probability Pr(s j |Mi) where the state of Mi depends
on the security plan ~T = (Ti). The expected loss/gain w.r.t. the security plan ~T , denoted
by LG(~T ), is computed as the cumulative sum of all node values, i.e.
LG(~T ) = ∑
s j∈S
Vj. (8.8)
A positive value of LG signifies gain, while a negative value signifies loss. Note that
we do not assume any particular cost model in our formulations, both for control cost
and loss/gain evaluation. The cost model is usually subjective to organizational policies
and hence can differ from one institution to another. The cost factors considered here
(security control cost, potential loss and potential gain) are standard quantities that any
organization must be able to determine in order to perform risk analysis.
8.5.3 Assessing the Security Mitigation Plan
In order to defend against the attacks possible, a security manager (as a decision
maker) can choose to implement a variety of safeguard technologies, each of which comes
with different cost and coverage. For example, to defend against the “ftp/.rhost” exploit,
one might choose to apply a security patch, firewall, or simply disable the FTP service.
Each choice of action has a different cost and different outcome. A security administrator
has to assess the technologies and make a decision towards maximum resource utilization.
The two objectives we consider in this study are the total security control cost and the
expected loss/gain. The single-objective problem is the most likely approach to be taken
by a decision maker. The problem is stated as follows.
Definition 28 THE SINGLE-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM (SOOP)
Given an augmented-BAG (S,τ,ε,P ) | (M,γ,V ), find a vector ~T ∗= (T ∗i ), T ∗i ∈{0,1};1≤
i≤ |M|, which maximizes the function αLG(~T ∗)−βSCC(~T ∗), where α and β are prefer-
ence weights for the expected loss/gain and the total cost of security control respectively,
0≤ α,β≤ 1 and α+β = 1.
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The method for assessing a security plan is as follows. First, the security analyst
chooses a subset of security controls to construct a security plan ~T ∗. She then updates
the unconditional probability of all attributes using the plan coverage information. She
computes the expected loss/gain associated with every attribute s j ∈ S using Eq. (8.7).
Finally, the total expected loss/gain of the entire graph is taken as an assessment of the
security plan’s outcome. The best security plan is the one that maximizes the function
αLG(~T ∗)−βSCC(~T ∗).
Given only two objectives, a preference based single-objective approach might seem
to provide a solution in accordance with general intuition. However, the quality of the so-
lution obtained using this process can be quite sensitive to the assignment of the weights.
In addition, security administrators often have to work within a limited budget that may be
less than the minimum cost of system hardening. The objective in such a case is to design
a security plan that maximizes the organization’s financial throughput. The next level of
sophistication is added by formulating the optimization as a multi-objective problem. The
multi-objective approach alleviates the requirement to specify any weight parameters and
hence a better global picture of the solutions can be obtained.
Definition 29 THE MULTI-OBJECTIVE OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM (MOOP)
Given an augmented-BAG (S,τ,ε,P ) | (M,γ,V ), find a vector ~T ∗ = (T ∗i ), T ∗i ε{0,1};1≤
i≤ |M|, which minimizes SCC and maximizes LG.
Multi-objective optimization differs from single-objective ones in the cardinality of the
optimal set of solutions. Single-objective optimization techniques are aimed towards
finding the global optima; whereas, in the case of multi-objective optimization, there
is no such concept of a single optimum solution. This is due to the fact that a solution that
optimizes one of the objectives may not have the desired effect on the others. Solutions to
a multi-objective problem are therefore characterized by the concept of Pareto-optimality.
In our case, a security plan ~T1 is Pareto-optimal if there is no other plan ~T2 such that
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1. SCC(~T2) < SCC(~T1) and LG(~T2)≥ LG(~T1), or
2. SCC(~T2)≤ SCC(~T1) and LG(~T2) > LG(~T1).
If any of these conditions hold, then ~T2 is said to dominate ~T1. ~T1 and ~T2 are non-
dominated w.r.t. each other if none dominates the other. Pareto-optimal solutions are
non-dominated w.r.t. all other solutions. A multi-objective optimizer identifies (or ap-
proximates) the set of Pareto-optimal solutions and reveals the trade-off relations between
the underlying objectives. Choice of a final solution from this set is at the discretion of the
decision maker, often decided by the cost to benefit ratio. For the BAG shown in Figure
8.6, we have identified that 13 different security controls are possible. These controls are
represented by an ‘eclipse’ in the figure. These security controls produce 213 candidate
security plans. A genetic algorithm based approach is presented next to search through
these candidate plans in an efficient manner.
8.5.4 Genetic Algorithm
Figure 8.5: Schematic of the Genetic Algorithm Used to Solve SOOP and MOOP.
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Figure 8.5 depicts the structure of the genetic algorithm designed for this study. The
algorithm begins with a population P0 of N randomly generated security plans. A gener-
ation index t = 0,1, . . . ,GenMAX keeps track of the number of iterations of the algorithm.
Each iteration proceeds as follows. The SCC and LG values of every plan in Pt are cal-
culated. N/2 plans are then selected from Pt to form a mating pool Mt . The selection
process is different for SOOP and MOOP, and discussed later. An offspring popula-
tion Qt (containing N/2 plans) is generated from the mating pool by using the standard
single-point binary crossover and mutation operators [33]. The process is then repeated
with Pt+1 = Qt ∪Mt until t = GenMAX .
8.5.4.1 Solving SOOP
The selection process to solve SOOP is based on the objective function αLG(~T )−
βSCC(~T ) and uses the process of binary tournament. In this process, two plans are ran-
domly selected (with replacement) from Pt and the one with the higher objective function
value is inserted into the mating pool. This process is repeated until the mating pool is
full. The solution to SOOP is the plan with the highest objective value across all iterations
of the algorithm.
8.5.4.2 Solving MOOP
Simple objective value comparison is not possible in the presence of more than
one objective function. Hence, a different selection scheme is required for MOOP. The
scheme used here is based on non-dominance ranking, a popular concept in evolutionary
multi-objective optimization. Under this process, all non-dominated solutions in Pt (so-
lutions not dominated by any other solution in Pt) are identified and assigned a rank 1.
The rank 1 solutions are then removed from Pt and the non-dominated solutions in the
remaining population form rank 2 solutions. The process is repeated until all solutions
are assigned a rank. Selection of N/2 solutions for the mating pool is then performed
according to increasing rank. A crowding distance metric [26] is used if the number of
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solutions required to fill the mating pool is lower than the available solutions in the rank
being considered. The crowding distance of a solution is the perimeter of the rectangle
formed by its two neighbors of the same rank; the distance is infinite for points having
less than two neighbors (e.g. extreme points). Choice of solutions within a rank is done
in decreasing order of crowding distance, thereby giving preference to solutions that are
not at close proximity to others. The set of solutions to MOOP are the rank 1 solutions of
PGenMAX .
Figure 8.6: Augmented-BAG of Test-bed Network with 13 Security Controls.
8.6 Empirical Results
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In the preparation phase, we conduct risk assessment analysis to initially compute
the static risk. Figure 4.2 shows the unconditional probabilities at the nodes of the test
network. We identify 13 security controls that can be used to reduce the risk. We assign a
security control cost to each individual control and link each control to the attribute(s) in
the BAG that are covered by it. The augmented-BAG resulting from this process is shown
in Figure 8.6. Next, we assign different damage costs and revenue to every attribute in
the graph. Although we do not assume any particular cost model and values are assigned
hypothetically for the purpose of demonstration, we did try to maintain some relative
difference in magnitude to account for the relative importance of different services.
In the first experiment, we assess the expected loss/gain on top of the static risk anal-
ysis results (Figure 4.2) using Eq. (8.7). When using no security control, i.e. a mitigation
plan signified by the zero vector, we have an overall expected gain of 622.0 units. Then
we assess the cost on the dynamic environment where we assume that two attack incidents
have been detected. Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.7 show the posterior probabilities and the ex-
pected loss/gain at the nodes under this situation. Note that these attack incidents quickly
change the business scenario. The total expected loss/gain (LG) changes from 622.0 to
−398.17 units. We also notice a change in the momentum of risk. In particular, the pos-
terior probabilities indicate a significant change in risk level at the Administrative server
owing to the two attack incidents. This change influences the priority of risks identified
earlier during static analysis, and highlights the importance of dynamic risk analysis.
Next, we conduct several tests to assess the outcome of using a security control. The base
case where no individual control is used yields an expected gain of 622.0 units. Table 8.4
shows the net benefit of using each control individually. At this point, the security admin-
istrator may want to rank the security outcomes and build a security mitigation plan from
the top-ranked controls. Such a methodology has two drawbacks.
First, the ranking procedure itself is not straight forward because of reciprocal rela-
tionships between control cost and expected outcome. For example, “disable portscan”
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Figure 8.7: Augmented-BAG of Test-bed Network Under Two Attack Incidents (The
expected loss/gain (Vj) is shown at each node)
and “filtering external traffic” when applied alone raises the expected gain from 622.0
units to 875.44 (an increase of 253 units) and 1208.84 units (an increase of 587 units)
respectively. The combined outcome when applying both is 1351.27 units (less than
622 + 253 + 587). On the other hand, combining “add Firewall” (individual increase
from 622.0 to 881.15 units) and “apply MS work around” (individual increase from 622.0
to 1202.45 units) can raise the outcome to 1735.6 units (greater than 622 + 259 + 580).
The latter two are better choices based on expected outcome, but the former two incurs
a lower cost of implementation. This makes the ranking of controls, based on a specific
cost factor, a difficult process. Second, even if a ranking has been established, greedy
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ID Security Control Cost (A) Outcome (B) Net benefit (B−A−622.0)
SC1 apply OpenSSH security patch 63 1407.89 722.89
SC2 apply MS work around 14 1202.45 566.45
SC3 filtering external traffic 70 1208.84 516.84
SC4 limit DNS access 53 1000.65 325.65
SC5 disable portscan 11 875.44 242.44
SC6 disable WebDAV 250 1095.90 223.90
SC7 apply MS09-004 work around 31 861.10 208.10
SC8 add Network IDS 102 858.91 134.91
SC9 add Firewall 205 881.15 54.15
SC10 encryption 34 681.75 25.75
SC11 digital signature 33 673.28 18.28
SC12 query restriction 84 681.00 −25.00
SC13 use POP3 instead 153 704.67 −70.33
Table 8.4: Security Outcome Assessment for Each Control in Augmented-BAG of Test-
bed Network.
selection can lead to sub-optimal plans. Assume that controls are ranked based on the net
benefit they incur individually. The security controls are ordered in this manner in Table
8.4. Given a control cost constraint of, say, 200.0 units and a selection scheme based on
the ranks, an administrator will choose the first four controls in the table. These controls
have a combined cost of 200.0 units and results in an expected gain of 2673.96 units (a
net benefit of 2473.96 units collectively). However, selecting the 5th and the 7th controls,
instead of the 4th one, effectuates an expected gain of 2809.28 units at the cost of 189.0
units (a net benefit of 2620.28 units). This shows that the security administrator should
not choose the security controls based on their individual outcomes or by greedy selec-
tion. Instead, a more sophisticated decision making platform is required. This motivates
the next three experiments with single and multi-objective optimization.
We conduct three risk mitigation analysis experiments on the test network. The
genetic algorithm discussed in Section 8.5.4 is used for this analysis. The algorithm
parameters are set as follows: population size N = 100, GenMAX = 50, crossover prob-
ability = 0.8, and mutation probability = 0.01. We ran each instance of the algorithm
five times to check for any sensitivity of the solutions obtained from different initial pop-
ulations. We also check if running the algorithm for a higher number of iterations (upto
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200 generations) results in any improved convergence. However, since the solutions al-
ways converged to the same optima (or set of optima), we dismiss the presence of such
sensitivity.
In single-objective cost analysis, we run multiple instances of SOOP using different
combination of values for α and β. α is varied in the range of [0,1] in steps of 0.05. β is
always set to 1−α. Figure 8.8 shows the solutions obtained from this process. In general,
a decision maker may want to assign equal weights (α = 0.5) to both objective functions
– security control cost and total expected loss/gain. It is clear from the figure that such an
assignment does not necessarily provide the desired balance between the two objectives.
Furthermore, the solutions are quite sensitive to the weights and they are not uniformly
distributed across different ranges of α. Since the weights do not always influence the
objectives in the desired manner, understanding their effect is not a trivial task for the ad-
ministrator. It is also not always possible to perform an exhaustive analysis of the affect
of the weights on the objectives. Given such situations, the decision maker should con-
sider obtaining a global picture of the trade-offs possible. With such a problem in mind,
we next consider the multi-objective variant. Figure 8.9 shows the non-dominated solu-
tions (in PGenMAX ) obtained in the multi-objective analysis. Further, all mitigation plans
explored by the genetic algorithm during the iterations are highlighted. The algorithm
reported all solutions generated for SOOP (using multiple α), as well as several others,
specifically solutions in the range where the security control cost is between 200.0 and
700.0 units. These new solutions provide much better flexibility in the decision making
process. Moreover, performing the multi-objective analysis is much faster than solving
SOOP. This is because the security administrator has to solve SOOP with multiple param-
eter settings in order to identify the plan with the desired outcomes, whereas by solving
MOOP, one can generate a good overview of multiple plans in one single run.
We also compare our experiment with the result from minimization analysis [35, 47,
68]. We first derive logic expression out of the Bayesian attack graph model given in
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Figure 8.8: Genetic Algorithm Solutions to Single Objective Problem Obtained by Using
Different Weights
Figure 8.9: Genetic Algorithm Solutions to Multi-Objective Problem with Static Risk
Assessment
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Figure 8.10: Genetic Algorithm Solutions to MOOP with Dynamic Risk Assessment
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figure 8.2. The logic expression derived in this stage represents the critical factors that
accommodate the security violation. This expression then converts into its disjunctive
normal form (DNF) to give the choices of protective measures. To preserve the meaning
of security objective, we derive DNF from all possible outcomes (all terminal nodes in
the graph) and then union the results so as to take into account the whole system like what
multi-objective analysis does. Similarly, we have to adjust the LCPD to take either true
or false so as to have our Bayesian attack graph representing propositional logic like what
Exploit Dependency graph [47] does. Figure 8.11 shows the comparison test with Noel’s
minimal-cost analysis. The result returns from the derivation is thus T = ¬(((Ω∨Γ)∧
ϑ)∨(Ω∨Ψ∨Γ)∨Ξ∨Ψ). The DNF derivation returns the security hardening plan as ¬Ω
∧ ¬Γ ∧ ¬Ψ ∧ ¬Ξ ∧ ¬ ϑ.
Given the security control as shown in the table 8.4, the least-cost security hardening
plan includes SC1, SC2, and SC3 with the total security cost of 147.0 (see table 8.4 and
figure 8.6). The experimental result in Bayesian attack graph is also shown in the inlet
figure. The graph is much steeper than figure 8.9 due to the adjustment in LCPD. As
we expected, the minimum-cost hardening solution is on the Pareto front. In particular,
it locates in the right-most of the graph. However, the graph does not show significant
benefit of using Bayesian attack graph over minimization analysis but there always exists
a condition where minimum-cost analysis gives a solution with the cost higher than the
organization budget. In such a case, system administrator may decide to tolerate some
risks in order to control the expense. This is where our Bayesian attack graph contributes.
Consider the following situation, if node ’G’ represents a much lower security risk than
root compromise. It is tempting to not including SC1 in the plan and manage to tolerate
a slice amount of risk with a cheaper cost. Such solutions can be found in our multi-
objective analysis. In the last experiment, we use the genetic algorithm to assess the
choice of security hardening in a dynamic environment. Figure 8.10 shows the choices of
mitigation plans in response to two emerging attack incidents, previously shown in Figure
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Figure 8.11: BAG Results Compare with Noel’s Minimum-cost Analysis
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8.4. In this plot, we compare the dynamic results with the static ones. Not surprisingly,
the plans in this case effectuate lower gains owing to the damage already caused by the
attacker when (and at which point) the incidents are detected. Despite this difference, the
mitigation plans with similar costs are not so different between the static and dynamic
solutions. The three plans highlighted in the figure are very similar to those shown in
Figure 8.9. Such minimal changes in plan characteristics can be considered a positive
outcome since the security administrator is not required to revise the entire plan chosen
during static analysis. Instead, she can exploit the commonalities for efficient usage of
already invested resources. Results from the dynamic analysis also highlight the require-
ment for pro-active action in security management. Note that although not implementing
any controls still results in a positive gain, the appearance of two attack incidents quickly
transform this into a case with negative expected outcome.
8.7 Chapter Summary
In this paper, we address the system administrators’ dilemma, namely, how to assess
the risk in a network system and select security hardening measures from a given set of
controls so as to maximize resource utilization. One important contribution of our solu-
tion methodology is the use of a BAG model of the network to drive the decision process.
We have provided formal definitions for network characteristics, attacks and security mea-
sures under this model. We also show that by using a BAG, we are able to better under-
stand the causal relationships between preconditions, vulnerability exploitations and post
conditions. This is facilitated by computing the likelihoods of different outcomes possible
as a result of the cause-consequence relationships. We have demonstrated how the BAG
can be used to revise these likelihoods in the event of attack incidents. Using empirical
results on a test network, we show that such a dynamic risk analysis helps the system
administrator identify evolving weak spots in a network. We also provide the necessary
optimization formulations required to build a mitigation plan that reduces the risk lev-
els. Towards this end, we propose a genetic algorithm capable of performing both single
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and multi-objective optimization of the administrator’s objectives. While single objective
analysis uses administrator preferences to identify the optimal plan, multi-objective anal-
ysis provides a complete trade-off information before a final plan is chosen. Results are
shown to demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm in both static and dynamic risk
mitigation.
As immediate future work, we shall work on improving the efficiency of our evalu-
ation algorithm. The evaluation algorithm is used to compute the unconditional probabil-
ities and is currently implemented using brute force DFS traversal. Posterior probability
computation is expensive using this implementation and therefore impacts the decision
making time in a dynamic scenario. In particular, we wish to revise the evaluation algo-
rithm to include heuristic based update mechanisms in order to reduce the time required
to complete the mitigation analysis, without scarifying the quality of results obtainable.
Furthermore, the mitigation process in dynamic situations needs to be improved so that a
security administrator can quickly identify the best security response that accounts for all
former investments made as part of the static analysis stage. It is worth mentioning that
some security controls have been found to be commonly included in the optimal solutions.
It is possible that security hardening is more critical in certain areas of the attack graph.
Such areas could be nodes that has multiple fan outs. In other words, these critical areas
are at-risk junctions that can be used by an attacker to cause multiple outcomes. Security
controls that can reduce risk in such areas are likely to be parts of the optimal solutions.
Therefore, it is worth investigating how such controls can be identified efficiently so as to
reduce the search space for the optimization algorithm.
Chapter 9
USING ATTACK TREES IN INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM TO DETECT
MALICIOUS INTENT
A major concern for computer systems security is the threat from malicious individ-
uals who can execute perfectly legitimate operations to compromise system security. Un-
fortunately, most currently available intrusion detection systems (which include anomaly
and misuse detection systems) fail to address this problem in a comprehensive manner.
An attack tree has been proposed to identify malicious activities from users. We develop
algorithms to generate minimal forms of attack tree customized for each user such that it
can be used efficiently to monitor the users activities. If the users activities progress suf-
ficiently up along the branches of the attack tree towards the goal of system compromise,
we generate an alarm. Attack tree is not intended to replace existing intrusion detec-
tion and prevention technology, but rather is intended to complement current and future
technology.
9.1 Introduction
Intrusion detection systems can be broadly classified into two groups knowledge-
based systems and behavior-based systems [28]. Knowledge-based detectors [42, 56, 61]
are the most popular techniques. Almost all commercially available intrusion detection
tools are knowledge-based [10]. These tools operate by processing system audit data
for signatures of known attacks and/or specific outcomes of interest. The result of this
processing is compared against a knowledge-base of signatures of specific attacks and
vulnerabilities. A positive match signals an intrusion.
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Knowledge-based detectors tend to be fairly accurate in the sense that they have
low rates of false positives. However, they are limited by their inability to detect new
attacks for which there are no known signatures. Any action that is not recognized as
an attack is considered acceptable. In addition, knowledge-based detectors are specific
system (operating system, software tools etc.) dependent. Thus their wide adoption is
limited.
Behavior-based detectors, on the other hand, take the paranoid approach everything
that has not been witnessed before is considered dangerous. To operate, these systems
compare the observed behavior of the system and/or the users against a model of normal
(or expected) behavior. Any deviations from the normal behavior is considered an in-
trusion. Behavior-based systems are often considered complete, that is, all attacks (even
previously not known attacks) can be caught. However, the accuracy of these systems are
often low. Behavior-based systems need to undergo extensive training sessions to deter-
mine what constitutes normal behavior. During this phase these systems tend to generate
false alarms at a very high rate. In addition, such systems require periodic on-line retrain-
ing. This results in either unavailability of the system or generation of false alarms till
such times as the system is retrained.
It is not possible to make a sound and objective judgment as to which type of in-
trusion detection system is better. Thus hybrid intrusion detection systems have also
been proposed. They combine knowledge-based detectors with behavior based detectors.
However, they still do not provide an ideal detector. An ideal intrusion detection system
is the most difficult to build because it needs to address a set of rather tough and often
contradictory requirements. It should be deployable in a heterogeneous and distributed
environment. It needs to have a low latency of detection by rapid decision making. It
should have both, a very low false positive rate as well as a very low false negative rate.
It should be able to scale to large environments. Last but not the least, it should provide
strong deterrence to attacks by active real-time monitoring [21].
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Instead of trying to build an ideal intrusion detection system we would like to develop
tools that complement existing systems. We note that existing intrusion detection systems
suffer from two shortcomings. First, not many of them do a good job in handling threats
from malicious insiders. These attacks, which are often considered to cause the majority
of security breaches, can arise in one of two ways: (i) A user uses perfectly legitimate
operations (those that the user is authorized to do) to exploit known system vulnerabilities
and launch an attack. (ii) A user uses information and resources that do not fall directly
under the category of computer system resources, and launches attack. The latter category
is considerably more difficult to prevent, detect or deter than the first category. Addressing
such threats is beyond the scope of this work. We are more interested in addressing the
first line of attack.
A second concern with intrusion detection systems is that they generate alerts only
after they are able to see the misuse signatures or some deviations from norm. A malicious
activity may result from a sequence of perfectly innocuous activities. Intrusion detection
systems do not report on these activities mostly to prevent information overload for the
system administrator. Thus the intrusion detection system generates an alarm only after
the cause for alarm has occurred. In many situations however, this may already be too
late. These two factors lead us to propose a new approach that can be used to predict
attacks arising from user activities. Our work uses Upadhyaya’s intent-analysis system
[21, 66, 57, 67] to extract activities and pass in to our prediction system as an input.
9.2 Dynamic Reasoning Based User Intent Driven (DRUID)
Upadhyaya et al. [66, 57, 67] propose DRUID system, a host-based concurrent intru-
sion detection scheme. The system is based on user work profiling [10]. This technique
assumes that if one can encapsulate the intent of a user in a reasonable manner, then it
is possible to assess intrusions by monitoring the activities on-line. Figure 9.1 shows
the flow diagram of DRUID system. The system works as follows. Sometime prior to
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Figure 9.1: Flow Diagram for the DRUID System
login, a user submits a description of his intended system usage. This forms the users
session scope. The system converts the scope to a “SPRINT” (Signature Powered Re-
vised Instruction Table) plan which is a list (may be ordered) of quadruples of the form
〈sub ject,action,ob ject, period〉. Here “subject” represents a user, “action” is an opera-
tion performed by the subject (such as login, logout, read etc.), “object” is the target of an
action (such as files, programs, messages, printers etc.), and “period” represents the time
interval for the duration of the action. Each quadruple represents a verifiable assertion, a
concept that is a generalization of IDESs [22] specification of user characteristics, and can
be monitored on-line. When a user is active, a monitor process (called the “Watchdog”)
monitors the users commands and checks them against the users SPRINT plan. Devi-
ations beyond a certain tolerance limit are considered potential intrusions and DRUID
generates alerts for such deviations. In short, DRUID ensures that during a particular ses-
sion a user remains reasonably within the scope of a previously declared set of activities.
Any digression beyond this reasonable limit constitutes a misuse of system and steps are
taken to protect against such digressions. However, this approach fails to account for the
123
fact that a user may remain completely within the scope of a previously declared set of
activities and still be able to launch attacks. This is where our approach contributes.
9.3 Attack Tree Base User Intent Intrusion Detection
We propose an alternative method of analyzing users intent by applying attack tree
analysis. With this approach, the system only monitors parts of users behaviors which
may conceal vicious intents. The advantage of this technique over DRUID is that the
system needs not be monitored in all the sessions. This saves the time and reduces the
number of resources required by the original SPRINT plan. Our attack prediction system
works as follows.
We begin by developing a model of network risks. We augment the notion of attack
trees as previously described in the Chapter 5 for this purpose. We then assign the quanti-
tative metric “attack probability P” as node property in the attack tree. Next we iteratively
apply each users SPRINT plan to the augmented attack tree, to generate a trimmed attack
tree for each user. We call such an attack tree the minimal cut of an attack tree with respect
to the user intent. Branches of this trimmed attack tree represent, in a concise manner, all
the different ways by which a user can use his assigned job privileges to launch an attack
on the system. In the event such a trimmed attack tree does not exist for a particular
user, we can safely claim that the users current job description does not pose a threat to
the system. This does not necessarily mean, however, that we can cease to monitor this
users activities. If we allow a user to deviate from her/his SPRINT plan as is done in the
original work [21] then we should continue monitoring the user as proposed in that work.
For this work we will assume that the user we are planning to monitor are the ones who,
by virtue of their work definition, are able to launch attacks against the system. In the
following sections we describe each component of our system in details. We begin with
the notion of augmented attack trees to model network risks.
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9.3.1 Augmented Attack Tree
Definition 30 AUGMENTED-ATTACK TREE
Let A be a set of attacks (see Definition 3), including the φ–attack. An Augmented Attack
Tree is a tuple AAT = (sroot ,S,τ,ε,P), where
1. sroot is an attribute which the attacker want to become true. sroot denotes an attribute
sk such that for which @ a ∈ A| sk ∈ pre(a).
2. S = Ninternal∪Nexternal∪{sroot} is a multiset of attributes. Nexternal denotes the multiset
of attributes si for which @a ∈ A| si ∈ post(a). Ninternal denotes the multiset of attributes
s j for which ∃a1,a2 ∈ A| [s j ∈ pre(a1) ∧ s j ∈ post(a2)].
3. τ⊆ S×S. An ordered pair (spre,spost) ∈ τ if ∃ a ∈ A| [spre ∈ pre(a) ∧ spost ∈ post(a)].
Further, if si ∈ S has multiplicity n, then ∃ s1,s2, . . . ,sn ∈ S| (s1,si)
,(s2,si), . . . ,(sn,si) ∈ τ. A set {s1,s2, . . . ,sn} becomes a parent set of si, denoted by
Pa(si).
4. ε is a set of decomposition tuples of the form 〈s j,d j〉 defined for all s j ∈ Ninternal ∪ sroot
and d j ∈ {AND,OR}. d j is AND when ∀a ∈ A, post(a) = s j | Pr(pre(a)) = 1.0 ↔
Pr(s j) = 1.0 and OR when ∃a ∈ A, post(a) = S j | Pr(pre(a)) = 1.0↔ Pr(s j) = 1.0 (a
true state).
5. P is a set of attack probability given by the tuple 〈n,m〉 where m and n are positive
integers greater than 0 with n≤ m. For all si ∈ Ninternal ∪ sroot there exists a set of attack
probability satisfy Pr(si) ∈ P. The value of n for the node si ∈ S can change over a
period of time;however the value of m is fixed for the node si. The item m is termed the
least effort to compromise subgoal si while the item n is termed the number of currently
compromised subgoals under si.
An instance of an augmented attack tree for a hypothetical system is shown in Figure
9.2. We will use this attack tree as our running example. Note, in the figure we have
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Figure 9.2: Attack Tree Corresponding to a Hypothetical System
shown only some of the labels on the edges to keep the figure simple. In realty, all edges
will have their corresponding attack probability labels. The values m and n in the attack
probability label of the root node sroot are of particular interest to us. The ratio nm at any
given time provides a measure of how far an attacker has progressed towards the ultimate
goal in terms of the “least effort” along the most advanced attack path that he has been
through. Thus this ratio provides the probability of the system getting compromised at
that time. The values m and n corresponding to the root node are computed based on the
corresponding values for the other nodes. At this time we show how to compute the value
of m for any given node. Note that this is a one time effort that is done during system
initialization.
Let us assume without loss of generality that the attacker uses one unit of effort to
perform one atomic attack that furthers his goal. In other words, each hop along one edge
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of the attack tree takes one unit of effort to get through. The least effort to compromise
a subgoal is the minimum effort the attacker needs to compromise the given subgoal. In
general, if a given goal s has an OR-decomposition, the least effort is computed as the
minimum least efforts of its child nodes plus one unit effort needed to advance to s from
the child node. If the goal s has an AND-decomposition then the least effort is the sum of
the least efforts of the child nodes plus all additional unit efforts, one for each child node
to go to s. These rules apply to all except φ - attacks. For φ - attacks, there is no effort
need to taken in order to advance the progress. The following definition captures the steps
to compute the least effort for a subgoal s.
Definition 31 Given a subgoal s and its parent set Pa(s) (locate below s in the tree), the
least effort to compromise s, ms, is defined as follows.
1. If s is a leaf node of the attack tree, the least effort is 0.






0 i f (si,s) is a φ−attack
1 i f otherwise
)
3. if s is some interior node and is an OR-decomposition, then
ms = Min(msi) +
{
0 i f Min(msi) is φ−attack
1 i f otherwise
Henceforth we will use the terms attack tree and augmented attack tree interchangeably
to mean the latter.
9.3.2 Minimal Cut of Attack Trees w.r.t. User Intent
An augmented attack tree can be used to model system vulnerabilities in a very
effective manner. The attack tree describes all possible ways in which a particular attack
can be launched. If there are more than one attack against a system that we are concerned
about, we can generate separate attack trees for each. However, there are a few drawbacks
of the attack tree defined as it is now. First, for a complex system the attack tree can
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become quite deep and spread out. Thus it will become difficult to manage. Second, it is
possible that a number of users are executing the same set of operations albeit at different
paces. In this case, the cumulative effects of these users actions will be reflected on the
attack tree. If the users are not colluding this does not give the true picture of the state of
the attack. For example, let a user has initially launched an attack and has compromised
up to subgoal s1 of S in an attack tree. Another user has compromised unto subgoal s2. If
the node S is an AND-decompostion of s1 and s2, the model will indicate that subgoal S
is compromised. However, if the two users are not co-operating, then this is not the case.
Thus, we want to refine the concept of attack tree so that we are able to monitor each
individual users activities. If we believe there is possibility of collusion among attackers
we will maintain the system-wide attack tree as generated so far in addition to the per-user
attack tree that we are now ready to define.
That a per-user attack tree is relevant is further strengthened by the following ob-
servation. For any attack, we may not always need to know all possible ways the attack
can be launched, but rather the practical ways. In the case of attacks from insiders, for
example, we are interested only in the activities of authorized users in the system. Thus,
we want to determine if the operations that a user executes can lead to an attack. This
implies that for a particular user, only a portion of an attack tree is relevant. This leads us
to propose the notion of a minimal cut of an attack tree with respect to a user intent. We
begin with the following definitions.
Definition 32 Given an augmented attack tree, AAT , an attack scenario, AS of AAT is
defined to be a sub-tree of AAT that is rooted at the root of AAT , and follows one or more
branches through the tree to end at one or more leaf nodes of AAT such that
1. if the subtree has a node that is an AND-decomposition then the subtree must con-
tain all the children of this node, and
2. the sub-tree represents one and only one of the many attacks described by AAT .
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Figure 9.2 also represents one possible attack-scenario corresponding to the attack tree,
with the shaded boxes constituting the nodes in the attack scenario. Referring to Def-
inition 3, attacks are represented as edges (spre,spost) in the tree where spre is the pre-
condition of an attack and spost is post condition of the attack. In this figure, some of
the attacks are pointed to by dashed arrows. Note that, to successfully execute an attack,
the attacker must execute some operations that exploit one or more vulnerabilities in the
system. Once a vulnerability has been exploited the attacker executes a set of “attacking
operations” that achieve the goal of an attack. Thus,
Definition 33 A suspicious operations set, SOa, corresponding to an attack a∈ A, is a set
of operations on specific objects that may potentially lead to the culmination of the attack
a. SOa is a set of tuples of the form 〈action,ob ject〉. If a is φ−attack, SOa is an empty
set.
We can identify two different types of operations in a suspicious operations set, SOa. The
first subset of operations is the set Vul of vulnerable operations. At least one of the op-
erations in the vulnerable set needs to be executed to exploit a vulnerability. An atomic
attack can be launched by exploiting one or more vulnerabilities. Similarly each vulnera-
bility can be exploited by executing one or more vulnerable operations. The second subset
of operations is the set Ao of attacking operations. All of these needs to be executed to
accomplish the atomic attack.
We would like to point out here that we specifically omit the use of the term “se-
quence” from the definition of suspicious operations set. It is quite possible that only a
particular order of execution of the operations will lead to an attack. Since we are in-
terested in estimating the probability of an attack and not just reporting on the attack if
and when it is launched, we are interested in all the operations in the set and not just the
operations in some particular order.
Definition 34 The set of intendedoperations of a particular user, IOs, is a projection of
the SPRINT plan for the user over attributes action and object.
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We need to be worried about a users SPRINT plan if some members of the correspond-
ing intended operations set includes a suspicious operations set. We define the intended
operations to abet an attack subgoal as follows.
Definition 35 Given, an attack subgoal si (that is a node in an attack scenario) decom-
posed as the set of atomic attacks ai, the suspicious operations sets corresponding to each
atomic attack, SOai , and a set of intended operations, IOs for a user, we say that the in-
tended operations abet the attack subgoal if and only if one of the following conditions
holds true.
1. If si is an AND-decomposition with m edges then ∀ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m; SOai ⊆ IOs
2. If si is an OR-decomposition with m edges then ∃ i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m; SOai ⊆ IOs
The intended operations abet an attack scenario if the intended operations abet all attack
subgoal in that attack scenario. Recall that one of our objectives is to determine if a users
activities in a system can lead to an attack on the system. A related objective is to deter-
mine the exact way in which an attack can be launched with the users intended operations.
Thus, given an attack scenario, AS, consisting of subgoals (s1, s2,. . ., sn), we need to de-
termine for each users intended operations, if the intended operations abet every subgoal
si ∈ AS. If the intended operations do not abet every subgoal si in AS, it implies that this
particular attack scenario cannot arise from the users activities. However, this does not
mean that another attack scenario cannot arise from the same intended operations. What
we need to identity, therefore, is the maximal set of attack scenarios that can arise from a
given set of intended operations.
Definition 36 The minimal cut, MCIOS, of an attack tree, AAT with respect to a particu-
lar user intent, IOs, is the minimal subtree of AAT which is rooted at the root of AAT and
whose leaf nodes are a subset of the leaf nodes of AAT, such that the subtree includes the
maximal set and only the maximal set of attack scenarios that can arise from IOs.
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Algorithm 2 Pruning Algorithm
{Description:This algorithm takes an attack tree and a set of intended operations for a partic-
ular user and generates a confined version of the attack tree. The confined tree includes those
and only those attack scenarios that are in the minimal cut and maybe some more attack sub-
goals. The original attack tree is represented as a tree structure in which each node except the
leaf nodes, contain an array of adjacency lists. Each element in the array represents an attack
subgoal. For each attack subgoal,s, Ad j[s] contains a reference to a pre-condition subgoal.
Each edge in the set τ of edges refer to an atomic attack.
The algorithm assumes the existence of a procedure called OPERATIONS that takes an edge
(si,s j) corresponding to a state transition in the attack tree and returns the set of operations
that result in the state transition. It also assumes a second procedure called PARENT that takes
a node s and returns the parent of s in the tree. The algorithm uses three temporary queues
called Explore-List, τ′ and S′ with operation ENQUEUE and DEQUEUE defined. Finally,
the algorithm assumes a procedure DRAW TREE that builds a tree given a set of nodes and
edges. }
{Input: The attack tree AAT , sroot , and the set of intended operations for the user, IOs}






while Explore-List 6= φ do
s← DEQUEUE(Explore-List)
10: ANY MET← false
for all si ∈ Ad j[s] do
ENQUEUE(Explore-List, si)
if OPERATIONS((si,s)) ⊆ IOs then
ENQUEUE(τ′,(si,s))
15: ANY MET← true
end if
end for
if (Ad j[s] = φ && (PARENT(s),s) ∈ τ′ ) then
ENQUEUE(S′, s)
20: end if






We now give two algorithms (Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3) applying which in sequence
gives us a minimal cut of an attack tree with respect to a given user intent. We call the
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first algorithm the pruning algorithm and the second algorithm the trimming algorithm.
The first algorithm takes an attack tree and generates a subtree rooted at the root of the
attack tree such that the subtree contains the desired minimal cut. It removes from the
original tree any attack scenarios whose attack subgoals are not abetted by the intended
operations. The second algorithm further reduces the subtree produced by the pruning
algorithm to produce the minimal cut.
The following theorems hold on the pruning algorithm.
Theorem 1 Let AAT = (sroot ,S,τ,ε,P) be an augmented attack tree and assume that the
pruning algorithm is executed on ATT starting with the root node sroot ∈ S. If the user’s
actions abet an attack then that attack subgoal will be presented in the pruned attack tree
generated by the pruning algorithm.
Proof: To prove soundness of the algorithm we need to prove that during its execution
the pruning algorithm explores every state s that forms an attack subgoal for the attacker
and includes it in the pruned attack tree. To prove completeness, we must prove that if a
node s is included in the pruned attack tree it must form an attack subgoal for the attacker.
First let assume that at the termination of the pruning algorithm, an attack subgoal
s ∈ S which can lead to the root of the attack tree exists such that it is not enqueued by
the pruning algorithm. The pruning algorithm starts by exploring the roots adjacent nodes
and then iteratively explores the adjacent nodes of these. Thus, if there is an unexplored
subgoal s left at the termination of the pruning algorithm, it must be the case that that
subgoal s is not be reachable from the root. Then according to Definition 30, subgoal
s /∈ S which contradicts the assumption.
We prove completeness of the algorithm as follows. Let us assume that at the termi-
nation of the algorithm there exist a state transition (si,s j)∈ τ such that SO(si,s j)⊆ IOs but
(si,s j) /∈ τ′. Since all states in an attack tree have been explored, then (si,s j) must have
been explored. By Definition 35, if user intent IOs abet an attack which causes the state
transition (si,s j), it must be explored and included in τ′. This results in a contradiction.
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The pruned attack tree generated by the pruning algorithm may include atomic attacks that
however can never materialize from a users activities. This is because the preconditions
to these attacks are never satisfied by the user actions. For example, a users intent may
abet a remote login attack but may not abet the user to perform an ftp/.rhost attack on
the target machine. In this case, the attacker cannot perform these atomic attacks at least
till such time as they are not permitted to modify their intent. The next algorithm called
the trimming algorithm removes these attack scenarios and produces the minimal cut of
attack tree.
Algorithm 3 Trimming Algorithm
{Description:This algorithm takes the pruned attack tree generated by the pruning algorithm,
and removes attack goals that the user can never reach. }
{Input: The set of nodes from the pruned attack tree ordered by traversing the tree in breadth
first order and stored in an array S′, and the corresponding τ′}
{Output: Minimal cut of an attack tree with respect to user intent}
BEGIN
5: K ← SIZEOF(S′)
while K > 0 do
si← S′[K ]
K ← K −1
valid ← f alse
10: if Ad j[si] = φ then
valid ← true
else
for all s j ∈ Ad j[si] do
if s j ∈ S′ then
15: valid ← true
else











Theorem 2 If the trimmed attack tree generated from a pruned attack tree by the ap-
plication of a users intended operation contains an attack scenario, then the intended
operations abet that particular attack scenario.
Proof: Let assume that there exist subgoal s (which its preconditions are met by the user
intents) mistakenly removed by the trimming algorithm. According to the semantic of
the trimming algorithm, the while loop in the trimming algorithm explores every node
in the input pruned tree and the for loop trying to discover all possible paths from the
leaf nodes to a subgoal currently explored by the while loop s iteration. Then the remove
instruction removes a subgoal if and only if the previous for loop could not find such a
path to the leaf node. We will split subgoal s in 2 cases.
Case 1: If subgoal s ∈ S′ is an initial subgoal, this case could not happened since the
if statement of line 10 in the procedure detect the leaf node. Then the initial subgoal s /∈
Minimal cut if and only if s /∈ S′ which contradicts the previous assumption.
Case 2: If subgoal s ∈ S′ is an intermediate subgoal, s will be removed by the
trimming algorithm if and only if s can not be reached from any initial subgoal. This
mean the preconditions of an intermediate subgoal s are not met which contradict to the
previous assumption.
9.4 Compute Probability of Attack from User Activities
We now use the minimal cut of an attack tree with respect to a user intent to determine
the probability of an attack originating from that user. Algorithm 4 computes the attack
probability label of a subgoal at any given time t. By applying this algorithm on the root
node of the minimal cut of an attack tree for a user, we get the attack probability label
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Algorithm 4 Risk Evaluation Algorithm
{Description:This algorithm takes an attack tree subgoal A and returns the attack probability
label (n,m) for that goal. Here n refers to the number of nodes that have been compromised
on the most advanced attack paths and m refer to the least-effort needed to compromise A on
that path.}
{Input: A subgoal of an attack tree}
{Output:
1. Number of subgoals that have been compromised along the most advanced attack path.
2. Least-effort needed to compromise the subgoal along the most advanced attack path.
}
Let n = number of currently compromised subgoal under A on the most advanced attacking
path.
5: Let m = least-effort needed to compromise A on the most advanced path.
BEGIN
if A is a leaf node then
return (0,0)
10: end if
if A is an AND-Decomposition then
(n,m)← ∑(Risk−Evaluation(Ai) | ∀Ai Childnodes o f A)
k← ∑
{
0 i f Ai is φ−attack
1 i f otherwise
else
15: (n,m)←MAX( nm) f rom Risk−Evaluation(Ai) | ∀Ai Childnodes o f A)
k←
{
0 i f MAX( nm) is φ−attack
1 i f otherwise
end if







Figure 9.3: Attack Probability on Minimal Cut of an Attack Tree
corresponding to the root at time t. The ratio nm at time t gives the probability of the users
attack succeeding at time t.
To illustrate this algorithm, Figure 9.3 shows an example trace for Algorithm 4.
Assume that at time t a malicious user compromises two subgoals as shown in the figure.
The algorithm computes the 〈n,m〉 value for the root of the tree as follows. All leaf-
nodes return value (0, 0). Node A.1 and A.3 have the summation equal to (0, 0) since
their immediate child nodes are all leaf nodes. When A.1 is compromised the procedure
returns (2, 2). Similarly for A.3 the procedure returns (0, 2). For B.1 and B.3 the values
are (1, 1) and (0, 1) respectively. At this point the value of (2, 2) tells us that it takes 2 units
effort to compromise A.1. The attacker has already compromised A.1 but no damage has
been done on A.3. Next we calculate value on A. Eventually, since the root is an AND-
decomposition on two branches A and B the least effort is 8 + 2 = 10 and the number of
compromised nodes is 3. This yields a probability of attack value of 310 at time t.
9.5 Chapter Summary
In summary, this section applies the augmented attack tree with the quantitative
framework to the user intent. The intent-based intrusion detection has been originally
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proposed by Upadhyaya et al. In DRUID framework, the user declares the intended ac-
tivities prior to the login. Based on the users intention, the system generates the SPRINT
plan. Then the system detects the misbehavior by comparing real-time activities with the
SPRINT plan. The deviation from the SPRINT plan shows the sign of intrusion. However,
an intrusion can be launched from the activities which do not deviate from the SPRINT
plan. Our work addresses this problem.
Our attack prediction takes the users SPRINT plan as an input. This plan is submitted
to the augmented attack tree to generate the trimmed attack tree. We call this the minimal
cut of an attack tree with respect to the user intent. Branches of this minimal cut represent
all the different ways by which an attacker can use his/her assigned jobs to launch an
attack. In the event such a minimal cut does not exist, we can safely claim that the users
jobs do not pose a threat to the system.
Chapter 10
A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH FOR INVESTIGATING COMPUTER ATTACKS
USING ATTACK TREES
System log files play a major role in the investigation of computer attacks. However,
system log files almost always have a flat, sequential structure. They grow very large
in size and contain significant amount of information that are not relevant to the specific
attack. Thus, it is extremely difficult and time consuming to extract evidence of attack
from the log file. In this paper, we propose an automated approach for filtering out irrele-
vant information from a system log file and creating a shorter log that contains sufficient
information about a computer attack.
10.1 Introduction
Following a large scale computer attack an investigator (system administrator or law
enforcement official) often needs to make a reasoned determination of who caused the
attack, when, and what the exact sequence of events were that led to the attack. The
system log that contains records of all events that occur in the system, is used for this
purpose. However, the process of this investigation is almost always manual, frequently
prone to errors and often inconclusive. There are three major contributing factors to this.
1. There is currently no standardized model for log file organization. The log file is
usually a simple, flat structured text file (see Figure 10.1). There is no minimum
requirement for information that needs to be stored in the log file.
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Figure 10.1: Flat Structured System Audit Log
2. There are currently no established procedure for filtering and retrieving informa-
tion from the log file other than a sequential backward scan from the most recent
entry. System administrators use ad-hoc regular expression searching commands to
extract information from the log file.
3. When a security incident occurs, the system administrator does not usually have
any information about what are the things to look for in the system log. Most of the
time the person has to rely on her experience or intuition for this purpose.
To address some these concerns, we propose an attack tree based approach for filtering log
files. An attack tree model is proposed that allows one to capture all the different ways
a particular system can be attacked based on currently available knowledge of system
vulnerabilities and exploits. The filtering approach then selects a set of records from a
log file that are relevant to the current attack being investigated by matching against the
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attack tree. Subsequently, other SQL queries can be used to extract evidence from this
table in an automated manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 10.3 we present the attack
tree model for computer attacks. Section 1.3 describes our approach of filtering log files.
Finally section 1.4 concludes the paper.
10.2 Attack Correlation Modeling
Attack trees have been previously proposed [25, 43, 60] as a systematic method for
specifying system security based on varying attacks. They help organize intrusion and/or
misuse scenarios by
1. utilizing known vulnerabilities and/or weak spots in the system, and
2. analyzing system dependencies and weak links and representing these dependen-
cies in the form of an And-Or tree.
For every system that needs to be defended there is a different attack tree. The nodes of
the tree are used to represent different stages (milestones) of an attack. The root node of
the tree represents the attackers ultimate goal, namely, cause damage to the system. The
interior nodes, including leaf-nodes, represent possible system states during the execution
of an attack. System states can include level of compromise by the attacker (such as
successful access to a web page or successful acquisition of root privileges), altering the
system configuration (such as a modification of trust or access control or escalation of user
privilege) or state changes achieved on specific system components (such as implantation
of Trojan Horses) and other sub-goals that will ultimately lead to the final goal (such as
sequence of vulnerabilities exploited). Branches represent a change of state caused by
one or more action taken by the attacker. Change in state is represented by either AND-
branches or OR-branches. Nodes may be decomposed as:
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1. a sequence of events (exploits) all of which must be achieved for this sub-goal to
succeed. An example of this can be the changing of the file mode of /proc/self/ files
and the execution of suid command that cause the root to be compromised (CVE-
2006-3626). This is represented by the events being combined by AND branches
at the node.
2. a set of events (exploits), any one of which when occurring will result in the sub-
goal succeeding. An example of this is the stack buffer over- flow that exploits the
libtiff library in SUSE v10.0 (CVE-2006-3459) or the SQL injection in Bugzilla
v2.16.3(CVE-2003-1043) which cause the root compromised (assume both service
run in the same machine). This is represented by the events being combined by OR
branches at the node.
The notion of attacks trees is related to the notion of attack graphs that have been proposed
by other researchers [12, 38, 47, 62] for network vulnerability analysis. The difference
is in the representation of states and actions. Attack graphs model system vulnerabilities
in terms of all possible sequence of attack operations. As pointed out by Ritchey and
Ammann [53] a major shortcoming of this approach is its scalability. On the other hand,
attack trees model system vulnerabilities in terms of cause and effect. Sequential ordering
of events does not have to be captured in attack trees. Thus constructing an attack tree
is significantly less complex than attack graphs. An often cited criticism of attack trees
(vis-a-vis attack graphs) is that they are not able to model cycles. However, we believe
that this criticism is valid only in cases where attack trees are used to represent sequence
of operations leading to attacks, not when they are used to represent the dependency
of states reached. A second criticism of using attack tree to model attack scenarios is
that they tend to get unwieldy. We assume that a technique is available to generate an
attack tree corresponding to the network system we are attempting to defend. We use
the following running example to describe how an attack tree is used to represent system
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vulnerabilities. Figure 10.2 shows the configuration of the network for a (hypothetical)
small company. The company has installed a firewall to protect itself from the Internet. In
the de-militarized zone (DMZ) there is the company web server. Other relevant machines
are on the local area network behind the firewall. The companys system administrator has
configured the firewall to block port scans and flooding type attacks. The firewall allows
incoming connections only via port 25 and 80 (for smtp and http respectively). We assume
John Doe, a disgruntled employee plans to attack his own company system. He performs
a vulnerability scan of company network using his insider knowledge and determines that
he needs to obtain “root privilege on the Web server” to achieve this objective.
John Doe identifies that there are two alternative ways to gaining root privilege his
ultimate goal. One way is via launching the FTP/.RHOST attack. In this attack, the .rhost
file on the Web server will be first overwritten by a .rhost file of John Does choosing
(namely the .rhost file on his own machine) by exploiting a known vulnerability. At
this stage the Web server will begin to trust John Does machine. This allows John Doe
to remotely login on the Web server from his machine without providing a password.
Once John Doe is a user on the Web server he will conduct the well known setuid buffer
overflow attack and gain root privilege.
A second way of attacking the Web server is via buffer overflow attack on the local
DNS server. John Doe knows that the system administrator uses an old unpatched ver-
sion of the BIND DNS application program. John can perform the BIND buffer overflow
attack on the local DNS server and takes control of this machine. He can then install a
network sniffer on this DNS server to observe sessions across the entire network. Even-
tually he can hijack the system administrators telnet session to the Web server and gain
root privilege there. The above attacks can be concisely represented in the form of the
simple attack tree shown in Figure 10.3. The interesting feature of the simple attack tree
is that it captures in a precise manner all the possible known ways in which a system can
be breached. While it does not capture unknown or zero day attacks, we believe that the
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Figure 10.2: Small Company Network Being Analyzed
attack tree model can be effectively used for helping log file analysis in a vast majority
of the cases. Following an attack, we just need to look out only for those operations that
lie in sequence along the paths leading to the attack. With the attack tree of Figure 10.3,
for example, if we determine that root privilege at the web server has been compromised
we need to look for just the sequence of operations given by the left branch or the right
branch. Moreover, these operations need to be in the exact temporal order as given by the
nodes going down in the tree. Any other order is not relevant for this particular incident.
In fact, if the log file filtering and analysis approach discussed next, does not show up a
sequence of events leading to a specific attack, we know that the attack in question is a
zero day attack.
10.3 Signature Embedded Attack Tree
To use an attack tree in forensic investigation, we extend the notion of the attack
tree (Def. 4) discussed in the chapter 5 by associating each branch with a sequence of
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malicious operations that could have been used in the attack. We call such a tree an
signature embedded attack tree. We also formalize additional notions as the following.
Definition 37 An atomic event is an ordered pair 〈operation, target〉.
Definition 38 An atomic event is an incident if it’s execution contributes towards a system
compromise.
Definition 39 An incident-choice is a group of related incidents, the occurrence of any
one of which can contribute towards the state transition in the attack tree.
Definition 40 An attack Signature SIGpre,post is a sequence of incident-choices
(IC) 〈IC1, IC2, . . . , ICn〉 such that the sequence (incidenti ∈ IC1, incident j ∈
IC2, . . . , incidentm ∈ ICn) constitute an attack.
The attack signature corresponding to the attack discussed in CVE-1999-1562 involving
an execution of wuftp in a target machine (let’s call machine A) and resulting in clear
text password disclosure will be represented by: ((ftp, A),(debug, A),(open localhost, A),
(‘’user name root”, A), (‘’password xxx”, A), (quote user root, A),(quote pass root, A)).
Definition 41 SIGNATURE EMBEDDED ATTACK TREE
Let A be a set of attacks (see Definition 3). An Signature Embedded Attack Tree is a
tuple AAT = (sroot ,S,τ,ε,SIG), where
1. sroot is an attribute which the attacker want to become true. sroot denotes an at-
tribute sk such that for which @ a ∈ A| sk ∈ pre(a).
2. S = Ninternal ∪Nexternal ∪ {sroot} is a multi-set of attributes. Nexternal denotes the
multi-set of attributes si for which @ a ∈ A| si ∈ post(a). Ninternal denotes the multi-
set of attributes s j for which ∃ a1,a2 ∈ A| [s j ∈ pre(a1) ∧ s j ∈ post(a2)].
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3. τ ⊆ S× S. An ordered pair (spre,Spost) ∈ τ if ∃ a ∈ A| [spre ∈ pre(a) ∧ spost ∈
post(a)]. Further, if si ∈ S has multiplicity n, then ∃ s1,s2, . . . ,sn ∈ S| (s1,si)
,(s2,si), . . . ,(sn,si) ∈ τ. A set {s1,s2, . . . ,sn} becomes a parent set of si, denoted by
Pa(si).
4. ε is a set of decomposition tuples of the form 〈s j,d j〉 defined for all s j ∈ Ninternal ∪
{sroot} and d j ∈ {AND,OR}. d j is AND when
∧
i




[si∧ (si,s j) ∈ τ]↔ s j is true.
5. SIGpre,post ∈ SIG is an attack signature associates to the edge (spre,Spost) ∈ τ.
An AND-decomposition node sv, means that each subgoal of sv represented by a child of
sv needs to be reached in order to reach sv. An OR-decomposition means that the goal sv
can be reach only if any one of the subgoals is reached. Note that reaching a child goal is
only a necessary condition for reaching the parent goal and not a sufficient condition.
10.4 Forensic Investigation with a Signature Embedded Attack Tree
We now show how to use an augmented attack tree to support forensic investigation.
The attack tree will be used to simplify the process of looking for activities that could have
potentially caused the attack. The process works briefly as follows. First the augmented
attack tree is used to prepare the set of incidents for all attack signatures. It is then used
to filter out suspicious activities from non-suspicious ones. All suspicious activities from
this stage is next written to a relational database for further investigation. We propose the
following database structure to store the filtered log file. The log file table includes five
fields id, timestamp,source,source−group,operation, target, and duration. The source
field stores the IP address of the connection originator and source-group field contains the
network address of the originator, if available. The target field similarly stores the desti-
nation address of the network connection. (Note that if the investigation policy dictates
using other information from a log file then those can also be included in the table.)
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Figure 10.3: Attack Tree for Network of Figure
Figure 10.4: Log File Investigation Process
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10.4.1 Use of Signature Embedded Attack Tree in Log File Filtering
Algorithm 5 Investigate(Node su, Table systemlog)
{Description:This algorithm begins at the root of an augmented attack tree. It recursively
calls itself during the subtree traversal under a node su in depth-first manner to visit all edges
(exploits). For each edge, the algorithm extract the suspicious incidents from edge visits.
Finally, the algorithm returns a set of evidence from the log file as appearing in an attack
tree.}
{Input: Node su (initial from root), Table Suspected Activities}
{Output: The list of all suspicious activities.}
BEGIN
5: if su is a leaf node then
return φ
else
for all sv ∈ Adj[su] do
SIGsu,sv ← getSignature((su,sv))
10: for all incidenti ∈ SIGsu,sv do
RESULT ← SELECT logRecord
FROM System Log
WHERE (operation,target) = incidenti AND timestamp < u.timestamp
if RESULT 6= φ then
15: INSERT RESULT INTO TABLE Suspected Activities
end if
end for
v.timestamp← the earliest timestamp of all RESULT in the previous loop
Suspected Activities← Investigate(sv,systemlog)
20: Mark (su,sv) if sv is compromised
end for
if su.ε = “AND” && ∀sv ∈ Ad j[su] | (su,sv) is marked then
Mark su.compromised = true
end if
25: if su.ε = “OR” && ∃sv ∈ Ad j[su] | (su,sv) is marked then





The signature embedded attack tree is used to prepare the set of incidents for all
attack signatures. The set of incidents is then used to filter out suspicious activities from
clean activities. The log file filtering algorithm sequentially executes SQL queries to
extract suspicious activities from the original log file database. The results from this
algorithm is written to a separate table called the suspicious activities table for further
147
investigation. This table has the same schema as the log file table but the size of these
table is much smaller than the size of whole log file. Algorithm 5 to filter the log file
based on the augmented attack tree.
The algorithm works as follows. It commences the investigation at the root node
of the attack tree. It traverses every edge incident to the root node. For each edge, the
algorithm extracts the attack signature SIGsu,sv given by the label of the edge. As men-
tioned earlier, the attack signature is the sequence of steps where an attacker may, or may
not, have a choice of incidents (operation on a particular machine/target) to execute. For
each step in the attack signature, the algorithm searches the log file for matching opera-
tions. An incident in the table is said to match the signature if the operation is executed
on the particular machine or against the particular target as indicated in the attack signa-
ture. Moreover, only matched incidents that were executed prior to the time that the root
node was compromised are suspected. Next, the suspected incidents are recorded into the
suspicious activities table by the selection procedure. Once the algorithm finishes the ex-
ploration on a particular edge (su,sv), it sets a time threshold for node sv by selecting from
the earliest incidents in (su,sv). This threshold is assumed to be the time instance at which
node sv has been compromised. Thus there is no need to suspect any incidents in the sub-
tree(s) under sv that executed after this time. The next step in the algorithm recursively
calls itself to investigate the subtree under sv from which the edge (su,sv) emerged. All
subtrees under the node are explored in this recursive manner. The recursive calls ensure
that the algorithm has thoroughly explored all subtrees. Once all subtrees under the root
node or any intermediate node su have been explored, the algorithm marks an edge (su,sv)
if it finds evidence that shows that all steps in the attack signature SIGsu,sv have been ex-
ecuted. If node su has an AND-decomposition, node su is considered compromised when
all exploits (represented by edge (su,sv) ) that are incident to su together with the state sv
that the exploit has emerged from, are marked. If node su has OR-decomposition, node
su is compromised when any one of its branch together with the state sv is marked by the
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recursive call. Finally, the algorithm returns the augmented attack tree where nodes have
been marked compromised together with the suspicious activities table. The latter stores
the evidence of attack for the further analysis.
10.4.2 Use of Augmented Attack Tree in Identifying Possible Suspect
Algorithm 6 Investigate(Node su, specific-source, Table suspicious activities)
{Description:This algorithm takes the root of an attack tree as an initial input. It recursively
calls itself during the subtree traversal under su in depth-first manner to visit all edges (ex-
ploits). For each exploit, the algorithm extracts the suspicious incidents from edge visits.
Finally, the algorithm returns the set of evidence as appearing in an attack tree.}
{Input: node su (initial from root), specific-source, suspicious activities table}
{Output: evidence-log-for(specific-source)}
BEGIN
5: if su is a leaf node then
return φ
else
for all sv ∈ Adj[su] do
SIGsu,sv ← getSignature((su,sv))
10: for all incidenti ∈ SIGsu,sv do
RESULT ← SELECT logRecord
FROM specific-source
WHERE (operation,target) = incidenti AND timestamp < su.timestamp
if RESULT 6= φ then
15: INSERT RESULT INTO TABLE evidence-log-for(specific-source)
Mark RESULT with the exploit from edge (su,sv)
end if
end for
sv.timestamp← the earliest timestamp of all RESULT in the previous loop
20: evidence-log-for(specific-source)← Investigate(sv,specific-source,suspicious activities)
Mark (su,sv) if sv is compromised
end for
if su.ε = “AND” && ∀sv ∈ Ad j[su] | (su,sv) is marked then
Mark su.compromised = true
25: end if
if su.ε = “OR” && ∃sv ∈ Ad j[su] | (su,sv) is marked then






The input to this stage is the suspicious activities table resulting from the log-file
filtering process. Hopefully, this table is more manageable than the original log file. At
this point, if the investigator sorts the suspicious activities table by source aggregated by
source-group, she will have a list of candidate sources for the attack. From this list, we can
conduct further investigation on a per source basis either to reinforce or discard our belief
about the specific source. Algorithm 6 is intended for this purpose. The output of this
algorithm will be a table named evidence-log-for(source) where “source” is the identity
of the source being investigated. This table has almost the same schema as the suspicious
activities table. The only difference is that this table has an extra column called exploit.
This field holds the exploit label corresponding to a relevant edge of the attack tree. If
the algorithm returns a non-empty table it indicates that the source is guilty. On the other
hand, if the algorithm returns an empty table no conclusion can be reached regarding the
guilty verdict of the source. This is because of the possibility of zero-day attacks. Thus,
we would like to emphasize that Algorithm 6 should not influence the decision as it only
marks evidence of activities that were possibly involved in an attack.
This algorithm is similar to the log-file filtering algorithm. The difference is the SQL
queries that are executed on a per source basis for sources in the suspicious activities table.
The algorithm marks the suspected record with the exploit label to accommodate the final
decision. The investigator may use these labels to map the evidences back to an exploit
in attack tree.
The table evidence-log-for(source) holds the activities that are believed to be respon-
sible for an attack against the system. The records are ordered chronologically. Typically
if there exist an internal node that is marked by Algorithm 6, then the suspect is almost
certainly responsible for the attack.
10.5 Chapter Summary
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System log files play a major role in the investigation of computer attacks. If properly
maintained a system log contains complete information about all pertinent events culmi-
nating in an attack. However, these files are difficult and time consuming to process. This
is partly because the files are almost always flat structured; this requires a sequential scan
for extracting information. They grow very large in size thus becoming unmanageable.
Last but not the least they contain an enormous amount of information a major portion of
which is not related to the attack being investigated. For facilitating investigation, an au-
tomated approach to log file filtering is needed. In this paper, we propose such a filtering
approach. Our approach is capable of eliminating irrelevant information from a log file
and creating a shorter file that contains most of the times, sufficient information about a
computer attack.
Our approach is based on the observation that in order to attack a system an attacker
must exploit certain vulnerabilities that exist in the system in a particular sequence. We
can represent these exploits in the form of an attack tree, the root of which gives the final
attacked state of the system. While unknown or zero day attacks cannot be captured in this
manner, a vast majority of attacks are not zero days. Thus this representation of attacks
against a particular system is useful. We propose an algorithm that filters a log file by
correlating it with the attack tree that is relevant for the particular attack in question. The
filtered log is much smaller than the original file as it contains only relevant information.
This filtered log file can form the basis of further investigation. A lot of work remains
to be done. Apart from not being able to capture information about zero day attacks,
our protocol assumes that the log file available is trusted. That is, the attacker has not
tampered with the log file to remove evidence of attack. How to ensure this in real life
is an open challenge. We are currently investigating this problem. We also assume that
a central log file is available that records all events occurring on the network. In reality,
each machine on a network maintains its own log. Thus, there needs to be a protocol
to merge these log files into one comprehensive whole. This remains part of our future
work.
Chapter 11
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
The enterprise attack model serves as a basis building block in the risk management,
intrusion detection, and forensic investigation. In conclusion, we pioneer three area of
contributions in the problem domain of information security.
11.1 Contributions to Risk Analysis and Risk Mitigation Analysis
An attack tree can help the security manager analyze the effectiveness of security
controls and prioritize risk. What’s always facing the security risk management is the
difficulty in assessing the risk and selecting security controls to mitigate the risk.
In the first challenge, although there are available methodologies to compute the risk,
but the actual risk is also tied to the factors out of reach by the current assessment meth-
ods. We have not seen an assessment model that takes into account the propagated effect.
That is even a low risk vulnerability can lead to the catastrophic damage to the system
if an attacker can use that risk as an entry point to attack. Beside, the risk is also tied to
its locations and how much it can propagate to make other undesirable events. Without
the knowledge about cause and effect of the possible attacks, the security administrator
cannot truly assess the damage from a given list of vulnerabilities alone. An attack tree
/ attack graph assesses the risk in terms of dependencies between preconditions, attacks,
and outcomes which, in turns, become the part of preconditions of other attacks. As-
sessing the damage on each outcome individually, the security analysts can simulate the
possible outcomes that capture all propagated effects if a given attack is executed. As-
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sessing the risk with an attack tree or attack graph is a systematic method. It provides
more accurate and reasonable results.
The second challenge is even harder, assuming that the risk assessment can be eval-
uated by other means; it is still difficult to assess the security controls the system should
employ given a number of countermeasures currently available. It is a difficult task be-
cause there is no known security control that can address all vulnerabilities. Even worse,
some countermeasures address one problem but worsen or open other vulnerabilities (e.g.
cryptography allows secure communication but weaken the system against the denial-of-
service attack). System administrators have to deal with the trade-off between costs and
benefits of deploying the security controls. An attack model also allows security analysts
to consider many what-if scenarios during the risk mitigation analysis. For example, the
analyst can easily simulate the effects of adding a new Firewall in a certain location in
the network. Similarly, a security administrator can identify potential damage if a cer-
tain control (or even a certain set of controls) is removed. Therefore, evaluating security
controls can be easily made.
11.2 Contributions to Intrusion Detection and Incident Response
In the area of Intrusion Detection System (IDS), we realize that such systems rely
heavily on configuring the sensors sensitivity to detect certain symptoms. Setting up
these sensors usually involves the trade-off between sensitivity and false alarms. When
the sensors are set to report all suspicious events, the sensors frequently issue alerts on
benign events. This often results in annoying and functionality drawbacks. On the other
hand, decreasing the sensitivity reduces the ability to detect malicious events.
System administrators can use attack tree to deal with this problem by having an
attack tree correlates alerts and by applying probabilistic risk analysis on correlated alerts.
Evidencing alerts with an attack tree will also give an ability to predict future attacks,
reduce volume of information to be analyzed, and increase an accuracy of IDS.
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Moreover, an attack tree can help administrating other kinds of analysis in the area of
intrusion detection. For example, marking the paths in the attack tree when an IDS detects
an attack incident allows systematic and real-time intrusion alert, determining where the
new IDS components should be deployed for the best coverage, exploring trade-offs be-
tween different security policies and between different software/hardware configurations,
and identifying the worst-case scenarios and prioritizing the defense accordingly.
11.3 Contributions to Forensic Investigation
After a break-in, forensic analysis is used to find a trace of attackers actions to assess
the actual damage and identify how to reinstate back to the last normal state. In addition,
if a legal action is required, analysts seek evidences to prove that a sequence of certain
activities is, indeed, a comprising of the coherent attacks and not just a series of benign
events. Typical forensic processes involve investigating the system log for the known trace
of attack patterns. This task relies heavily on the analyst’s experience and thoroughness.
The task becomes even harder when intruders obfuscate attack steps by slowing down the
pace of the attack or varying specific steps. An attack tree is proposed to help improving
the accuracy and speed of the forensic process by submitting the data extracted from IDS
logs to a formal reference model based attack tree.
11.4 Future Works
This dissertation innovates an enterprise risk management analysis. In this disser-
tation, we propose a formalism of enterprise risk model to help analyst understand the
enterprise risk model so as to be able to apply the model on different risk analysis meth-
ods. We demonstrate the feasibility by implementing the comprehensive attack tree anal-
ysis tool that discovers all possible paths in which the system can be compromised given
vulnerability and network topology. We also pioneer the works toward risk mitigation
analysis. In particular, the Multi-Objective analysis extends the problem domain so as
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to cover the use of external security controls and discover the optimal security hardening
plan. Thus, it gives a more comprehensive solution than the traditional risk mitigation
analysis.
Our work, however, is still in its early state. There are many works that need to be
done. In the virtue of formalism, more practical studies of attack analysis are needed.
In particular, the attack generation tool needs to have more rigorous tests. The challenge
here is to study the use of the model analysis on different network environments such
as mid-size network, large scale network, virtual network, and network on cloud. The
results from these studies will be used to improve the model formalism, model generation
algorithm, node insertion/deletion, and other maintenance issues.
In the virtue of tool automation, we need to integrate the tool with the vulnerability
parser and topology parser. In the current implementation, we rely on the information
about attack templates, network topology, and vulnerabilities presented in the network
system from external data sources. This information is written in a formatted language
such as Html or XML. Hence, the tool can be significantly improved in terms of perfor-
mance and error reduction by the automatic program that extracts this information and fill
the database for reference.
In terms of the risk management analysis, we have conducted several experiments
on risk mitigation analysis. These experiments cover both the static and dynamic aspects
of the risk mitigation analysis. It is worth mentioning that some security controls have
been found to be commonly included in the optimal solutions. Hence, it is possible that
security hardening is more critical in certain areas of the attack graph. Such areas could be
nodes that have multiple fan outs. In other words, these critical areas are at-risk junctions
that can be used by an attacker to cause multiple outcomes. Security controls that can
reduce risk in such areas are likely to be parts of the optimal solutions. Therefore, it is
worth investigating the “critical path analysis” to understand how such controls can be
identified efficiently so as to reduce the search space for the optimization algorithm.
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Last but not least, risk assessment and risk mitigation analysis are the two instances
of problems where we can use causal dependency model to solve the problem. There
are other instances of problems where the causal dependency model can be used as well.
Chapters 9 and 10 are two small examples of applying an attack tree to solve problems in
intrusion detection and forensic investigation domains.
It is worth to note that there is a key information to determine if a graph-base model
is applicable on the specific problem. That is the analyzer must be able to model the
problem as an acyclic dependency graph. In our case, we successfully apply Monotonic-
ity constraint to prevent a graph cycle. Monotonicity implies that attack progress never
backtracks. This constraint is valid when we view causal dependency as “Why a given
node can be compromised” since backtracking path will become trivial. However, this
constraint may not be applicable to other problem domains.
Chapter 12
GLOSSARY
1. Vulnerability – Vulnerability is a weakness in the system allowing an attacker
to violate the integrity, confidentiality, access control, availability, consistency or
audit mechanism of the system or the data and applications it hosts. Typically,
vulnerabilities often result from the carelessness of a programmer, though they may
have other causes. Vulnerability allows an attacker to misuse an application to cause
it in (for example) bypassing access control checks or executing commands on the
system hosting the application. Some vulnerabilities arise from un-sanitized user
input, often allowing the direct execution of commands or SQL statements (known
as code injection and SQL injection). Others arise from the programmer’s failure
to check the size of data buffers, which can then be overflowed, causing corruption
of the stack or heap areas of memory. The method of disclosing vulnerabilities is a
topic for debate in the computer security community. Some advocate the complete
disclosure of information about vulnerabilities once they are discovered. Others
argue for limiting disclosure to the users placed at greatest risk, and only releasing
full details after those notified have fixed the problem by developing and applying
patches, but may also increase the risk to those not privy to full details. This type
of vulnerability is often called zero day attack [58].
2. Vulnerability Exploitation – Vulnerability exploitation (or simply ’exploit’) is an
execution that takes advantage of a bug, glitch or vulnerability in order to:
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(a) Gain control of a computer system, or
(b) Allow privilege escalation, or
(c) Bypassing the security validation, or
(d) Perform a denial of service attack, or
(e) Reconnoiter for the credential information, or
(f) Change the system configuration in such a way that it prepares for the execu-
tion of future exploit.
As an example, the Buffer overflow in Collaboration Data Objects (CDO) used in
Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2005-1987) allows re-
mote attackers execute arbitrary codes when CDOSYS or CDOEX processes an e-
mail message with a large header name. Another example of an exploit that prepare
for another attack is the Denial of Service in MyDNS Server (CVE-2006-0351).
An attacker might executes this exploit to temporary disable the local DNS Server,
redirects DNS requests to an attacker provided address and then fools the user to
get sensitive information such as the login name or password.
3. Attack Pattern – Exploits can also be classified by the characteristic of vulnerabil-
ity they attack. The buffer overflow, heap overflow, integer overflow are attacks that
exploit the vulnerability of the victim program and cause the corruption of the stack
or heap areas of the memory allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on
the behalf of the application’s privilege. The code injection is a technique to intro-
duce (or “inject”) code into a computer program or system by taking advantage of
the unenforced and unchecked assumptions the system makes about its inputs. The
consequence of this type of attack can allow an attacker to compromise the victim
machine. An SQL injection is another code injection type of an attack that occurs
in the database layer of an application. The vulnerability is presented when the user
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input is either incorrectly filtered for string literal escape characters embedded in
SQL statements or the user input is not strongly typed. A cross-site scripting attack
(XSS) is an attack allowing malicious Web server send executable code to a client-
browser. If the client site has an improper input validation, a script from one page
could be allowed to access data from another page or object. As a result, malicious
Web site could steal sensitive information or even bypass the access control.
We employ classification taxonomy and schema to classify attack patterns from the
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [2]. CAPEC is
sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security as part of the Software Assur-
ance strategic initiative of the National Cyber Security Division. The objective of
this effort is to provide a publicly available catalog of attack patterns along with
a comprehensive schema and classification taxonomy. CAPEC defines a standard
schema for representing attack patterns and to describe in adequate detail the mean-
ing and intent of each constituent schema element. An attack pattern is the mech-
anism to capture and communicate the attacker’s perspective. It is a description of
common methods for exploiting software. The CAPEC web site is hosted by the
MITRE Corporation and can be assessed at url:http://capec.mitre.org/.
Based on these available information we can form the inter connection between a
precondition, vulnerability exploitation, and consequence that uniquely identify an
attack. We define an attack template in the following section.
4. Attack Template – An attack template is an atomic transformation between pre-
conditions, exploitation, and post conditions. Both precondition and post conditions
are represented by attributes. Note that an information necessary for establishing
an attack-template model can be obtained from the Vulnerability Bulletin. To il-
lustrate one of these attack-templates, let consider the Microsoft RPC vulnerability
as reported in the Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS03-026). MS03-026 is a buffer
159
Figure 12.1: An Attack Template for Microsoft’s RPC Vulnerability
Overflow attack discovered in the Microsoft’s RPC service. The vulnerability exists
in the part of the RPC that deals with message exchange over the TCP/IP. This vul-
nerability affects a Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) interface with
RPC, which listens on the TCP/IP port 135. The vulnerability allows an attacker
to execute arbitrary code with the system privileges or cause a denial of service.
Judging from this information, we can construct an attack-template model for the
RPC buffer Overflow attack (MS03-026) as shown in Figure 12.1.
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